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THE RACE TO TRANSFORM

SPORT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AGM – Annual General Meeting
ANC – African National Congress
ASA – Athletics South Africa
ASASA – Amateur Swimming Association of South Africa
BCCI – Board of Control for Cricket in India
BEE – Black Economic Empowerment
CAF – Confederation of African Football
CEO – Chief Executive Officer
COGOC – Concerned Group of Cricketers
COSAFA – Council of Southern Africa Football Associations
COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSA – Cricket South Africa
DDCU – Durban and District Cricket Union
DOE – Department of Education
DSR – Department of Sport and Recreation
DWAF – Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
EU – European Union
FASA – Football Association of South Africa
FEW – Forum for the Empowerment of Women
FIFA – Federation of International Football Associations
FINA – Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur
GCB – Gauteng Cricket Board
GEAR – Growth, Employment and Redistribution
IAAF – International Association of Athletics Federations
ICC – International Cricket Council
ICL – Indian Cricket League
IOC – International Olympic Council
IPL – Indian Premier League

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IRB – International Rugby Board
KZN – KwaZulu-Natal
KZNCU – KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union
KZNRU – KwaZulu-Natal Rugby Union
MDM – Mass Democratic Movement
NAMIC – Non-Aligned Movement in Cricket
NCA – Natal Cricket Association
NCB – Natal Cricket Board
NEC – National Executive Committee
NOCSA – National Olympic Council of South Africa
NRB – Natal Rugby Board
NSC – National Sports Congress (late 1980s and early 1990s)
NSC – National Sports Council (from the late 1990s)
PMC – Provincial Monitoring Committee
PSL – Premier Soccer League
RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme
SAAAB – South African Amateur Athletics Board
SAAAC – South African Amateur Athletics Congress
SAAAU – South African Amateur Athletics Union
SAASA – South Africa Amateur Swimming Association
SAASCO – South African Amateur Swimming Congress
SAASU – South African Amateur Swimming Union
SAASWIF – South African Amateur Swimming Federation
SACB – South African Cricket Board
SACBOC – South African Cricket Board of Control
SACOS – South African Council on Sport
SACP – South African Communist Party
SACU – South African Cricket Union

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SAFA – South African Football Association
SANASA – South African National Amateur Swimming Association
SANROC – South African Non-racial Olympic Committee
SARB – South African Rugby Board
SARFU – South African Rugby Football Union
SARRA – South African Road Running Association
SARU – South African Rugby Union
SASC – South African Sports Commission
SASF – South African Soccer Federation
SASL – South African Soccer League
SAWFA – South African Women's Football Association
SAWSA – South African Women's Soccer Association
SWIMSA – Swimming South Africa
TARC – Transformation and Anti-racism Committee
TMC – Transformation Monitoring Committee
UCBSA – United Cricket Board of South Africa
UCT – University of Cape Town
UK – United Kingdom
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
US – United States
USSASA – United Schools Sports Association of South Africa

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1

Introduction: Long run to freedom?

Ashwin Desai

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> ...the level playing field is enclosed within a society which is anything but level. Access to the level playing field has always been unequal... But there is a sting in the tail. On sport's level playing field, it is possible to challenge and overturn the dominant hierarchies of nation, race and class...The level playing field can be either a prison or a platform for liberation. (Marqusee 1995: 5)

THE DAWN OF POST-APARTHEID South Africa witnessed a proliferation of writing on the value of sport in breaking down racial barriers and building a united nation. This was given incredible impetus in the immediate aftermath of the 1995 Rugby World Cup victory. Most dramatically, Nelson Mandela appeared at Ellis Park in a Springbok jersey, signalling the acceptance of this decades-long symbol of oppression as a national emblem for the rugby team. At the same time, this gesture was about more than the acceptance of a national emblem. Rugby, the symbol of Afrikaner nationalism, at once became the sport that would help to catalyse the building of a 'rainbow nation' predicated on a common identity, a common sense of 'South Africanness'. This project can be best summed up in a

comment originally made by Massimo d'Azeglio in 1870 in the context of the political unification of Italy: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (D'Azeglio, cited in Hobsbawm 1996: 257). Inscribed in this nation-building project was also a commitment from the African National Congress (ANC)-led government to address the brutal legacy of apartheid.

This promise to redress the conditions of existence of those who had been oppressed under apartheid came to be captured in a simple but evocative ANC slogan: 'A Better Life For All'. The party's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of 1994 promised a heady mix of measures to address the expectations of the majority of South Africans, for whom poverty and minimal life chances were still a daily reality (ANC 1994). The RDP specifically addressed sport and recreation, referring to it as '[o]ne of the cruellest legacies of apartheid' and signalling an emphasis on 'the provision of facilities at schools and in communities where there are large concentrations of unemployed youth'. As was the way with the RDP, the document tempered this commitment with the recognition that 'sport is played at different levels of competence and...there are different specific needs at different levels' (ANC 1994: 72–73).

While in the aftermath of the 1995 World Cup it appeared that everyone could be part of 'a talismanic club of equality' (*Cape Times* 26 June 1995), the challenge of redress and change would see sport become, over the next decade and a half, an arena of intense engagement and contestation.

In discussions and debates around policy formulation for a 'new' South Africa, two approaches that could broadly be labelled 'reformative' and 'transformative' emerged. The transformative project sought to fundamentally transform the way society was structured; its economic emphasis was best captured in the popular slogan 'growth through redistribution'. In sport, this emphasis would mean a bottom-up, mass-based approach, a position exemplified by Minister of Sport and Recreation Makhenkesi Stofile in 2004:

> Our focus will be to build the right attitude and skills from below. In our view the starting place to achieve this is to get the basics

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> right. Community clubs must be revived and our children in township and village schools must be assisted to do sport. There is no short cut to this…Schools sport is the nursery for participants in senior competitions…We are strongly arguing here for a focussed attention on the schools and community clubs in building a broad base for talent scouting, developing and nurturing. This is the mass that will transform society and de-racialise it. We must go back to Wednesday afternoons as school sports days. But this cannot happen by chance.[1]

The reformative approach, on the other hand, prioritised reconciliation and cooperative governance, in the interests of economic growth and acceptance into a neoliberal world order. In this scenario, the conditions best suited to facilitate an environment for doing business in South Africa would be created, and the logic underlying this paradigm was that the benefits of economic growth would 'naturally' trickle down to the poorest members of society; this argument was encapsulated in the adage 'redistribution through growth'. In terms of this model there would be state intervention to de-racialise the uppermost reaches of the class hierarchy through pursuit of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). In sport, this would be seen in the emphasis on high-performance centres and on the racial composition of national teams. Billions of rands would also be pumped into mega sports events such as the Football World Cup 2010.

It was the reformative project that won hegemony as the transition to democracy unfolded; it was encapsulated in economic policies in which the 'twin objectives of restoring business confidence and attracting foreign investment seemed to swamp all other considerations' (Murray 1994: 24).

The macroeconomic project had an impact on the configuration of classes in the country. Between 1994 and 2004 the number of South Africans who would be classified as 'super rich', in other words having assets in excess of US$30 million (approximately R300 million), increased from 150 to 600 (*Sunday Times* 9 May 2004). Included in this list were some well-

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known figures from the former liberation movement. The black elite had arrived, and its speed of wealth accumulation was astounding.

Alongside this there was an immediate post-apartheid rise in income inequality, which was slightly mitigated after 2001 by increased welfare payments, but which still meant that the GINI coefficient, a measure of a country's inequality, soared from below 0.6 in 1994 to 0.72 by 2006 (*Business Day* 5 March 2008).[2] According to Charles Meth, 'although the social wage may have improved conditions for some of the poor, the number of those in poverty increased by between one and two million between 1997 and 2002' (Meth 2004: 7). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report for 2003 outlined the state of South Africa's economy in unusually blunt language:

> ...highly skewed distribution of wealth; an extremely large earnings inequality; weak access to basic services by the poor, unemployed and underemployed; a declining employment outcome of economic growth; environmental degradation; HIV/AIDS, and an inadequate social security system. (UNDP 2003: 90)

The government's 'growth' model came in for persistent criticism from both inside and outside the Congress Alliance (consisting of the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP)) as an elite model that benefited only the few. Blade Nzimande, the SACP general secretary and currently the Minister of Higher Education, for example, railed against 'filthy-rich millionaires' and argued that BEE favoured a select few at the expense of the working class (*Business Day* 25 May 2000). Service delivery protests that flouted the disciplinary wishes of the Alliance were breaking out across the country. The language of 'trickle down' redress was becoming difficult to sustain, given the everyday experiences of the poor.

Attempts at implementing improvements in sport, for example, ran up against 'budget constraints', a point made with rare honesty by Deputy Minister of Sport and Recreation Gert Oosthuizen in 2006:

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> To realise the benefits that can possibly accrue from our sector, we need three things; resources, resources and more resources. What we need is: infrastructure organisation, programmes, facilities, equipment and kit; human resources sufficient thereof, of good quality and with an appropriate disposition; and, finance that underpins both infrastructure and human resources...As a Department we have the smallest budget of all national government departments. We are committing some R10 per person per year to the participation of our people in sport and recreation activities presently. R10 can never make a substantial contribution to participation rates in sport and recreation... (Oosthuizen, cited in Mbeki 2006)

The Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile, in further breaking down the figures, estimated that the government was budgeting 40 cents per child per year.[3] Neville Alexander wrote in 2002:

> The stark reality is that the political settlement of 1993–94 was based...on the assumption of a more or less rapid trickle-down effect deriving from the 'miraculous' increase in the rate of growth of the GDP...The real situation is that hardly any change has taken place in the relations of economic power and control. Moreover, in the foreseeable future and in terms of the prevailing system, no such fundamental change is to be expected. With hardly any exceptions, the sources of economic power remain in the hands that controlled them under apartheid. (Alexander 2002: 144–146)

In sport, the market was fingered for failing to redress the apartheid legacy. Butana Khompela, an ANC MP and head of the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation, fumed:

> [B]ig businesses in the townships do not help black schools. You never get big bursaries for those children. Things will remain that way until business creates a kitty for black schools. Business is biased against black schools because the thinking seems to be that they get better returns when they invest in white schools. (*Sunday Times* 15 July 2007)

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As opposition mounted, the ANC government spoke increasingly about ways of integrating the reformative and transformative approaches. Most famously, President Thabo Mbeki spoke of the need for both these approaches, in what has come to be known as the 'two economies' thesis. In 2003 he characterised South African society as divided between first and third world components, with the former defined as:

> ...the modern industrial, mining, agricultural, financial, and services sector of our economy that, everyday, becomes ever more integrated in the global economy. Many of the major interventions made by our government over the years have sought to address this 'first world economy', to ensure that it develops in the right direction, at the right pace...the successes we have scored with regard to the 'first world economy' also give us the possibility to attend to the problems posed by the 'third world economy', which exists side by side with the modern 'first world economy'...Of central and strategic importance is the fact that they are structurally disconnected from our country's 'first world economy'. Accordingly, the interventions we make with regard to this latter economy do not necessarily impact on these areas, the 'third world economy', in a beneficial manner. (Mbeki 2003)

Mbeki argued that the solution lay in a tweaking of the neoliberal approach so that government intervention could support 'the development of the "third world economy" to the point that it loses its "third world" character and becomes part of the "first world economy"' (Mbeki 2003).

However, despite the ubiquitous use of the term 'second economy', there was little clarity about exactly what comprised this second economy, and the particular interventions that were to be made in the second economy were just as hazy. Adam Habib makes the point that:

> ...the entire analogy of two economies is itself misleading for it assumes the existence of a Chinese wall between the two; the one having nothing to do with the other...But what if, to stick with the

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> analogy, the policy reforms and interventions of the first economy is [sic] what creates the poverty and immiseration of the second?... The ANC had as its explicit mandate the [transcending] of the racial economic divide. Instead, however, the economic and social policies it pursued in the first decade of its rule began the process of deracialising the first economy, while simultaneously increasing the size and aggravating the problems of the second economy. (Habib 2005: 46)

Similarly, in sport the question could be posed: while a tremendous amount of resources has been thrown into mega stadiums, and the professionalisation of sport has created a stratum of highly paid players of all colours, what kind of development has trickled down to sport in Mbeki's 'second economy'?

How have the state and sporting organisations sought to redress the damage caused by 'one of the cruellest legacies of apartheid'? It is not difficult to discern that there are two sporting fields in South Africa, one of which is represented in the state-of-the-art high-performance centres and the incredible stadiums built in preparation for the 2010 World Cup. It is also to be seen in the old white schools, with their four or five rugby fields, floodlights, Olympic-size swimming pools and highly qualified coaches. The other sporting field consists of the sandpits that pass for football pitches, the lack of even rudimentary equipment, and the erosion of organised school sport. In shack-lands across the country footballers barely carve out a tiny piece of land that becomes 'home ground' for five to ten teams, before it is gobbled up by more shacks.

It must immediately be said that the chapters in this book reflect the fact that there are many sports facilities that lie 'in-between' these extremes. Rather than rely on a simplified dualism of 'two sports', many of the chapters illustrate the complexity, variation and interconnections in the reformative/transformative approaches in the context of changing class, race and gender configurations. One of the central questions that this volume asks is whether

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the changes in South African sport are reinforcing a form of class apartheid in sports, and whether the present trajectory will deepen inequalities rather than progressively mitigate them.

Chapter Two, on swimming, by Ashwin Desai and Ahmed Veriava, begins by focusing on the neglect of black swimming during the apartheid era, and the struggle by black sportspeople to develop a culture of competitive swimming, given that by 1977 there was not a single Olympic-size swimming pool available to African swimmers. The chapter then sets out in fascinating detail the story of 'the fractious process that led to the establishment of a single controlling body for the sport'. The focus then shifts to examine actual 'performance' in the pool. Post-apartheid South Africa has witnessed the winning of a number of swimming gold medals at the Olympics, but all have been awarded to white swimmers. While SWIMSA has rolled out a comprehensive programme to enhance a 'culture of swimming', there has been considerable pressure from the ANC and government to produce Olympic-standard black swimmers. The chapter explores the growing tension between the drive to create a grassroots culture of swimming and pressure to produce black Olympic qualifiers and medallists.

Chapter Three, by Ashwin Desai and Zayn Nabbi, focuses on the Jaguars, the only black rugby club in the premier division in KwaZulu-Natal. The chapter traces the history of the club, its courageous attempts to 'keep going' during apartheid and its experiences after the unification of the national rugby boards. The story of Jaguars provides important insights into the continuing salience of race and class, the legacy of apartheid geography and the 'unintended' consequences of transformation, which can rebound on the very constituency that policies are designed to benefit. Important in the story of Jaguars is the erosion of school rugby in the areas closest to the club's headquarters. The chapter describes how Jaguars has tried to overcome this by drawing in younger and younger players into youth teams, with varying degrees of success.

There are two chapters on football, the pre-eminent game in South Africa. Both chapters offer a necessary enrichment of understanding of the

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game's significance in the country, given the celebratory environment created in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup.

Chapter Four, by Dale McKinley, deals with the inner workings of the South African Football Association (SAFA). It highlights the positive developments of achieving a unified soccer body together with some good performances on the field. However, McKinley argues that, in part because of the government's conservative macroeconomic programme, soccer at local level has been 'effectively privatised', while SAFA has adopted 'the institutionalisation of a status quo approach' to the administration and management of the game, where no one wants to really rock the boat too much lest it capsize – thus ending up with a paralysis of player development, management/training of coaches and staff, and the overall administration of the game itself. McKinley's searching critical analysis was given credence on the eve of the hosting of the World Cup 2010 when some of the leading coaches in the Premier Soccer League (PSL) lamented the state of the pitches on which their teams played. The coach of Ajax Cape Town, Mushin Ertugal, said that on one ground 'even cows wouldn't graze for fear of breaking a leg'. Manqoba Mngqithi of Golden Arrows backed Ertugal: 'We seem to be forgetting that after all the fancy infrastructure, football is about the pitch, the players, the technical staff and the supporters.' The response of PSL chief operations officer Ronnie Schloss was blunt: 'In the South African context certain things can be regarded as a luxury. Can we afford to reseed it every year? Who is going to finance it?' (*Sunday Times* 6 September 2009). In the context of billions of rands being spent on new stadiums, Schloss's comments only serve to reinforce arguments about the growing divide in South African soccer, and the potential for World Cup 2010 to exacerbate rather than mitigate the divide.

Chapter Five, by Prishani Naidoo and Zanele Muholi, considers the women's national soccer team Banyana Banyana. While highlighting the neglect of women's football – in the words of one informant, 'women's football is an afterthought' – the chapter also raises issues of sexual orientation and the struggle to confront the 'attempts at disciplining women's bodies and

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rendering them functional to the heterosexist norm'. Flowing out of this, the analysis raises not simply issues surrounding the struggle against exclusion, but the form and nature of inclusion. The work of Naidoo and Muholi on sexual orientation is particularly prescient, given the murder in 2008 of former Banyana Banyana player Eudy Simelane, allegedly because she was lesbian. Mark Gevisser notes that while 'the prosecutor failed to establish a connection between Simelane's sexual orientation and her murder, her friends are convinced she was a victim of an epidemic of violence against lesbians, who are subjected to what is sometimes called "corrective rape" by men seeking to punish or cure them; or who feel that butch women are competing with them by straying into their territory' (*Sunday Times* 30 August 2009). Hopefully, read against the massive outpouring of support by South Africans for Caster Semenya after her success at the World Athletics Championships in August 2009 was challenged on gender grounds, the chapter will stimulate more research into issues relating to gender identity and (inter)sexuality, both inside sport and in the wider society.[4]

Chapter Six, by Justin van der Merwe, begins with an analysis of the state of athletics at a national level. Focusing on South Africa's re-admission to the Olympics, Van der Merwe dissects the highs and lows of the broad transformation agenda in South African sport. The chapter then uses this national backdrop to present a fascinating case study of the Worcester Athletics Club, based in the Boland in the Western Cape province. The chapter provides insights into the way that old apartheid racial categories persist as well as get challenged at the local level, as club athletics tries to deal with a long racial legacy while facing a myriad hurdles in the present conjuncture.

Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed, in Chapter Seven, focus on the journey of cricket at a national level after 1990. Cricket won a number of plaudits for its efforts to both de-racialise the game at the uppermost levels and also broaden its reach into 'previously disadvantaged areas'. The chapter seeks to assess the transformatory project of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCBSA), now known as Cricket South Africa (CSA), by excavating the limitations and potential of their development programme. The last part

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of the chapter looks at the changing face of international cricket, especially the growing global reach of the Indian Premier League (IPL) and its implications for the 'local' game.

Chapter Eight, by Goolam Vahed, Vishnu Padayachee and Ashwin Desai, leaves the national stage and 'digs into' the way the transformation project has played itself out at provincial level. The focus is on the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union (KZNCU). While exploring a variety of issues arising from the cricket transformation agenda in the province, the chapter's analysis is centred on the historic construction of boundaries between Indians, whites and Africans as it pertains to cricket in the province, and the impact that these constructs have in the contemporary struggle for control of provincial cricket. In this context one of the key questions posed is whether the transformation agenda is creating tensions in the old black bloc of Africans, Indians and coloureds. An interesting aspect of this identity question is the way in which categories such as 'Indian' are fracturing further, with ethnicity and religion coming to constitute new lines of division.[5]

Emerging out of a major study on racial redress in post-apartheid South Africa, the chapters in this collection offer an in-depth look at how the dialectic between the reformative and transformative projects play out in the context of sport.

What is clear is that the divide between the two halves of sport in South Africa, like that between Mbeki's two economies, is increasing. There is an urgent need to make the kinds of demands and stimulate forms of mobilisation, both in the broader political arena and in sport, 'to realise intermediate victories, that, even when pursued and won, keep the long-term goal of ever broader transformation in sight and further empower the popular classes, organisationally and ideologically, to pursue it' (Saul 2006: 107). However, what the case studies in this volume show is that any transformative agenda must take cognisance of the changing terrain on which sport is played, as national sentiments both contest and reinforce global impulses. This approach could potentially create (once again) the conditions for sport to become a 'platform for liberation'.

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The limitations of the present project, in terms of the number of sports covered in the book, are recognised. Hopefully it will serve to stimulate similar studies into areas such as hockey, surfing and disability sport. In a country that has trumpeted sport as a symbol of redress and nation-building, the lack of critical analysis of sporting activities is startling. To steal a word that is so much part of South Africa's transformation lexicon, this neglect needs to be urgently *redressed*.

Notes

1 www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04061511451004.htm
2 The GINI coefficient measures inequalities within a country, with a coefficient of 0 (zero) indicating extreme equality and a coefficient of 1 extreme inequality.
3 www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04061511451004.htm
4 See Swart W & Lelliott J, They've made Caster a freak, *Sunday Times*, 13 September 2009; Momberg E, I lied, but I'd do it all over again, *Sunday Independent*, 20 September 2009
5 All the contributors to the book recognise that race designations have no scientific validity. The categories white, coloured, Indian and African are used with an understanding that these are apartheid designations which, while not having any legislative basis that would permit apartheid-style discrimination in the post-1994 era, have been carried over into post-apartheid South Africa in many social and policy contexts. Similarly, while there are no more racially defined 'group areas', apartheid geographies continue to define much of South Africa's urban landscape. We use the term 'black' as a collective reference to African, Indian and coloured people in the discussions that follow.

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2

Creepy crawlies, portapools and the dam(n)s of swimming transformation

Ashwin Desai and Ahmed Veriava

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> Conscious activity is a human characteristic...in swimming in the ocean of struggle, [we] must not flounder, but make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing struggle, constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of struggle. (Mao Tse-Tung 1963)

SWIMMING, MORE THAN ANY other Olympic sport, has enjoyed tremendous success since the country's reintegration into international competition. Swimmers such as Penny Heyns, Ryk Neethling and Roland Schoeman have become household names whose feats in the swimming pool have been immortalised in the record books – hot commodities in an increasingly corporatising discipline (as the attempts by the Olympic hopeful, Qatar, at luring Schoeman and Neethling into their squad illustrate). As many national squads are struggling to chalk up even the most modest accolades in international competition, South African swimming continues to go from strength to strength. However, and in spite of a long history of 'black swimming'[1] in South Africa, the highest levels of the sport remain dominated by white swimmers, and the infrastructure and levels of

organisation necessary for participation remain concentrated in residential and recreational areas that were reserved, in terms of apartheid legislation, for whites only, and continue to have a predominantly white population. This is likely to be the case for some time to come.

In 1965 Karen Muir became the youngest person in the world to break a world record in any sport, and that record still stands today. At the British Championships in Blackpool, she broke the world record for the women's 110 yards backstroke at the age of 12, and between 1965 and 1970 she went on to break 15 world records in the 110 and 220 yards backstroke as well as the 100 and 200 metres backstroke. In 1966 Ann Fairlie broke three world records, two in the women's 110 yards backstroke and one in the women's 100 m backstroke. In 1976 Jonty Skinner broke the world record for the men's 100 m freestyle and in 1988 Peter Williams broke the world record in the men's 50 m freestyle. However, by 1976 South Africa was not a member of the Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA), and Skinner's and Williams' records were not officially recognised.[2]

How could it be otherwise? Competitive swimming has always been a sport associated with leisure and privilege. Private swimming pools were ubiquitous in white South Africa and substantial resources were put into the building of world-class facilities. It is not surprising that, in searching for a global niche market in manufacturing exports for post-apartheid South Africa, one economist focused on swimming pool filtration systems, otherwise known as 'creepy crawlies', a technology in which South Africa has long been an acknowledged leader (Kaplinsky, cited in Bond 2005: 65–66).

The lifestyles of leisure and privilege reliant on expensive facilities are alien to the reality of the vast majority of South Africans. In a context where even the most basic facilities for recreational swimming are massively inadequate, or simply don't exist, the likelihood of the next Ryk Neethling being nurtured in one of South Africa's impoverished townships in the near future is slim.

There was a time in the early 1970s, though, when black swimming was growing in strength. Brian Hermanus, swimming in Kimberley, was ranked 25th in the world in the 100 m breaststroke in 1973, and Drexler Kyzer

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was also highly ranked in the 100 m freestyle. In 1972 the recently formed national non-racial swimming organisation, the South African Amateur Swimming Federation (SAASWIF; see further discussion below), sent their top five swimmers (Brian Hermanus, Sharief Abass, Seelan Nair, Anita Vlotman and Denver Hendricks) on a coaching camp facilitated by Sam Ramsamy in the UK. But in many senses this was a high-water mark for black swimming. The lack of resources, the political imperative of not seeking any funding from white swimming and political authorities, and the boycott of international competition all conspired to elevate swimming administrators into some of the leading figures in the local and international struggle against apartheid, while simultaneously hurting the actual swimming performance in the pool.

The present chapter sifts through this history, tracing developments from the early days of non-racial swimming, through the various phases of sporting unity, into the present period when swimming has become a highly technical and specialised modern sport. This is not meant to be a comprehensive history of the sport; rather, it is an attempt to chart the forces that have come to shape its political and competitive contexts, specifically approaches to the transformation debate and the strategies of various actors in this regard. Finally, the chapter will offer a preliminary assessment of the success of swimming in meaningfully resolving the contradictions that have plagued the sport, and our society more generally.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section focuses on the political history of the sport under apartheid; the second centres on the unity process, and the manner in which this process has influenced the contexts of transformation. In the third section we take a critical look at how different approaches and strategies have shaped the modern face of the sport, and the extent to which they meaningfully address the racial and class imbalances that characterise swimming in South Africa today. The final section presents some recommendations for strategies that could take transformation of the sport beyond the levels already attained.

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The birth of black swimming

Sport in an apartheid society

In the early 1960s, as international condemnation of apartheid was beginning to gather momentum, the South African government anticipated the impact this would have on its economy if European markets were closed as a result of its race policies, and began to look east. In November 1961, a delegation of Japanese businessmen came to South Africa to conclude a trade agreement. and the South African government announced that Japanese people, who had been classified as 'Asian' within the apartheid racial schema, would henceforth be given the status of 'honorary whites' in South Africa. However, early in 1972 this policy was tested when the Pretoria City Council refused to grant permission for the touring Japanese swimming team to use its pool. Fearful that the incident would disrupt South Africa's ambitions on the economic front, the government was forced to intervene and voice its disapproval, while the city council moved to rescind the ban (Lapchick 1975: 42).

The Japanese incident highlights important elements of the relationship between apartheid and sport. If anything, it demonstrates the state's whimsical approach to the official policy environment for sport. But perhaps more importantly, it speaks to a deeply pathological commitment to racialised sport – in particular when it came to swimming – that went far beyond the legal frameworks of apartheid. As Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon point out in *The South African Game*:

> [A]t the heart of white social life swimming is subject more than any other leisure activity to...pitiless, indeed pathological segregation. For unlike tennis or golf, swimmers are in direct physical contact with each other, through the medium of water; far from separating swimmers of different races (or sex) water dissolves the physical barriers between them. Innumerable stories describe the 'pollution' which white South Africans fear will result from mixed bathing, and the outrage they feel when it occurs. (Archer & Bouillon 1982: 105)

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It is therefore not surprising that, even before the introduction of formal apartheid sports policies after the National Party came to power in 1948, segregation was maintained within the local institutional structures of the sport; it was also present to varying degrees in other sports, specifically in the various governing bodies of the different sports codes. This is clearly illustrated in the struggle of weightlifters to gain international recognition. In 1946, T. Rangasamy, a leader of local black weightlifters, petitioned the British Amateur Weightlifters Association for formal recognition of black South African athletes. The Association's response speaks to the challenges faced by black athletes in all codes of sport:

> We cannot bring any pressure on the South African weightlifting federation to force them to recognise you. Their rules, as with all national sporting associations in South Africa, will not permit of mixed contests between white and coloured athletes. This is also a condition of the South African Olympic Council... (cited in Lapchick 1975: 21)

Apartheid, rather than introducing segregation in sport, worked to codify and institutionalise these relations. As Grant Jarvie has pointed out:

> By the time the National Party came to power in 1948 and the apartheid policy emerged, a degree of segregation and inequality of opportunity between white and non-white athletes had evolved already in South African sport. There was little need, therefore, to impose a policy of apartheid upon specific sporting relations since social differentiation already existed. Furthermore, the general laws of apartheid rule rendered multiracial sport impossible in that it was illegal for black and white athletes to mix openly in competition, as it was for black and white people to mix socially in society. (Jarvie 1985: 48)

Notably, government pronouncements on sport often followed from explicit political challenges to racially discriminatory practices in sport. By 1956 resistance to apartheid sport had arisen, as a result of international

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recognition being fought for and granted to the Non-Racial Table Tennis Board; this served as a catalyst for a growing demand by black sporting federations for international recognition. Such resistance resulted in the announcement by the Minister of the Interior, Eben Dönges, of South Africa's first official sports policy. The thrust of the 1956 policy, apart from making explicit the state's commitment to the separate organisation of sports, was to insist that black federations seeking international recognition would be forced to do so through the existing white organisations in South Africa, and that athletes who attempted to travel overseas to engage in activities 'designed to change South Africa's traditional racial divisions' would not be issued with passports (Draper 1963: 6). The broad application of the latter measure effectively banned any black sportsperson from competing in international competition without the explicit support of the state. Although the state's policy would be variously amended in order to navigate the bumpy terrain created by an increasingly powerful campaign to ensure white South Africa's exclusion from international competition, state policy continued to reflect a deep commitment to the basic tenets of the 1956 policy:

> The government does not favour inter-racial team competitions within the borders of the Union and will discourage such competition from taking place as being contrary to the traditional policy of the Union – as accepted by all races in the union...The policy of separate development is in accordance with the traditional South African custom that whites and non-whites should organise their sporting activities separately. The inclusion of different races in the same team would therefore be contrary to established norm and custom. (Minister of the Interior Naudé, cited in Lapchick 1975: 35)

However, the determination of the state to impose its apartheid vision on sport did not go unchallenged within the country. The formation of the South African Non-racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) in the early 1960s was an important turning point in black South African sport. SANROC set out to establish itself as the official Olympic representative body, effectively

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calling for white South Africa's exclusion from the Olympics. In its assertion of the autonomy of black sporting organisations, this marked a radical departure from previous strategies of resistance in the domain of sport. The formation of SANROC also marked the hardening of relations between black and white sporting federations in South Africa.

These developments ran parallel to a growing militancy in black nationalist politics that increasingly provoked repressive responses from the state. SANROC was not left untouched. Leaders like Dennis Brutus were imprisoned as the state worked to systematically weaken the leadership of the young organisation. In 1965 SANROC suspended its activities, and it re-emerged in exile in 1966. By the 1970s international opinion over apartheid sports policy had shifted firmly in favour of the movement. White sports organisations, desperate to return to international competition, were forced to open talks with their black counterparts in the hope of bettering their case. Such overtures were, however, more often than not insincere, with white organisations reneging on agreements soon after they were made. Faced with the reality of well-endowed white sports bodies backed by an assertive apartheid state, sports activists sought out a more radical approach. The South African Council on Sport (SACOS) was formed to meet this challenge, and would represent the interests of the non-racial sporting movement in South Africa until the period of unity talks in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Increasing resistance, both internally and externally, to apartheid sport led to Prime Minister B.J. Vorster reiterating the government's commitment to separate development in sport in a second policy statement on the subject in 1967. However, by the 1970s international pressures had forced the apartheid government into trying to represent its policies in a more palatable way to the international community. The year 1970 was a turning point. In that year South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement, the first expulsion of any country in the history of the movement; it also became known as 'the year of the boycott' as anti-apartheid groups in Britain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand staged massive demonstrations

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against the South African government's sports policies. In addition, it was in 1970 that the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa condemned apartheid and apartheid sport; South Africa was banned from competing in nine international events and suspended from a number of international sporting federations (Jarvie 1985: 54).

In 1971, the South African government under B.J. Vorster began drafting a new sports policy that would be adopted in its final format in 1976, under the tutelage of Minister of Sport Piet Koornhof. In terms of this 'new' framework, black athletes would be allowed to compete in a few events called 'multinational' or 'open international' events. This permitted different racial groups to compete with each other as 'four nations' outside the country; however, locally no mixed sport was to be allowed (although cricket made a short-lived attempt to stretch the boundaries and field mixed teams). According to Jarvie, 'while the shift in policy was being portrayed internationally as a radical change in policy, in practice the logic of apartheid was preserved in that each racial group was allowed to develop its own separate sporting relations with the proviso that the white administered sporting bodies remained in overall control' (Jarvie 1985: 54).

In fact, this 'multinational' sports policy would provide the framework for inequalities to be entrenched under apartheid, with differential allocation of resources to the separate racial groups written into the policy. In the case of swimming, such resource gaps had a profoundly negative effect on the organic growth of the sport in the massively under-developed and poverty-stricken townships. According to the London *Times*, in the early 1970s just five per cent of the national budget was allocated to spending on physical infrastructure for the African majority (Archer & Bouillon 1982: 167). Such spending disparities had significant effects on the provision of sporting resources to black communities. Where white sport in South Africa was funded primarily through public finance, only seven per cent of the budget for African sport came from this source, while the rest was drawn from the South African Bantu Trust (a special fund created to purchase land for the bantustans and finance official development programmes for Africans).

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Additional money for the construction and upkeep of township facilities was drawn from profits secured through the sale of liquor at township outlets (which fell under the control of the local authorities). The starkness of the resultant inequality is demonstrated by the fact that, in the period 1973–1974, the state spent one hundred times less money on black sport than it did on white sport (Archer & Bouillon 1982: 167).

Whereas white athletes could benefit from the infrastructure and facilities of sports centres and private clubs, this was not the case for their black counterparts, whose communities generally lacked the economic resources to develop equivalent private sector facilities. In addition, Africans in particular were prohibited from owning and managing sport facilities. This meant that, whereas Indian and coloured athletes could enjoy degrees of autonomy where privately owned facilities were available, African athletes were entirely dependent on the white organisations and authorities.

Statistics derived from the *1977 Official Yearbook* demonstrate the massive shortfall in adequate infrastructure for participation in swimming (South Africa 1979). For the black population as a whole, there was a ratio of 1 public pool to every 569 441 people. In such a context it was clearly impossible for swimming to become a mass sport in black communities, let alone one in which black swimmers could excel at competitive levels. By 1977 not a single public Olympic-size pool was open to African swimmers.

Such statistics, however, speak only to shortages at the level of physical infrastructure for the development of swimming. To this should be added the lack of resources for coaching, and poor organisational infrastructure. And if all this was not enough to discourage black swimmers, there were always institutionally reinforced pseudo-scientific reasons offered for why blacks could not swim. Frank Braun, a former president of the South African National Olympic Committee, provided one popular example: '[S]ome sports, the African is not suited for. In swimming, the water closes their pores so they cannot get rid of carbon dioxide and they tire quickly...but they are great boxers and cyclers and runners' (cited in Lapchick 1975: 92). Nonetheless, and in the face of these enormous obstacles, swimming did

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develop into a popular sport among black people, one that boasted high levels of organisation and performance.

Black swimmers begin to organise

The formation of SAASWIF

Without any state support or adequate infrastructure, pockets of black swimmers began coming together to form clubs and to test their skills in competition. While these first clubs were, in the main, grouped in Indian and coloured areas, they formed the basis of what would become a non-racial swimming movement. Although competitions had been held as early as the 1930s, it was not until the mid-1960s that the imagination and capacity necessary for the formation of a national non-racial swimming federation culminated in the creation of SAASWIF.

In January 1965, at the Swain household in Wynberg, Cape Town, 13 people representing different provincial swimming organisations came together to discuss the formation of an alternative national controlling body for swimming. The meeting itself was something of a triumph, having taken some 15 months to organise (with Western Cape administrators travelling the length and breadth of the country, transported by 'Dickie' Herbert, an erstwhile swimming administrator; stories of 'Herbert's Transport' became folklore in the black swimming fraternity) (Davey interview). At this first 'national' meeting the Natal Indian Amateur Swimming Association, Griqualand West Amateur Swimming Union, Eastern Cape Amateur Swimming Association and Western Cape Amateur Swimming Association were present. Not surprisingly, the question of race in sport was discussed. Significantly, even in these first meetings 'racism in society in general and sport in particular was rejected with venom that was to be built and given precise direction in the decades that followed'.[3]

A small national swimming meet and two more meetings of the founding group would follow before, in 1966, at the David Landau Community Centre in Asherville, Durban, SAASWIF was formed, and

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W.A. Paulse was elected as the first president of the organisation. This historic meeting was followed by the federation's first 'official' national tournament hosted by the Natal Indian Amateur Swimming Association. In the tournament Natal asserted its strength, winning all but one of the competitions. Notably this tournament also marked the last time the category 'Indian' featured in the name of this provincial association. In 1969 SAASWIF's headquarters shifted from Cape Town to Durban when Morgan Naidoo became president of the organisation.

Under his leadership, SAASWIF would continue to organise national tournaments and coordinate activities among the various provincial affiliates. At the same time SAASWIF was one of the prime movers behind a heightened campaign to ban South Africa from international sport. Most famously, SAASWIF spearheaded the campaign to suspend the South African Amateur Swimming Union (SAASU) – the controlling body for white swimming – from FINA.

In 1973 a delegation from FINA arrived in South Africa to evaluate the state of swimming in the country. SAASWIF met with the delegation and presented a detailed memorandum to its members. The memorandum was something of a triumph, and was the most complete account of the state's systematic exclusion of the black community from participation in swimming.[4]

The report, as well as the excellent campaigning work of people such as Morgan Naidoo and Sam Ramsamy, resulted in FINA suspending the white swimming union at a meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. This happened in spite of the fact that SAASU had been a founding member of FINA. Morgan Naidoo, then president of SAASWIF, was denied a passport to travel to the Yugoslavia meeting and in October 1973 was banned under the Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44 of 1950), clearly a reaction by the state to his pivotal role in isolating 'white' swimming.

In 1976 FINA formally expelled SAASU from international swimming. The expulsion represented a major victory for non-racial swimming under the banner of SAASWIF.

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However, in spite of SAASWIF's tremendous success, both at the level of its political engagement and in the development of non-racial swimming, it remained predominantly an organisation located in Indian and coloured communities. This is not surprising, as Indian and coloured sport was able to develop with greater levels of autonomy, and Indian and coloured people also benefited from better resources and higher standards of living, compared to African people.

The emergence of SANASA

The 1970s saw the emergence of organised African swimming, beginning with the formation of the Western Transvaal Amateur Swimming Association in 1974, later known as the Amateur Swimming Association of Western Transvaal (ASAWT). In the course of 1975 other provincial associations were formed, eventually culminating in the formation of the South African National Amateur Swimming Association (SANASA).

The various affiliates of SANASA had largely grown out of initiatives developed by local municipal administrative 'boards' under white government control. According to Thabo Seotsanyana (the second president of SANASA), their stated intention was 'to organise swimming and later hand over the reins to the community'.[5] Initially the boards were extremely helpful, making transport available to convey swimmers to galas. SAASU, keen to see the emergence of an alternative voice to SAASWIF as the voice of black swimming, supported SANASA with coaching manuals and small amounts of funding to run swimming clinics. As SANASA began to assert its autonomy, however, SAASU attempted to regain control of the organisation. According to Seotsanyana:

> ...it later became evident that SAASU's financial and material involvement had ulterior motives. After the staging of SANASA's first and second national championships, an attempt was made to 'hijack' SANASA by SAASU. To get out of this situation, SANASA decided to become less dependent on SAASU and began to organise its own fundraising campaigns. When SAASU realised that their relationship

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> with SANASA was turning sour, they tried to co-opt the president of SANASA, in his absence, to the position of honorary vice-president of SAASU. This pathetically patronising attitude was met with anger and bitterness by SANASA. Subsequent meetings between SAASU and SANASA proved fruitless and the two organisations parted company.[6]

Its fallout with SAASU would, however, exact a price. Previously SANASA affiliates had received small amounts of money and support from various municipal boards. These were summarily terminated, and attempts were made, by the West Rand Board in particular, to divide organisers. While the latter attempts were unsuccessful, in other parts of the country administration boards succeeded in destroying the organisation by threatening organisers with dismissal from government jobs if they did not cooperate with the authorities. In Seotsanyana's view, '[s]wimming, as a result, suffered a severe and crippling blow in those areas.'[7]

ASASA: taking swimming into the township

As its relationship with SAASU crumbled, SANASA grew closer to SAASWIF, and in March 1982 the two organisations merged to form the Amateur Swimming Association of South Africa (ASASA). An ASASA publication recalls the event:

> Whilst both organisations were firm believers in the credo of non-racial sport, because of the artificial barriers which exist in our society their constituency was in the case of [SAASWIF] predominantly so-called coloured and Indian and [in the case of SANASA], African... The most important reason why the two bodies merged was first and foremost, their unshakable belief in the principle of non-racial sport.[8]

Like its predecessor, SAASWIF, the political character of ASASA was explicit from its inception, and the organisation placed itself firmly within the ranks of the struggle against apartheid. In the 1980s, in regard to sport, this was the terrain of SACOS. Growing out of the political traditions of

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SAASWIF and SANASA, ASASA entered the SACOS fold of organisations with a long history of struggle and boasting a highly skilled and competent set of administrators.

But, where SAASWIF's political history was rooted in the sports politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s (SAASWIF being a founding member of SACOS), ASASA was far more a creature of the 1980s. For SAASWIF, the major fronts of the struggle had been the campaign for recognition of black athletes, and white South Africa's exclusion from international sport. In the 1980s, however – with the proliferation of autonomous black organisations antagonistic to the state across all sectors of society – the emphasis shifted to ways of organising sport, guided by the practice of non-racialism. For ASASA this meant 'delivering swimming on a non-racial basis' (Davey interview). And in spite of incredible obstacles, ASASA managed to cover all the major codes of aquatic sport (the umbrella term covering swimming, water polo, diving, synchronised swimming and open-water swimming) with the exception of diving (since virtually no pools available to black swimmers were equipped with diving boards).

According to Mike Davey, a former official of ASASA, their strategy focused on taking the sport into the townships, and despite the political and logistical challenges this presented, the organisation consciously located its national tournaments within townships. This often meant swimming in pools whose sizes were considered obsolete by competitive standards:

> We had a national tournament in Orlando West swimming pool [in Soweto] under terrible conditions. It was the first time that something like that happened. We had to supply our own generators so that we could swim at night. We had to supply lanes' ropes and starting blocks. The original lanes' ropes were fixed with meat hooks in a swimming pool. A youngster taking a wrong turn could have impaled himself. But still, we ran for a week and at that time we had so-called coloured and Indian, fair blue-eyed girls, living in the heart of the township…and those children were as happy as anything…the event went off without incident except for the rottenness of the city

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> council…And in that political climate we were given no airplay or mileage. (Davey interview)

But ASASA's biggest challenge was to present itself outside the pool. As the political landscape of the 1980s began to shift, and a path was cleared towards negotiations and national reconciliation, black swimming was forced to confront the question of unity in sport.

(Dis)unity in sport

While much has been written about the 'ease' with which reconciliation has happened since the first democratic government was inaugurated in 1994, with a lot of attention being paid to the symbolic gestures made by figures such as Nelson Mandela, little is said of the major differences that existed amongst black sports organisations immediately after 1990 with regard to the process of unity and reconciliation. In the debates arising from these different positions, the prioritisation of reconciliation over redress was questioned by many who saw prioritising redress, as a means to attain equality, as a precondition for unity and reconciliation. Much of the history of the unity process in sport has yet to be written. More importantly, we have yet to understand how these political processes shaped the present competitive contexts and priorities of the different codes of sport. For swimming – where 'full' unity was achieved only in 1999 – it is without question that the current complexion of the sport is directly linked to the fractious process that led to the establishment of a single controlling body.

SACOS and the contexts of unity

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the formation of SACOS, and the increasingly confrontational character of black organisations, also coincided with the state's quest to control all facets of life. In the decade that followed its establishment, SACOS would grow into a formidable force in South African sports politics, and an important node of the anti-apartheid movement.

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However, SACOS's relationship to the Congress movement[9] was always ambiguous. Since its inception, the membership of the organisation had been drawn from across the spectrum of black politics in South Africa. But, in the political vision of the Congress movement – which became increasingly hegemonic over the anti-apartheid movement in the course of the 1980s – SACOS remained outside the fold. This perception was reinforced as debates within the organisation over its non-collaborationist stance (expressed, for instance, in the double standards policy that forbade members of any of its affiliates from taking part in sporting events outside its control, and the 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' position, which involved a general refusal to engage with the 'organs of apartheid' – which for SACOS included white sport) began increasingly to reflect the divisions between the different political traditions within the broad liberation movement. Such SACOS positions sat uncomfortably with many from the Congress tradition and, as a result, increasingly came to be viewed as too far to the left. But, as Jace Naidoo, the president of SWIMSA, notes, the organisation was anything but uniform and nurtured a strong culture of debate:

> I know that there were those accusations [of ultra-leftism]. But, I think if you sat in some of those SACOS meetings, there was debate on the widest political level, and I don't think any other political structures in the country were operating on that level of democratic debate...While there might have been those accusations, I think SACOS was one of the few structures that allowed for political debate... (Naidoo interview 1)

However, in the late 1980s the Congress movement also began its push to unite the anti-apartheid movement under the 'Harare Declaration' and to formulate its programme to bring about a negotiated end to apartheid.[10] Guided by the 'radical' rhetoric of the 'National Democratic Revolution' (NDR), this programme prioritised asserting the hegemony of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) (made up of ostensibly independent structures

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steeped in Congress tradition) over all aspects of civil society, including the organisation of sport. With respect to the latter, this meant providing political leadership for, and control over, a process that would lead to the unification of the governing bodies of black and white sport. SACOS's steadfast commitment to the principle of 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' would prove a difficult obstacle to overcome, and presented a defiant challenge to the Congress agenda of negotiation with existing white organisations on all fronts.

In 1988, the National Sports Congress (NSC) was launched as the sports arm of the Congress movement. While the language of the NSC did not initially set it in competition with SACOS, a clear line had been drawn and the deep differences between the two organisations would soon become apparent. Initial engagements between them crumbled under the weight of strategic differences – specifically the respective organisations' approach to unity with white sport – and a split loomed. As Gideon Sam, a past president of SWIMSA, explains, for cadres inside SACOS a choice had to be made:

> There was this feeling that if I am NSC it's because the NSC aligned itself to the ANC and that SACOS aligned itself more with Black Consciousness. So, it became a question of ideology, and there was a split along those lines. (Sam interview)

As the lines were being drawn, ASASA declared its allegiance to SACOS. As Jace Naidoo explains, 'ASASA was a strong SACOS affiliate. It was very clear – we were a SACOS affiliate and we would have nothing to do with the NSC' (Naidoo interview 1). But as these debates raged between SACOS and the NSC, ASASA was experiencing other problems which, although not directly linked to the question of unity, would come to dramatically reconfigure this terrain. Historically, SAASWIF coaches and administrators had worked on a purely voluntary basis. However, as the sport grew more popular in the late 1970s, a few coaches had begun charging fees. This contradicted the amateur status of the organisation and the sport generally, both nationally and internationally, and eventually led to the breakaway

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of two clubs after the 'professional' coaches were refused entry onto the pool deck at the National Championships in Cape Town. They formed a new body called the South African Amateur Swimming Board of Control, under the leadership of Eddie Meth and Easlyn Fredericks. The organisation subsequently disbanded and rejoined the folds of non-racial swimming after the formation of ASASA.

However the rapidly changing political environment in the late 1980s was to cause another split.

At ASASA's 1991 national tournament, athletes were asked to read a pledge supporting SACOS and the principles for which it stood. This resulted in a split in the organisation:

> ...this issue was about the political one in terms of SACOS – the acknowledgement of SACOS, acknowledgement of the struggle in terms of issues about racism. [The group led by] Easlyn Fredericks was fairly actively involved in the Labour Party and actively campaigning for them.[11] I remember the first breakdown came when each team had to pledge allegiance to SACOS. And they refused to do that. And they pulled out a club in Cape Town, East London (later), and a club in Johannesburg. (Naidoo interview 1)

Unification: round one

The split in ASASA would prove convenient for the NSC. While it was clear that ASASA was unlikely to change its approach to unity, the breakaway group now presented the NSC with a possible ally in swimming. Shortly after the split, the South African Amateur Swimming Congress (SAASCO) was formed and almost immediately entered into unity talks with the white SAASU. ASASA had at that stage already initiated talks with SAASU; this was a tactical move in response to the growing power of the NSC. The NSC began taking a keen interest in the process. Although SAASCO had the benefit of competent and experienced swimming administrators like Eddie Meth and Easlyn Fredericks, the new organisation lacked the type of organisational culture and political experience that could have prepared them for the

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task ahead. The NSC, whose deep investment in the success of the process would not allow them to see talks fail, 'deployed' Gideon Sam – a seasoned sports administrator – to lead the SAASCO delegation until Sam Ramsamy returned to country.

As Gideon Sam explains, the new organisation had something of an ad hoc character; its energies were directed at the task of forging ahead with the NSC agenda for unity:

> [When] we sat in an NSC meeting, we would look around and we would say 'who can we send into that federation?'...We were actually asking people to go to various federations – okay, Mackerdhuj was there in cricket, Patel was there in rugby – so all the other little ones, like swimming, we would ask among ourselves, who knows how to tackle these whiteys in swimming...And then, they'd say 'Ja, Gideon, you come from Somerset West, you can swim, you go... and meet the people'...There was a splinter group from Durban with Eddie Meth, there was a splinter group from Cape Town, someone from Kimberley, and then we had a Border faction. We didn't have anything in Gauteng. So those splinter groups formed a congress. (Sam interview)

As negotiations unfolded, ASASA insisted that SAASCO with their four clubs could not be considered a representative organisation. The talks deadlocked. However, SAASU and SAASCO continued with talks and formed a new organisation.

By the time Sam Ramsamy returned to South Africa talks were already under way, and he immediately took over from Gideon Sam as the chief negotiator for SAASCO. In terms of the unity agreement there would be a fifty–fifty split of the executive, and after two years an open election would be held. The resultant body that was formed was the South Africa Amateur Swimming Association (SAASA). Sam Ramsamy was the first president, and Issy Kramer (a former National Party representative in government) and Gideon Sam shared the vice-presidency.

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FINA and the second round of unification

Through the first round of the unity process, ASASA stuck firmly to the SACOS position on unity. Numerically ASASA had the upper hand. While the new body had significantly greater resources, ASASA organised the vast majority of black swimmers. Because of this, ASASA believed that without their participation, there would always be a question mark over the process and over the new body's claim to being representative of black swimming in South Africa. In this they were wrong.

In 1992, the question of which organisation could claim the status of being the official controlling body for swimming was put firmly on the table when SAASA applied to join FINA. While ASASA was allowed to put its case to the international body, it had under-estimated the influence of Sam Ramsamy in the international arena. For years Ramsamy had been the accepted representative of swimming at all international meetings, with ASASA's own voice in these forums often mediated by him. Not surprisingly then, FINA went with the new unified body:

> I think also the reality was that we didn't realise the extent of Sam's influence...the moment we came up against Sam we lost the battle because when Mike Davey went to the FINA meeting to address them, they only gave him a few minutes...that decision was made a long time ago, and the way those international federations work, an outsider is not going to come in and change their minds. It wasn't how good the case was. The organisational structure, not so much in terms of swimming organisations, but Sam, and his interaction at a political level and his influence in terms of the African swimming structures where he was completely influential, meant there was no way we were going to win that fight. We were painted as people who were anti-ANC. And so that fight was lost. (Naidoo interview 1)

While FINA acknowledged ASASA's historical role in the struggle, recognition was given to the new body as the official representative of South African swimming.

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However, beyond the influence of Ramsamy, this decision was also in part a consequence of the international community's firm support for South Africa's 'unfolding miracle'. Internally as well, the language of non-participation was coming to seem increasingly out of step with national developments. After the FINA decision, ASASA was forced to reconsider its approach to the new organisation. However, emboldened by the international body's decision, the terms of a merger offered by the new 'unified' body, SAASA, were nothing like those of the previous process. ASASA was offered just three seats on the executive, with an open election following in less than a year. ASASA, which boasted a few thousand swimmers and a modest bank balance, declined the offer. Over the next seven years the organisation remained outside the official 'unified' structure and continued to host its own national tournaments.

Unity, finally

If ASASA showed every sign of good health at the outset of the unification process, by 1999 it was in deep trouble:

> We were on our last legs. Because by then children on the other side were going overseas…they had the financial muscle while we were haemorrhaging. We still managed to have national tournaments worthy of the name in 1999 but were in bad shape. (Naidoo interview 1)

Cash-strapped and unable to offer its swimmers anything other than localised competition, something needed to change for ASASA. Ironically, the final phase of unification was catalysed by the success of an ASASA swimmer who was given the opportunity to travel to Australia to train and compete. However, this proved complicated because ASASA was not a member of FINA and the new body objected to the swimmer's participation in Australia. As a result, ASASA approached the South African government for assistance. Although the government informed ASASA that it could not interfere in the affairs of an individual sporting authority, it also put pressure on the FINA-recognised SAASA to resolve this matter.

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In 1999, SAASA changed its name to Swimming South Africa (SWIMSA). ASASA had entered discussions with SWIMSA hoping for nothing more than a programme for the development of black swimming in the country. However, Gideon Sam, who was the president of SWIMSA at the time, agreed to begin formal talks with ASASA. This created an opening for discussions on cooperation between the two organisations and ultimately for unification. The terms of the merger also proved to be far less disadvantageous this time around. While this could have been seen as a magnanimous gesture on the part of the internationally recognised structure, the latter was also searching for mechanisms to achieve its 'transformation agenda' and stood to benefit from a merger. It had not been able to produce any new black administrators, technical officials or coaches of note, and the numbers of such persons that had entered the organisation at the time of unification were small. ASASA presented SWIMSA with a substantial number of established, technically competent administrators and coaches who were well versed in sports politics and who, theoretically, could advance the agenda for change within an organisation that was predominately white. And so, in 1999, ASASA finally merged with SWIMSA.

The transformation of aquatic sport

Two 'transformations'

It has been posited that the characterisation of South Africa as a country with two economies (Mbeki 2003; see also Chapter 1 of this volume), necessitating two separate and parallel strategies for transformation, has, rather than allowing for redress, democracy, reconciliation and cooperative governance to facilitate the progressive erosion of inequality, instead made it possible for inequality to persist, and in fact to remain entrenched in society. This finds an echo in the state of swimming in South Africa today, with a separation between transformation efforts aimed at developing a pool of 'elite athletes' to represent South Africa ('non-racially') in international events

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(Transformation 2 – reformative), and those efforts aimed at developing mass participation in swimming (Transformation 1 – transformative).

Transformation 2 has most often been evident in the state's need to make all institutions of society, including civil society formations such as sports federations, reflect the country's racial demographics. This has resulted in many institutions and individuals approaching transformation purely as a matter of replacing white faces in structures with black faces, or ensuring the presence of a token number of black swimmers in teams. In the words of Jace Naidoo:

> [M]ost federations have seen transformation almost exclusively as a 'numbers' or 'quotas' issue. To a large extent this has been driven by the state's philosophy of transformation – society and organs of civil society, such as sports federations, being reflective of the country's demographics. This race-based philosophy has contributed to the need to define racial groupings in sport, and has served to entrench ideologies of race, rather than moving toward a philosophy of non-racial and mass-based sport. (Naidoo interview 1)

Proponents of Transformation 1 have argued that the state could have played a much more useful role by prioritising redress in its approach to transformation, i.e. understanding transformation as the need to correct the imbalances created by apartheid through proactively dedicating resources to increasing access for the previously disadvantaged to swimming. With such an understanding, increasing the majority of people's access to the resources, facilities and institutions necessary to realise their full potential as swimmers would become the focus. In sport, this would have meant placing a substantial emphasis on ensuring mass participation in sport at all levels, from the urban townships through to the rural farmlands and marginalised areas, as opposed to the constant emphasis on ensuring adequate numbers of African participants in national teams. According to Jace Naidoo:

> [P]rogrammes aimed at mass participation in sport, if initiated at the turn of democracy in South Africa, would have ensured that South

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> African sport, 12–14 years down the road of sporting unification, would have been reflective of the demographics of South Africa – more so than the current racial interpretation of demographics. South African sport at all levels would have seen representation by the rural poor, the unemployed township youth, participants from working class communities – all of whom had been historically denied access, and currently have few opportunities for accessing either recreational or competitive sport. (Naidoo interview 1)

Instead of taking this approach to transformation, the prioritisation by the state of an approach of 'two transformations', within a socio-economic situation that has remained largely unchanged for the poor, black majority since the end of apartheid, has meant that the realisation of true potential is still limited to those few South Africans who continue to enjoy inherited apartheid privileges or who have been able to gain access to the necessary resources through their participation in the first economy, i.e. white and black middle class South Africans.

Transformation 2, while limited in this sense, has however also entailed important struggles to change the racial composition of various sporting federations, where successful engagement has resulted in the changing of conservative (generally white) leadership at national and provincial levels. This process has, though, had little or no effect at the level of clubs which, through their historical access to resources (being based in middle and upper-middle class communities), continue to play a dominant yet conservative role in sports transformation. With a prioritisation of Transformation 1, such struggles would not have reaped benefits only for an elite few.

Swimsa's current transformation programme attempts to bring together these two approaches. However, tensions run through this strategy. Pressure to speedily produce black international stars sits uneasily alongside a project that seeks to build mass participation in swimming at all levels, in all communities.

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The state of transformation in aquatic sport today

First-time travellers flying in to any major South African city often remark on the little blue swimming pool shapes that dot the green gardens of the suburbs, as well as on the dry and barren squatter camps that either sprawl next to these suburbs or climb up the nearby hillsides and dump sites. They are a telling reminder of apartheid's legacy – entrenched inequalities that confront even the best attempts at transformation.

The state of aquatic sport in South Africa today reflects this legacy, with white and middle class people continuing to enjoy representative advantage at both competitive and recreational levels over black and working class people. This has been the result of the consistent development of strong white aquatic sporting organisations since the turn of the last century. The unification process that started at the beginning of the 1990s was also characterised by an adoption of the existing infrastructure of the dominant partners in the process, i.e. white organisations.

In time, too, the unified structures assumed the organisational culture and practices of these organisations. Instead of allowing for a new organisational culture to emerge from the merger process, it was assumed that the culture of the dominant partners was best suited to the new context. In the main, this culture was characterised by 'the rapid development of the individual and the creation of a super-elite, ultra-competitive grouping of athletes with the ability to bring international glory' (Naidoo interview 1). The type of organisation celebrated by this culture was one in which leadership, decision-making and responsibility were highly centralised, and membership was elitist. This kind of organisation is not conducive to the building of mass participation, through the implementation of transparent processes which engender accountability, democracy and collective responsibility and leadership. In this context the development of a mass-based recreational aquatic sporting organisation remained the vision of the minority. According to Jace Naidoo, the bringing together of such different cultures in one organisation resulted in:

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> ...the inability to either transform the organisation or properly institute grassroots development programmes in disadvantaged communities. An organisation committed to mass-based aquatic recreational activities requires structures within the organisation which can cater for this need. In the short term, a centrally driven structure may prove essential to direct the organisation to the goal of mass participation. However, in the medium to long term, an organisational structure which is transparent, democratic and accountable to its smallest unit, i.e. clubs and their membership, is crucial. All attempts must be made to resist the temptation to create more bureaucratic structures (often under the guise of better management) that result in greater alienation of the basic units of the organisation. While democracy cannot be legislated, it must be encouraged to remain a dynamic activity within aquatic sport in the country. (Naidoo interview 1)

While the current state of aquatic sport in South Africa has made it difficult to redress apartheid's legacy, and in many senses organised swimming remains bound by the limitations of the political and economic transition, SWIMSA's commitment to 'the numbers game' seems to be paying off, at a competitive level. According to Jace Naidoo, 'The profile of our entry level national competition (level 1) has been completely transformed, with only a small number of historically advantaged competitors or team officials' (Naidoo interview 1). A slow but discernible increase in the percentage of black participants has been noted at the higher levels of national competition, through to the national team. But this transformation at a competitive level is not mirrored at either a team management or technical official level. In recent years, in an effort to increase participation and strengthen clubs, the national federation has decided that the lower levels of national competition should be club-based, rather than provincial meets. This has resulted in a reversal of the 'demographic profile' seen previously at level 1. But this strategy reveals the reality that it is going to take many years for even the narrow goal of making elite teams racially representative to be achieved.

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It is clearly evident that the big winners since the early 1990s have been white swimmers. The lifting of the international boycott has given them the opportunity to garner international accolades, and access to well-endowed US universities. Unlike cricket with its Makhaya Ntinis, and rugby with its Bryan Habanas, swimming has not produced its post-apartheid standard-bearer. But the officials presently managing the national organisation seem determined to change the status quo and, as the latter part of this chapter will show, there is an emergent set of proposals with the potential to make for a productive race-redress programme.

However, any understanding of the processes of change needs to factor in the particular nature of the sport of swimming.

Obstacles to the transformation of aquatic sport

The expense involved in becoming a swimmer is often a prohibitive factor in the lives of potential black competitors. Because of the resources necessary to participate in swimming (either recreationally or competitively), the transformation of participation in elite swimming competitions has remained restricted largely to whites and the emerging black middle class. At present, it is only those young people with access to these resources, i.e. attending private or semi-private schools, who are able to enter the arena of elite competitive swimming, as they generally have access to in-house experienced coaches, and high-standard swimming facilities.

The state has played a significant role in this regard, encouraging efforts and resources to be directed towards the development of individual stars, particularly through its 'knee-jerk' responses following the apparently poor performance of athletes at the Sydney Olympics in 2000, and their marginal improvement at the Athens games in 2004. Here an increased emphasis began to be placed on the production of elite athletes at a national level, particularly athletes of colour. The lack of success at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 only served to heighten to fever pitch the clamour for

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more resources to be thrown into the production of elite athletes. The linking of federation funding to the success of these programmes has resulted in federations in a range of sports shifting their focus from investment in mass-based sport to the development of elite black athletes.[12]

> Rather than focusing on the long-term development of mass sport, with the natural rising to the elite levels of those with potential, the state wanted 'quick fixes' to institutionalised problems. The state failed to recognise that countries such as Cuba and Kenya, with sports investment several orders of magnitude lower than South Africa, were generating medal winners, or that countries such as Australia and the United States were making investments per individual medal won beyond any imaginable budget among South African federations. (Naidoo interview 1)

Promotion of competitive aquatic sport is also dependent on increasing the numbers of youngsters entering the sport at an early age, i.e. six to seven years. This entry is facilitated either by parents enrolling children in clubs or through the involvement of schools. While former Model C and existing private or semi-private schools have the resources to promote the sport – and in many instances actually have major clubs based at the school pools – schools in townships do not have swimming pools or educators with the requisite skills to promote the sport using community resources. To a large extent, the development of swimming in historically disadvantaged schools over the last 10 years has been the responsibility of the national swimming federation. However, the United Schools Sports Association of South Africa (USSASA) has tended to focus on the organisation of events, drawing together schools that already have swimming programmes. USSASA has therefore had limited involvement with the development of the sport in schools that were traditionally outside the domain of organised aquatic sport, with the result that transformation has not included those who were most marginalised and excluded from the sport under apartheid.

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The organisational factors impeding transformation are several. The human resource demands for transformation are substantial, particularly if the focus is on increasing mass participation. Large numbers of swimming teachers are needed to promote the sport at all levels. Although SWIMSA has trained several hundred such teachers, it has very little control over where these teachers practise their skills – generally in communities that can provide some remuneration for their services. Thus such teachers are rarely active in poor townships or at schools where they will receive no income. Apart from swimming teachers, other human resource needs relate to the voluntary activities associated with organised swimming, such as technical officiating, administration and management positions at club, provincial and national levels. While SWIMSA has conducted training for all of these categories of volunteers, the competitive demands of the sport are tremendous, with activities taking place on most weekends, particularly in the summer months, in competition venues located at a distance from the poorer communities. For unemployed volunteers from the townships, this represents a substantial financial investment – which is not sustainable either by the individuals themselves or by the organisation. Thus, these activities are undertaken by the better resourced members within the swimming fraternity – those with vehicles, time and professional expertise. And these, more often than not, happen to be white.

Facilities and related issues also pose a major threat to transformation. Since 2000 many municipalities throughout the country have made major investments in the upgrading of existing or the building of new aquatic facilities – many up to competitive standards – in communities in need. However, these initiatives have not been backed up by community participation through the establishment of clubs. While SWIMSA has often tried to provide as supportive an environment as possible, working class communities have lacked the necessary resources to establish clubs. In many cases, the promotion of use of the facilities and of aquatic activities has come to rely on the pool supervisor or the lifeguard, which has obvious limitations: 'A single individual providing a limited amount of time to developing

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competitive swimmers fails to provide the necessary infrastructure either to transform the grouping of youngsters into a competitive team or create a new generation of technical officials or administrators' (Naidoo interview 1). Other problems faced by established facilities include the lack of heating facilities, which means that pools go unused during the winter months in all provinces.

Faced with these sorts of organisational complexities, and the need to respond to state pressures to produce internationally competitive black swimmers, the tendency has been to identify potential black athletes and remove them to a facility within an advantaged community under an experienced coach. This comes about at the expense of investing resources in developing infrastructure within poorer communities, a strategy which, while not likely to produce a national champion immediately, is likely to result in the long-term development of the sport, particularly in terms of coaching skills and a much bigger talent pool of internationally competitive swimmers (Naidoo interview 1).

Another significant obstacle to transformation has been the persistence of conservative attitudes and practices by individuals in positions of power. Often, because of the legacy of apartheid, technical expertise and skills have continued to reside in white individuals who have conservative attitudes and are resistant to change. This has meant that processes of transformation have had to rely on individuals who have not bought into their intentions and ideals, often resulting in the processes being delayed or derailed through sabotage or a lack of will.

The transformation processes adopted by SWIMSA

In 1999, following the integration of ASASA into SWIMSA, a national committee was established to develop a policy on transformation. The first step in determining appropriate intervention measures to address the identified problems in swimming would be the definition of a transformation vision for the organisation. This vision came to be understood as the need to transform

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aquatic sport so that it catered for the needs of the majority of South Africans, and to redress inequity created by apartheid. In the short term, SWIMSA would strive to become more representative of the racial demography of the country in all its structures and activities, at club, provincial and national level. Its long-term objective would, however, be the transformation of SWIMSA's programmes to focus on the development of programmes for black children and adults, and the transformation of aquatic sport more generally to increase access for the disadvantaged.

This overall objective and vision was to be achieved through carefully designed projects, each with a set of clearly defined results to be attained through set activities. All of these were to be measured by specified indicators and timeframes, implemented by a responsible agency within the structures of SWIMSA. These projects included:

1 the democratisation of SWIMSA structures;
2 the development of black human resources;
3 greater grassroots development;
4 increasing black representivity of teams;
5 establishment of financial mechanisms for transformation.

In 2000, SWIMSA established a Transformation Monitoring Committee whose role it was to monitor the results of these projects. By the end of 2004 it was obvious that the self-regulatory approach adopted by the national leadership – i.e. the expectation that the provinces and clubs would adopt the comprehensive policy and integrate this into their respective programmes – was not working, for a variety of reasons. In recognition of this, in 2005 the organisation adopted a revised policy document. The revised strategy was more focused, with the setting of targets for all entities within the organisation (i.e. provincial structures, national technical structures, disciplinary boards etc.), applicable to competitors, technical officials, coaches, team management and administration. These targets were accompanied by both incentives and punitive measures (Naidoo interview 1).

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According to Jace Naidoo, there continue to be huge challenges that must be faced. The number of black swimmers at national level remains low, black swimmers in clubs in the main urban areas form less than 15 per cent of the membership, and the attraction and development of black administrators continues to be difficult. However, he hopes that a R24 million windfall received from the National Lottery Fund, spread over three years starting from 2009, will provide some impetus to their development plans. He is particularly hopeful that this will enhance the Learn to Swim Programme that was designed to broaden swimming into hitherto neglected areas, and in the longer term encourage a broader pool of competitive swimmers (Naidoo interview 2).

Recommendations: policy strategies for aquatic sports transformation

The transformation of aquatic sport in South Africa is faced with challenges that are uniquely different from those facing other sporting disciplines. While the federation has risen to these challenges as far as it is able to, it is obvious that if aquatics is to be truly transformed it will require vastly increased financial resources, especially from the state, increased facilities with specialised resources, and the adoption of innovative approaches to ensure that the sport becomes mass-based. Overall, proper mobilisation of resources has to occur to provide the infrastructure and other material and human resources necessary to correct the inequalities entrenched by apartheid – inequalities based largely on race and class. A transformation that seeks only to create access for a few black and white elite athletes to top-level competitive swimming not only entrenches old inequalities, but produces new relations of exclusion and marginalisation that themselves do not allow for the production and development of new talent. As this chapter has demonstrated, policies implemented thus far have tended to prioritise Transformation 2 (elite-level competitive swimming) over Transformation 1 (mass-based involvement in the sport).

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In order to give more space to Transformation 1, there are several policy approaches that must be considered. These relate to the following issues:

1 performance pathways from recreational to international sport (sport-specific strategies);
2 sport in schools;
3 community club development:
   a. urban
   b. rural;
4 coaches and other human resources;
5 facilities:
   a. urban: competitive
   b. rural;
6 centres of excellence (national and regional);
7 financial resources.

Performance pathways

The development of elite athletes has to follow a structured pathway from the first stage of introducing a child to the water to winning a medal at the Olympic Games. The current structures have produced breaks in these pathways, resulting in duplication of resources, as well as substantial potential being neglected, especially in the townships and rural areas.

Structured programmes to introduce children to swimming at schools (as a life skill, and in the form of basic competitive swimming) are critical to the development of nationally and internationally competitive swimmers.

This strategy must be driven by a single authority under the leadership of the national federation. Competitive programmes, coaching skills, team development and infrastructure development must adopt this strategy. This will ensure that the performance of the programme can be clearly evaluated.

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Promoting sport in schools

Swimming is recognised as a life skill, and the national Department of Education (DOE) has attempted to incorporate this skill into its curriculum – this provides an ideal opportunity to transform swimming into a mass-based sport. However, this policy intervention can only be promoted within a supportive and resourced environment. Currently the DOE adopts a non-enforced approach to the policy. The department needs to provide a mechanism by which learners can have adequate time *during* school hours to acquire the necessary skills, at least biweekly, rather than attempting to teach them after normal school hours. These programmes have to be targeted at primary schools in order to be effective, with much reduced resources at the secondary school level.

While the national DOE needs to provide the environment, the provincial DOES must develop a coherent strategy to implement these programmes, commencing with the identification of the necessary facilities within defined school zones, and ensuring that during school hours these facilities are for the dedicated use of schools within that zone. For this to happen, the provincial DOES have to work closely with local government Departments of Sport and Recreation (DSR). The DOE needs to provide the necessary infrastructure, such as transport required by the schools within the zone.

Competitive aquatic programmes must be clearly linked to the overall strategy of developing athletes. This includes the nature and content of competitive programmes, so that there is not a competitive relationship between the school and federation programmes. This will allow for the effective utilisation of scarce resources for coaching clinics and for travel to national and international competitions.

Community club development

Although a comprehensive and successful school-based learn-to-swim programme is likely to result in a mass of aquatic participants, the ability to translate this into competitive success will be dependent on the establishment of proper functioning clubs within the historically

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disadvantaged communities in both urban and rural areas. Among working class families, adult participation in sporting organisations is limited by the availability of time – and without a reduction in the length of the working week, this is not likely to change. Community clubs are currently dependent on volunteer administrators – usually unemployed youth, who, once they become employed, cannot commit to supporting the club. Creation by the national DSR of a 'community aquatics organiser', whose task would be to organise a competitive club within the community, would present a possibility to harness the potential generated by the schools' programme. Crucially, the organiser needs to build a community club infrastructure, as opposed to being the single individual on whom the club is dependent.

The 'community aquatics organiser' must be linked to the federation so as to ensure that the programmes at local level are linked to the overall national performance pathway strategy. Mechanisms must be found for ensuring the sustainability of these clubs, and support – both financial and in terms of human resources – from local and provincial government will be essential. The programmes of these clubs must not be linked to purely competitive swimming but should adopt a holistic approach to the role that swimming can play in the development of health, the youth and job-creation opportunities.

Developing human resources

Promotion of the school aquatic sport policy is dependent on the development of the necessary human resources. The national DSR and DOE must commit to the creation of posts whose job description is to ensure that learners acquire swimming skills at the most basic level. This is likely to require a huge state investment, with several thousand such positions needing to be created. However, without such dedicated resources there is minimal likelihood of a school-based programme succeeding. The provincial DSR and DOE need to work closely with the national federation's Learn to Swim programme for the training and certification of these trainers. During school holidays trainers can then take responsibility for the coaching of community-based clubs, reporting to the federation.

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In addition, human resources will have to be developed for the management of the sport in terms of officiating and administration. Joint programmes with the DOE and the federation will be essential.

Facilities development

The development and maintenance of facilities will be critical in the transformation of swimming throughout the country. Different innovative approaches will have to be implemented so that resources for facilities can be allocated to both urban and rural areas.

Local government needs to take more responsibility for the provision and maintenance of facilities. All facilities, particularly those at which a DOE aquatics trainer and community aquatics organiser are based, should ideally be open from 06h00–21h00 each day. Essential are adequate heated facilities, so that aquatics activities can continue for a full 12 months of the year. The latter is critical if serious competitive swimmers are to be developed who can hold their own in national and international competitions.

In rural areas two options should be investigated: firstly, the development of open-water facilities at dams and rivers that can be used for recreational and competitive swimming; and secondly, the introduction of economically feasible portable swimming facilities at schools in rural areas. This will create opportunities for athletes in rural areas to bid for a place in international swimming teams.

Drowning and rural areas The challenge of transforming swimming in South Africa is linked to the development of resources and facilities throughout the country. Swimming remains largely an urban sport, since urban municipalities with the necessary resources are more likely to have the capacity to build and maintain these facilities.

However, the introduction of open-water swimming into the Olympic programme provides an ideal opportunity for the development of talent in rural areas, by using the presence of rivers and dams as an opportunity to develop and hone swimming skills among those living in the vicinity

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of these sites. This will address the critical issue of swimming skills development within rural areas, where more than 80 per cent of drownings in the country occur each year.

Innovative resources need to be mobilised to address this skills gap. While the development of sufficient facilities in rural areas is unlikely in the medium term, there is a need to look at other options. The production of cheap portable pools creates an ideal opportunity for the development of swimming skills amongst rural residents, and for the identification of potential talent that can be nurtured.

The emergent relationship between SWIMSA and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) around the Portapool Project and the Rural Splash programme is an encouraging signal. The Portapool Project is designed not only to teach learners to swim but also to make the school an important part of community life. The pilot study for this project was launched at Bolata Primary School in Qwaqwa in the Free State. SWIMSA provided training for the local unemployed youth and mothers so that they could deliver the Learn to Swim programme to all learners.

Alongside this, SWIMSA's Rural Splash programme was launched on 3 November 2006 at Germiston Lake in Gauteng, also in partnership with the DWAF. Centred on natural water resources such as rivers, lakes and dams, it focuses on education and skills development activities.

While the immediate result might not be a black Olympic medallist, this programme will impact on national statistics, which reveal that fatalities through drowning are the second-highest cause of accidental death in South Africa. Over 50 per cent of these drowning victims are children under the age of 15 years, and some 70 per cent of these tragedies take place in still water.

Centres of aquatic excellence

South Africa will always have limited resources for the development of elite aquatic athletes, far less than the vast amounts of resources that are available to athletes in the top aquatic countries in the world. In this context, we need

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to develop innovative South African solutions that will allow us to utilise the limited resources that we do have, and at the same time develop the great pool of talent that exists.

Centres of aquatic excellence should be established in four or five regions across the country, with one national centre. These centres should provide world-class training facilities for the top athletes in the country, and also provide additional technical and scientific support for the development of athletes and coaches working at local and provincial levels.

Financial resources

A clear financing strategy needs to be developed that includes national and provincial government, the National Lotteries Board, the South African Sports Confederation and the Olympic Committee. This strategy needs to ensure that a multi-year (preferably four-year) funding strategy exists so that both development and elite programmes are sustainable over time.

Conclusion

The debate over swimming transformation has swung between the hysteria generated by national squad selection processes and racial quotas, and acknowledgement of the necessity of building the sport at the grassroots level. As this chapter has shown, these complexities lie at the heart of the fractious process of unifying black and white swimming and simultaneously working to transform the sport.

Much of the transformation struggle taking place within SWIMSA is reflective not only of South African sport generally, but also of the emergent social struggles in post-apartheid South Africa that revolve around the search for a balance between immediate demographic representivity in all social spheres, including sport, and the building of the necessary infrastructure for the sustainable transformation of society.

Generally, the policies adopted in sport have resulted in the investment of inordinate amounts of resources in a limited number of

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individuals who are groomed to become the standard-bearers of the 'new' South Africa in the domain of sport. As we have seen, this creates an imbalance in the allocation of resources between elite and mass-based sport.

These tensions have been evident in SWIMSA. A transformation agenda has been embarked upon that simultaneously addresses mass-based sport and the creation of an elite group of black swimmers, but success has varied over time – black elite athletes have emerged outside a mass-based context, only to retire from the sport, which then awaits its next black star.

While at the elite level SWIMSA has not produced black gold medallists, it certainly has put in place a transformation agenda that is creating and spreading a culture of swimming at the grassroots. But transformation is not a smooth process, and trying to challenge the racial composition of teams at, say, provincial level can lead to a number of unintended consequences and to scenes that read as if they were part of a Monty Python script.

At the end of 2007, for example, the Western Province water polo team was barred on the eve of playing in the finals of the Kramer Competition, because it had no black players or administrators. The rule applied by SWIMSA was that there had to be one black player in a group of thirteen players, or one black person on the management team, and the Western Province team did not meet this requirement. It emerged, though, that this suspension had been preceded by the suspension of five other teams because they did not meet the quota requirement. When *Die Burger* newspaper inquired of SWIMSA's general manager Rushdee Warley how Western Province had been allowed to go through to the final stages of the competition, he replied that 'it was difficult to know from team lists which players were black' (*Die Burger* 11 December 2007).

The consequences for the participants must have been devastating. Yet at the same time, thirteen years into South Africa's democracy, the fact that some six teams could not produce a black team member makes one wonder about the kinds of programmes that have been instituted, if any at all, in black areas. The unintended result of present initiatives could be

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that black players are simply put into a team to meet requirements, only to reinforce racial stereotypes and the racial contours of the apartheid era.

While struggles over representation in provincial and national teams will continue, it is vitally important that those in control of swimming keep their central focus on spreading a culture of swimming into schools and rural areas. However, early indications are that the fallout from the dismal performances at the Beijing Olympics is that swimming authorities are bowing to pressure to devote the bulk of available resources to the development of elite swimmers.

A hopeful development is that swimming received a major boost in June 2009 when the National Lotteries Board announced a substantial investment in the sport over three years. It remains to be seen where the emphasis will be placed in using this money, and how the swimming authorities will balance the imperatives of winning medals, nurturing black elite swimmers and pursuing mass-oriented programmes such as Learn to Swim and Rural Splash.

Notes

1 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.
2 Through the 1960s there was a growing call both from inside and outside South Africa for the country to be excluded from international competitions. As a result of this pressure South Africa was expelled from the International Olympic Committee in 1970, and from many other international sporting bodies.
3 From an untitled ASASA document of 1992, in the Morgan Naidoo collection of archival material held by his son, Jace Naidoo.
4 The memorandum is in the Morgan Naidoo Collection.
5 Seotsanyana, cited in an untitled ASASA 1992 document in the Morgan Naidoo collection.
6 Seotsanyana, cited in the ASASA 1992 document in the Morgan Naidoo collection.
7 Seotsanyana, cited in the ASASA 1992 document in the Morgan Naidoo collection.
8 Untitled ASASA document of 1992, Morgan Naidoo collection.

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9 This term was used to refer to a wide range of organisations that saw the Freedom Charter as their guiding beacon, and the ANC as its main organisational form. They are also sometimes referred to as Charterist organisations.

10 A four-day workshop was held in Harare in April–May 1990 at which economists from the ANC-COSATU-SACP (Tripartite) Alliance Economic Trends unit debated ideas about an appropriate economic policy framework for post-apartheid South Africa. The workshop sought to harmonise the different impulses of the Tripartite Alliance, and was a precursor to the formal negotiations with the apartheid government. The workshop ended with a statement of policy recommendations that was published in full in *Transformation* 12, 1990, with the title 'Recommendations on post-apartheid economic policy'. It is also known as the 'Harare Declaration'.

11 The Labour Party was a coloureds-only political party that participated directly in the racially segregated parliamentary system. It was condemned by many organisations in the liberation movement for its collaborationist policies and acceptance of racial categorisation.

12 The resources required to produce a swimmer who is capable of winning a medal at the Senior National Championships of SWIMSA, or who becomes eligible to swim in the final meet of an international competition, are considerable. A competitive swimmer will need to train for between four and six hours per day, for at least six days per week over 10–11 months each year. For this, the swimmer will require modification of his or her education programmes, access to a coach with international experience, access to a heated swimming pool during the winter months, and a proper regulated diet. Critically, parental involvement and support are essential for the success of the individual athlete. The swimmer will also need access to fitness assessment experts and sports psychologists. In addition, biological monitoring tests, such as monitoring of heart rates, lactate assessments and so on, will have to be conducted. Cost estimates to maintain a single swimmer within a top competitive club and participation in selected national competitions are in the region of R16 000 per year. SWIMSA, in fast-tracking selected disadvantaged athletes, invests in the region of R80 000 per year to maintain one swimmer in a high performance centre. These expenses are obviously unsustainable by either the club, provincial affiliate or national federation.

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Mike Davey, former president of ASASA, Johannesburg, April 2006

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3

Inside 'the House of Pain': A case study of the Jaguars Rugby Club

Ashwin Desai and Zayn Nabbi

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> Sports remains a highly contradictory enterprise that, on the one hand, brings people and communities together, albeit for short periods of time...On the other, it divides people through its very nature of having winners and losers...The question we must continually examine is who are the winners and losers... (Nauright 2005: 213)

IN THE BUILD-UP to and aftermath of the Rugby World Cup victory in 1995, the South African rugby authorities made a number of public commitments to a comprehensive development programme. For example, in March 1993 the South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU) committed a sum of R13 million rand to a fund for a general programme of rugby development in previously disadvantaged areas for the first year, and some 6 000 coaches fanned out across the country to bring rugby to disadvantaged communities (Grundlingh 1995: 6). There was also the promise of 'Operation Rugby', designed to encourage mass participation by building or upgrading over 40 grounds, using 40 per cent of World Cup profits. These initiatives, it was stated, would pour resources into previously disadvantaged areas and create a solid base of black rugby players (Desai & Nabbi 2007: 410).[1]

While there have been numerous debates about the impact of development programmes such as these, there has been very little critical reflection on how black rugby clubs have fared since the unification of rugby.

This chapter proposes to do just that, by looking in particular at the experiences of Jaguars Rugby Club, which is based in KwaZulu-Natal. Our intention is to provide a 'fine-grained analysis' (O'Brien & Slack 2004: 169) of the impact of the last decade-and-a-half on one rugby club based in the coloured area of Sydenham in Durban. The latter part of the chapter attempts to stitch local dynamics onto the national canvas in order to explicate how developments at a broader level impact on the local context, and on the possibilities for a deeper transformatory project at this level.

Jaguars: the pride of Sydenham

On Friday evening 6 March and Saturday 7 March 2009, the only black rugby team in the KwaZulu-Natal Premier League, Jaguars, held a sevens tournament at their headquarters in Sydenham.

A total of 16 teams were participants, including three teams from the Jaguars Rugby Club and one visiting team from outside the province (Eersterust from Pretoria, who play in the Carlton Cup, the Blue Bulls Premier League club competition).

On the Saturday afternoon there were hundreds of people at the ground. A sound system belted out music and there was a brisk trade in boerewors and beer. Some of the teams barely had the funds to put a kit together and the lunch pack was the only meal they would have for the day. But there was joy and excitement here – a grassroots feel and a feast of running rugby in about 40 matches.

Jaguars are a household name in club rugby in the province. In 2005 they had underlined their nickname as the sabre-toothed minnows when they finished joint-third in the Premier League (the Moor Cup) and lost in the semi-finals of the Murray Cup knockout competition. They remained undefeated at home; it is no secret that opponents find it extremely uncomfortable to play at

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their home ground, Capell Road, which has come to be known as the 'House of Pain' like the famous Carisbrook Stadium in Dunedin, New Zealand.

Barely concealed behind the carnival of rugby in March 2009, however, was a great deal of tension and worry in the ranks of the Jaguars administrators. Old-style black community clubs like Jaguars face tremendous pressures, and their situation is a far cry from what seemed to pertain at the time of the heightened expectations that surrounded them in the wonderful 2005 season.

The relative success of 2005 inspired the club to map out an ambitious three-year plan to win the league by 2007. But this plan was almost immediately mitigated by the declining fortunes of the club. In 2006 they finished in the second half of the table and in 2007 and 2008 this position persisted; the plan to win the league in 2007 was replaced with a desperate quest to avoid relegation. The enthusiasm and optimism that infused Jaguars in 2005 have been challenged by a variety of obstacles that continue to plague the club. They have only one main playing field. This means that the senior teams constantly vie with junior teams and women's teams for access to the ground to train. Pressure on the old white rugby clubs to 'deracialise' sees them looting Jaguars of black players who are already 'finished product', or nearly there. Over the years, Jaguars have produced Springboks of the calibre of J.P. Pietersen and Waylon Murray. Hanging on to players, hiring top-class coaches, and providing transport, equipment and floodlights all mean that sponsors have to be found to keep the club going.

To understand the current blockages that continue to impede the club's progress, it is important to have an understanding of the roots of Jaguars, and its relationship with the KwaZulu-Natal Rugby Union (KZNRU). Officially founded in 1987, Jaguars Rugby Club was born out of the amalgamation of four coloured clubs. Between 1960 and 1988, black rugby in the province of Natal was under the control of the Natal Rugby Board (known as the Natal Rugby Union at one stage) and was affiliated to the non-racial South African Rugby Union (SARU). SARU followed the tenets of the South African Council on Sport (SACOS), which endorsed the call for

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an international sports boycott of South Africa until the dismantling of apartheid.

To avoid any confusion, it must be pointed out that the white rugby fraternity in the province was also known as the Natal Rugby Board (NRB) and was an affiliate of the South African Rugby Board (SARB), which controlled white rugby. Even though SARB and the white NRB tacitly supported the ruling National Party by following the government's racist sports policies, the International Rugby Board (IRB), which governs the sport of rugby union globally, still acknowledged SARB as the ruling rugby body in South Africa. In 1992, SARB and SARU fused together as one organisation. The new body was called the South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU) and in 2004 the body was renamed SARU.

During the period preceding the merger of SARB and SARU, the black NRB reported to SARU. Although, competitive leagues were run in Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the standard of rugby played by the local black players was not as strong as that of players in the Eastern and Western Cape. Even so, the local black players played the game with gusto. However, in the mid to late 1980s black rugby in Natal went into a rut. For several reasons the player base had been eroded, and there were only three active clubs left. With so few teams operating, interest in the game waned, while most of the games turned into 'grudge matches' and the clubs found fewer and fewer young players attracted to the game.

With the local leagues crumbling, the black NRB sought guidance from mother body SARU to rescue the game in the province. SARU itself was bereft of resources, and could provide no plan for the NRB to broaden the appeal of the game. These were desperate times.

Moving from one cage to another

At the end of 1987, a meeting was chaired in St Anne's Church Hall in Sydenham; in the presence of representatives of the four amalgamating clubs, the decision was made to form one black rugby team and participate in the

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white-controlled NRB club competition from 1988 onwards. Thus it was that Jaguars was founded.

SARU officials still committed to the SACOS principle of 'no normal sport in an abnormal society' were hostile to this move. Rather play no rugby than play with the enemy, was the SARU inclination.

When Jaguars became an affiliate of the Durban Rugby Sub-Union in 1991, all black club rugby organised under the banner of SARU in KwaZulu-Natal ceased, as did the black NRB. (This is a salient point because, when there were unification talks between SARU and SARB in 1991–1992 and the process of unification was taking place at a national and provincial level in other parts of the country, there was no actual unification in KwaZulu-Natal. This was to result in the current state of rugby in the province, where the black clubs remain a very small minority and have very little influence on the running of the local game.)

The NRB officials had suggested that all the black players be farmed out and absorbed by the white clubs, but the Jaguars' founding members, Dekker Govender and Malcolm Groome, scoffed at the notion. 'The point of forming one club was to keep the culture of rugby alive in the coloured community and we told them that that would never happen' (Groome interview). Eventually a decision was made to include Jaguars in the NRB's lowest league, the fifth division, and the club entered one team in 1988.

In their inaugural season Jaguars found themselves on the receiving end of some cricket scores, but the following year (1989) two teams were entered into the club competitions. Jaguars now fielded sides in the fourth and fifth divisions. However, the club initially struggled to find its footing because the fifth division was the stomping ground of many former Natal and club first-team players, who were now enjoying social rugby:

> Yes there were many former Natal and first-XV club players in those fifth-division teams so the games were tough. We also battled because our pack was smaller than the other forwards so we used to have a hard time up front. We had such a potent backline but sometimes we were unable to unleash them. (Govender interview)

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In interviews about the Jaguars, both Malcolm Groome and Dekker Govender also highlighted what they perceived to be refereeing biased against them. According to them, this is something that would intensify as the scores became closer during their rise to the premier division.

> We also started being verbally abused. We were called coolies, kaffirs, bushmen, bushies and hottentots on many occasions. People would say 'what do you know about the game?' and 'why are you playing this white sport?' (Govender interview)

These experiences mirrored Chester Williams' experience at the highest levels of the game. His biography, published in 2002, revealed a litany of racist abuse, none more startling than that of his team-mate James Small: 'You fucking kaffir...why do you want to play our game? You know you can't play it...' (Small, cited in Keohane 2002: 45).

According to Govender, they never complained to the union (the NRB) because 'we didn't take those comments seriously. The way I looked at it if somebody was calling me a coolie I was one up on him' (Govender interview).

In 1989 the Jaguars first team was able to win the fourth division knockout cup, much to the surprise of all concerned. That year the 'father of white rugby', Doc Danie Craven, made a trek to Durban after hearing about the growth of black rugby in the province. Craven was clearly impressed with the club's commitment to the game. He gave the Jaguars' executive an undertaking that he would support them, and eventually cajoled the NRB into giving the club a R120 000 loan to build a clubhouse. As discussed below, this loan would eventually become an albatross for the club and Jaguars are still paying it off.

While overt racism is one challenge the club has had to face, another problem is the lack of support from the KZNRU. While the provincial body is quick to laud the club as a positive exponent of their development programme (even though this is a misnomer, as the club has been around since long before the catchphrase 'development' was coined), this lack of support has hindered their progress.

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Being the only black team in the Premier League means that the transformation policy also works to the detriment of the club because, whenever there are provincial teams selected, several Jaguars players are usually to be found in the junior and senior KwaZulu-Natal squads. Although some players are in the team on merit, the others are there simply to meet quota requirements. While the selection of these players does reflect positively on the club, in practice their departure weakens the team substantially and kills the momentum that has been established for it to move forward and upward. With none of the other eight clubs in the premier division consistently selecting more than a paltry three players of colour in their starting XVs, Jaguars has been called upon constantly to provide the cream of black talent. Even though there are 17 other black clubs in the province, the next-best black club is Wentworth, which plays in the third division.

With Jaguars seen as the home of black rugby in KwaZulu-Natal, players from various coloured and black townships often join the club. However, many of these players do not have their own transport or cannot afford to pay for public transport. Accordingly, the club forks out money to run minibus taxis to Wentworth, Newlands East, Ntuzuma and Marianridge. The funds come out of the Jaguars' budget and cost the club about 40 per cent of its grant and sponsorship money. This kind of financial outlay is not carried by any of the other premier division clubs, whose player bases are mainly white and black players from the middle class. For the 2009 season, a few highly talented young players joined from Ogwini Bafana, a club based in Umlazi that plays in the lower divisions. To travel to train in Sydenham four times a week costs each player R120 weekly, a sum of money beyond the resources of many of the players.

Jaguars also spend a large part of their budget on the clubhouse, which was built in 1996. It will be recalled that the NRU gave Jaguars a loan of R120 000 to build the club and, at the time, club chairman Martin Newell agreed that the loan would be paid off in instalments. However, with extremely limited resources, Jaguars have sat with this loan for 11 years, and

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because of the KZNRU's refusal to write it off, the club is forced to siphon off money which could be spent on the players and on investing in new resources. Jaguars are also allocated the smallest budget of all the premier division clubs, yet they have the greatest expenses, and historically have never received funding from the union. The current KZNRU system of allocating funding is geared towards maintaining the top clubs – the more teams a club has, the more funding it gets. While at one level seemingly fair, this adversely affects Jaguars. Here we see the poverty of the approach that understands non-racialism as the denial of race, and of the historical privileges that have been accumulated over time. In fact, until recently, some of the white clubs were able to make a killing because they were in a position to rent out parking space and collect the money for their own coffers when big games were played at the ABSA stadium in Durban.

Jaguars' plight has been worsened as a result of the global economic meltdown. The club's long-term sponsor, ChemSpec, has been affected by the global recession after a few years of heady profits and market expansion. The owner of ChemSpec, Strath Wood, has generously pumped money into Jaguars and over the past six seasons put in well over R1 million. In 2007 he also expanded his interest in KwaZulu-Natal rugby by becoming the main sponsor of the Premier League (the Moor Cup) through his franchise of paint stores, The House of Paint. However, at the onset of 2009 the club still had not received any money from the chemical company, which put a huge strain on their operations as they struggled to meet transport costs, coaches' salaries and living expenses for eight players. Jaguars' running expenses would amount to R500 000 for the 2009 season.

ChemSpec was expected to cover a large part of this amount through their promised R315 000 sponsorship, while the balance would come from a grant from the KZNRU, a development grant and some minor sponsorships. However, by the end of April 2009 the club had not received any of ChemSpec's sponsorship money and their ability to keep going was in severe jeopardy.

In May 2009, with the club on its last legs, the sponsor finally came through. The episode reflects the precarious position that Jaguars are in.

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The poaching of the Jaguars

The Jaguars' financial problems have been compounded by a player drain. The club's success and production of Springboks have seen Jaguars games attended by scouts from rugby clubs across the country, and there has been a steady migration of players to other clubs within KwaZulu-Natal and even across provincial boundaries. Even though local club rugby is meant to be fully amateur, Govender says that it is commonplace for under-the-table payments to be made (Govender interview).

With the lure of more money, and with the labels 'development' or 'small club' attached to them, the Jaguars have steadily lost players to the bigger and wealthier clubs. For instance, flyhalf Andy 'Kaiser' Fynn and fullback Lungisa Kama have sought success at College Rovers, even though this has meant their stepping down from the first team at Jaguars to the second XV at their new club. Indeed, even when there have been injuries in the first team at College Rovers in the positions in which Fynn and Kama play, more often than not other white players have been called up to fill the gaps.

Francois Louis, a Jaguars official, says the problem with white clubs is that 'they only want the finished product. They don't want to invest money or resources into developing black players. That's why it's easy for them to poach players from us' (Louis interview). As if to emphasise this point, in April 2006 the Jaguars' outstanding coloured flyhalf Ryan de la Harpe was signed by the Mpumalanga Pumas. This came after strenuous overtures by local white clubs.

The Jaguars' ability to replenish their playing stock has also come up against strong institutional barriers. In 2008 Jaguars were allocated four junior contracted white players from Welkom: Jan André Marais (lock), Johannes Snyman (hooker), Arno van Zyl (centre) and Wynand Pienaar (flyhalf). The boys joined the club and played in a struggling Jaguars under-20A team. However, their individual brilliance had been noted and they were called up to the first XV.

The quartet shone and were selected for the KwaZulu-Natal under-19 team. However, at the end of the 2008 season all four boys left the club

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because they were unhappy with the coaching and problems with the depth at the club. Jaguars were reluctant to sign their releases, but in response to pressure from the KZNRU agreed to release them, after one of the top officials dealing with the Sharks' junior contracts had explained to club officials that it was in their best interest for the players to leave. The official went on to explain that putting white boys in a black club had also been a social experiment, and this hadn't worked. He said the boys were future Sharks and needed to be involved in clubs where the coaching was up to scratch. Ultimately, the official stressed that no player could be forced to stay at a club where he was unhappy.

Jaguars were also not awarded any junior contracted players for the 2009 season, despite having been assured that the KZNRU would allocate a player to them. The argument put forward was that Jaguars had not concluded the process of appointment of coaches. The KZNRU official dealing with the matter was confronted on the issue by outraged Jaguars officials. They asked why he did not provisionally allocate Jaguars a player and, once the appointments were made, make a call on whether the junior contracted player would be coached by a qualified coach. The official's answer, according to a Jaguars official, was short and sharp: 'He said he thought about doing it, but then opted not to' (Pyoos interview 2008). He then simply refused to entertain any more discussion.

This decision had major implications for the club. By not being allocating any contracted players the under-20A team would be weaker than the year before, thus making it virtually impossible to produce a turnaround in results. However, what caused Jaguars greater consternation was the refusal of the KZNRU to allow four black players from Harlequins to come to Jaguars.

An interesting twist to the story saw the four players in question – Jazeed Johnson (wing), Howard Msisi (centre), Logan Basson (wing) and Faizel de Bruin (fullback) – visit Jaguars and meet with head coach Pieter Muller about the upcoming season. This followed an earlier meeting with Jaguars chairman Gerald Pyoos and life member Francois Louis, in which the four players had asked to join Jaguars. While there is a dispute as to what caused the deal to fall through, Jaguars officials are adamant that KZNRU officials had a hand in torpedoing the deal (Pyoos interview 2008).

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Wherever the fault lay, the net result was that at the end of 2008 Jaguars lost four quality junior players and were not allocated even one for the 2009 season. This has led to considerably weakened under-20A and premier division teams.

A senior Jaguars official was of the opinion that this episode was emblematic of the incredible battles Jaguars faced to secure players. He ruefully reflected that 'even though the club have a history of producing the likes of Pietersen, Murray and Etienne Fynn (all Springboks), the powers-that-be still don't believe that a historically disadvantaged club can regularly produce Sharks and Springboks' (Pyoos interview 2008).

Jaguars officials also face the frustration of development initiatives taking off, the club being mobilised to make them work, and then suddenly having the sponsorship cut off, thereby killing the programme. This is not a new phenomenon. For instance, in about 1993, Beacon Sweets sponsored a development club initiative that saw Francois Louis and Gerald Pyoos running mini-rugby games (usually played barefoot by children) in Sydenham. The programme became so successful that droves of black players flocked to Capell Road to learn the game. In fact the Junior Jags, as they were nicknamed, became so good that they started to roll over the traditionally strong white clubs at under-6 to under-13 level. But, without any warning or explanation, the sponsorship was suddenly withdrawn and the initiative fell apart.

Issues of tokenism, dealing with the lack of resources and inequitable distribution of income to the clubs remain areas of concern. Even though Francois Louis, a Jaguars official, chairs the transformation committee of KZNRU, by his own admission the committee has its limitations:

> We can't enforce anything because all our proposals have to be approved by council and the KZNRU executive. With the majority of the officials at the KZNRU being white, transformation is seen as a dirty word and an attack on white hegemony. There have been insignificant changes, even though the Sharks/KZNRU are meant to be the most transformed rugby body in the country.[2] (Louis interview)

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Meanwhile, black representation in the boardroom has also been minimal. Even though Oregan Hoskins, who is coloured, was the president of KZNRU as the present study unfolded, and chaired the Sharks board of directors in 2002–03, there had been no black CEO of either the amateur or professional arms of rugby in the province to date. Indeed, when in late 2005 the senior vice-presidency position at the KZNRU fell vacant, the man in line for the job was junior vice-president Francois Louis. However, Louis, who one Jaguars official described as 'a born administrator', was challenged for the position by a junior administrator, Gary Meyer.

In his time on the council Louis has been seen as a radical by the conservative element. If one was to measure suitability for the position in terms of length of service to the game, Louis would be seen as the more qualified candidate in that he has served on the KZNRU council since unification in 1992; even the president, Hoskins, admitted that Louis was senior to him. However, Louis lost at the ballot box to Meyer. On a council of 42 members, with a meagre 8 black officials, it became common knowledge that the vote had not been about competency but rather about preserving the upper echelons of power in white hands. Reflecting on the 'shock' that the voting demonstrated such an overtly racial bias, one of the Jaguars officials commented: 'Indeed the last outpost stands in the province and the message from the election blared out like a klaxon: the only Jaguars we want are ones without teeth' (Pyoos interview 2006).

In mid-2008 Louis was eventually called up to the Sharks board, where all major decisions concerning commercial rugby in KwaZulu-Natal are made. One wonders what transformation initiatives he will be able to put in place, though, as he is serving with a group of officials for whom the financial bottom line is of paramount importance.

Jaguars without teeth?

What this case study demonstrates is the lack of a clear development programme for black rugby, how voting power (skilfully manipulated) blocks black administrators with a vision of change from rising through the ranks,

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how the transformatory agenda is abused so that provinces and white clubs are able to use money to buy 'the finished product', and how this hurts clubs like Jaguars. Fourteen years after winning the World Cup, and close on to two decades after 'unity', there is still only one club from a disadvantaged background in the premier rugby league in the province. It would appear that the agenda is to create an elite group of players, while the broadening of the game has fallen off the list of priorities.

Even so, what remains so impressive about the Jaguars, apart from their sound administrative base and their success in producing top-class players, is the manner in which they have mutated from a 'coloured' club to a truly non-racial club. Today some seven of the players in the first team are African, and the captain for the 2006 season was white. Furthermore, watching them play at home produces a distinct sense of carnival: a small club battling against the odds, taking on overwhelmingly white sides with greater resources and longer traditions. Spectators are involved in the game, turning it into a spectacle full of drama. The administrators of the club are all ex-players. The clubhouse is a place of entertainment for people of the area throughout the week.

In the pursuit of greater success, and in keeping with its commitment to having in its ranks players from impoverished backgrounds, the club needs financial backers committed to the long haul. Yet even with the club's present success to burnish its reputation, it encounters difficulties in securing commercial backing because of the limits of the impoverished market in which it is geographically and socially located. Thus, as indicated earlier, in 2005 it managed to secure the sponsorship of a company, ChemSpec, that sells spray paint to panel beaters. A white firm, it had hoped to break into the panel beater market, traditionally a sector in which many business owners are coloured. However this sponsorship has proven to be a poisoned chalice, as the company has been less than forthcoming in recent times. Despite such problems, the Jaguars have remained determined to secure a lucrative sponsorship deal that will allow them to hold on to good players and even attract players from other clubs.

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Some of this determination is motivated by the fact that none of the schools in the immediate catchment area of Jaguars plays rugby any longer. The schools cite a lack of resources as the reason for their failure to provide for youngsters wanting to play the game. In this context Albert Grundlingh makes the pertinent point that 'rugby has also become a commercial product at school boy level' (Grundlingh 2008: 12). He points to the annual Easter weekend tournament involving elite private schools in Johannesburg as an example of this:

> Large corporations, including banks, act as sponsors of the tournament and in the process turn the game into a commodity with a view on future dividends. The teacher in charge of rugby at one of these schools explains: 'It is all about business. The school's accounts are now held with the bank sponsoring them. For every million they spend on school rugby, they probably get back R13 million in business. The kids will open accounts with that bank as well.' (Grundlingh 2008: 12)

The lack of local feeder schools, seen in the context of the rugby union not making young players available to Jaguars, means that there are real problems in creating a viable player pool. The lack of finance only serves to exacerbate this situation.

It has been suggested that the only way for Jaguars to survive is to subsume itself under the banner of one of the white clubs. What effect would this have on the sense of community, on the way ex-players stay in the game, and on the environment created in which black players in an overwhelmingly white rugby culture can 'find their feet'?

Meanwhile, after some 15 years of 'unity', racism continues to raise its head. In a match against a 'white' club in March 2009 one of the Jaguars players was called a 'kaffir'. Unlike the response to such behaviour that was typical in the times of Dekker Govender, the players and officials wanted to pursue the matter. The KZNRU officials either seemed at a loss as to how to deal with the issue or did not think it important. The matter has now made its way to SARU headquarters. Jaguars officials say that after a lull of a few years, racist baiting is back, coming from both spectators and players.

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Truck and trailer

Truck and trailer is a metaphor that can be used to understand transformation in South African rugby.[3] The national team and the approach to the running of the game that flows from this – with its emphasis on elite academies and the professionalisation and commercialisation of the game, allied to the need to have winning teams – are increasingly de-linked from the way rugby is managed and played at local level. Measuring the success of transformation in rugby by reference to representation at national level is important, because of its high public profile and because it allows for the creation of role models and so on. However, it can also rebound on the game as a whole, despite the best of intentions, by covering up the lack of fundamental change at lower levels. This means that the base of the game is not broadened; the number of black players coming through is limited, placing incredible pressure on a few black players at the top and on the coach and selectors if top black players get injured. Transformation then becomes a roller coaster ride, with some provinces, Super 14 teams and the national squad showing progress, and then suddenly moving backwards with fewer and fewer black players available for the team.

The ideal situation would be for the transformatory agenda to function seamlessly from bottom to top. As is the case in the rules of the game, allowing one component of a loose maul to pull or push another along is not illegal per se. For truck and trailer to be effective and not penalised, the entire loose maul must be connected and bound to each other. But when the players in the front are acting as shields for the ball-carrier behind, preventing him from being tackled, then a truck and trailer situation arises. This is, metaphorically, what is happening in South African rugby. The relative, if by no means adequate, representation of players of colour in the top echelon of the game disguises the fact that, behind them, all is not well at all. At that level, the ball-carriers remain overwhelmingly white.

The de-linking of the truck and trailer is a metaphor that can be used at a number of levels. Regions like the Eastern Cape, for example, could

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be de-linked. It is precisely this issue that Francesco Migliore quite starkly points to, in an article published in the *Mail and Guardian* in 2006 (*Mail and Guardian* 16–22 June 2006). Migliore shows that the trajectory that rugby has taken can entrench and exacerbate regional and school-level under-development:

> The Eastern Cape is a hotbed of black rugby talent and yet awful administration has ensured that the game in the region is dying. Talented players slip by unnoticed, the lucky ones move elsewhere to play, where they have to compete for places in unfavourable circumstances. In other provinces, a black player has to be a proven performer before he gets to displace someone the coach has known for season upon season. Where on earth does a promising black player go to get these credentials when his home union cannot provide first class rugby?

In schools rugby, talented black players

> ...are plucked from their homes and deposited in a foreign environment, removed from family and friends. While in some cases this could be beneficial, it is undoubtedly difficult for everyone concerned. It also affects the legacy they could leave. Heroes are needed to encourage younger players to emulate feats. Capturing the imagination of the youngest players is a key to a sustainable chain of superstars. In areas where television is a luxury, top-quality schools is the only answer so, instead of stripping these areas of their idols, is it not preferable to create an arena for them to showcase their talents? Imagine a rugby-playing school giant such as Grey Bloemfontein playing rugby in Umtata, for example, and losing to a better team. Impossible? No, all it needs is restructuring, starting with one school, the blessing of the Department of Education and a willing sponsor.

Migliore uses the debate over the Super 14 franchises to point out that the current transformatory agenda in rugby

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> ...is obviously flawed, considering that after a decade and millions of rands all we have to show from the development programmes is a handful of players capable of higher honours...As a country we have produced restricted-age-group teams that are selected on merit and representative of all ethnic groups – but the players seem to disappear at senior level. The blame must be apportioned to all involved, from coaches not willing to embrace a new society to administrators for not taking care of these nuggets and the politicians who are too busy enjoying their new power to actually care.

Chester Williams makes a number of suggestions relating to transformation. For him, the coach of a team is crucial:

> 'The only person who can erase doubt is the coach. If our coaches are committed to selecting the best possible players in South African rugby, then there would not be a colour issue and the matter of quotas would disappear in time.' There has to be a broader base of black players 'competing at provincial and Super 12 level on a regular basis. From this pool those good enough to make the national team will do so. You will never need a quota system applied to the test team if the quota system is effective at provincial level. The black players will stand up and be picked at the highest level because they are good enough.' All this, according to Williams, is predicated 'on a new order' administering the game. (Keohane 2002: 157)

Mark Keohane (2002: 153–154) places great emphasis on changes that need to be made at domestic level and points to the dangers of window-dressing:

> Those politicians who were eager to see some progress in transformation, but who were frustrated by the slow pace of change, started playing the numbers game. But their good intentions were misdirected; instead of focusing on the domestic structures of the game, their emphasis was on the national level. This only harmed the fight by black players for equality in South African rugby and it abetted

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> the absurd notion that blacks could not play test rugby. Black players were used as political pawns in the middle and late 1990s to deflect government pressures – and those players were the ones who suffered most.

Stanley Raubenheimer, who played briefly for Western Province in 1993 as scrumhalf and who was a product of the anti-apartheid SARU, focuses on the fact that black administrators simply fitted into the 'system' and lacked courage: 'We can blame the provincial presidents and coaches until we are blue in the face, but our own people have let us down since unity. The administrators are only looking after themselves' (Keohane 2002: 107).

What Raubenheimer is alluding to is the need to rethink the kind of administrators needed in rugby. Is it simply about managing in the same way that previous white administrators did – seeing things in technical ways rather than in political *and* technical ways? Or is it about adopting a more patient approach of building a solid foundation, from the school level upwards? Clearly, it means rather more than just taking the lead from government, and it will entail challenging the government to free up resources to fund a solid cohort of coaches at schools level, identifying schools in townships that can serve as well endowed centres of excellence, forcing the sponsors to look downwards to clubs like Jaguars for success rather than simply upwards, and creating the conditions for innovation rather than the imitation of global trends.

It is Nick Mallet, the former Springbok coach and now coach of Italy, who may have put his finger on the key point. Among a number of proposals he has made for a way forward for South African rugby, Mallet has argued that the Vodacom Cup should be jettisoned and replaced by a national club competition. The clubs, via a grant from SARU, would be run on a semi-professional basis. Mallet builds in a transformation element at this level, with clubs only receiving 'the grant if they met quotas – no transformation equals no money. You could perhaps say three white players must start for "black" teams and five black players start for "white" teams. This would guarantee broad-based transformation' (*Sunday Times* 2 March 2006).

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Sports journalists have, on the whole, received Mallet's proposals with acclaim. Yet these proposals would require a significant change of mindset and will on the part of rugby administrators. For example, if every union was to have six clubs, they would all require substantial resources to sustain more than one top black rugby club. And how would one prevent white clubs from simply raiding black clubs for 'the finished product'?

Oregan Hoskins became president of SARU in 2006. Following his election, he offered these answers to questions concerning transformation and leadership:

> Q: Do you have any ideas about developing the game in areas where there are scarce resources?
>
> OH: Let me say this: for transformation to take place the development of the game will have to work hand-in-hand. SA Rugby [i.e. SARU] can provide the skills but government must provide the resources. We can't do that.
>
> Q: But, don't you think given our past SA Rugby should be doing something extra to help previously disadvantaged areas/schools/clubs gain access to resources?
>
> OH: We don't have the money to invest in resources. That must come from government. We can provide the skills, leadership and knowledge – like coaching and organising competitions. SA Rugby is not here to build infrastructure in the townships – that is government's job. We simply don't have the capacity or finances to do that. Government and SA Rugby must work hand-in-hand to develop the sport and I can tell you that [the] Ministry of Sport want to work with us to grow the game.
>
> Q: What type of leadership model do you envisage for SA Rugby?
>
> OH: I want the executive staff to handle the day-to-day running of the company and the Springboks. The CEO [Johan Prinsloo] would handle the goings-on at the head office of SA Rugby in Cape Town and ensure that everything is running smoothly. The President's Council [made up of the 14 provincial heads, vice-president, deputy president and president] would act as a check and balance on the executive staff. The President's Council would formulate policy and the executive

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> staff would ensure that this policy is carried out. In no way do I see the President's Council becoming redundant or around just to rubber stamp decisions. It is important to run our company like a professional business with the players the most valued assets. (Hoskins interview)

There are some honest but worrying signals coming from Hoskins that stem from his view that he is running a business. SARU, he maintains, is not going to build infrastructure from the tens of millions it derives from television rights and sponsorships deals. For Hoskins, that is the job of government. He is right. But this is a government that has not thrown significant resources into disadvantaged areas. In fact with the onset of planning for the Football World Cup 2010, the emphasis is on mega-projects like 'world class' stadiums, the Coega industrial zone in Port Elizabeth, the Gautrain in Johannesburg and the Dube-tradeport in KwaZulu-Natal.

Hence it is that as the rugby officials pass the ball to the politicians, they in turn look to the private sector, who look to the disadvantaged areas and see no market for their goods. And so intricate patterns are woven across the field but there is no one taking the ball beyond the gain line into disadvantaged areas.

In 1995, two somewhat contradictory forces took to the playing field: the professionalism of the game that has profit as its central concern, and an African nationalism that saw a progressive shift of the game away from white dominance. African nationalism, beyond the power exerted by Mandela's moral legitimacy at the time, was appeased by the singing of *Shosholoza* (a song originally sung, ironically, by migrant mineworkers to reflect on their difficult lives), and the re-naming of the national team as 'the Amabokoboko'. This 'Africanised the team and gave blacks a stake in the Springboks for the first time' (Booth 1999: 189). By 2006, African nationalism demanded more than a re-naming exercise. As if on cue in the build-up to the Springbok–All Blacks clash on 26 August 2006, a group calling itself the Transformation and Anti-racism Committee (TARC) threatened to stage a protest outside the venue, Loftus Versfeld Stadium. Vuyo Matsha, the convenor of TARC, was quoted as saying: 'There has been covert racism in rugby since the unification

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14 years ago, and if we don't act now it will remain. How do you explain the absence of black referees in the Currie Cup and black players in our representative teams? We demand meaningful and massive transformation from SA Rugby. When last did we hear of black players at Craven Week?' (*The Citizen* 24 August 2006). There were four black players in a squad of 22 for the game. There was a curt response from the country's player of the century, Frik du Preez, to the protest: 'South Africa has enough black players representing the national team' (*The Citizen* 24 August 2006).

The difficulty is that as professionals, South African rugby players expect to be paid the same amounts as New Zealand and Australian players, leaving few resources for the development of the game in disadvantaged areas. While at the level of rhetoric the South African government is committed to developing facilities in these areas, in reality the emphasis is rather on 'a cycle of events-driven development' (Booth 1999: 179) that emphasises mega-sports events, with resources thrown into mega-stadiums and high-tech infrastructure.

In regard to representation the focus is at national level, but this is accompanied by a concomitant decline in broad-based development. Part of the reason for this comes from the heady days of 'unity'. Tommy Bedford, a former Springbok loose forward who played a pivotal role in the initial negotiations, has ruefully reflected on how officials ignored the state of club rugby:

> Black and white rugby administrators had the undoubted responsibility to treat full integration (through the clubs, at club level competition) as their greatest priority for South Africa when they formed SARFU. They singularly failed in this because they concentrated on getting the Springboks back into action; then on getting the IRB professional status; followed by the Super 12 and TriNations. They allowed club rugby to go to pot and [become] unable to produce the number of black players necessary for a new South Africa. So a quota system is a poor substitute but understandable 14 years on. (*Sunday Tribune* 19 March 2006)

The long-awaited SARU Transformation Process and Charter was unveiled in May 2006. It sought a broad-based transformation drive that would take

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in all aspects of the game, from club rugby to procurement of goods and services, placing demographic representation and access at the centre of its efforts. There was a nod to 'gender equity – [the] introduction of programmes to make sure that there is complete gender equity in the structure and operations of all SARU structures' (Basson 2006: 47). This, of course, is rich, coming from an organisation that has paid scant attention to women's rugby and re-introduced cheerleaders to its matches – black and white ones.

While the document presents a complex system of scorecards for the different aspects of transformation, there is very little on how club rugby in black areas is going to be rejuvenated and extended. Where will the resources come from? There is a throw-away line about 'Government and SARU' working 'towards new sources of funding' (Basson 2006: 47). At the time of writing, this looks like pie in the sky, especially with World Cup 2010 on the horizon. Rugby will find itself at the shallower end of the feeding trough when it comes to new sources of funding – a situation that will probably be exacerbated by the failed bid to host the 2011 Rugby World Cup.

However, many commentators argued that winning the Rugby World Cup in 2007 would be a catalyst for fundamental transformation. Minister of Sport and Recreation Makhenkesi Stofile stated that in 1995 an opportunity had been missed and it should not be missed again. Seemingly in this spirit, SARU appointed a black coach, Peter de Villiers, to take over from Jake White as the Springbok coach. While the appointment of a black coach is significant, given the history of the sport, there is no suggestion that this signals a commitment to broadening the game and the spread of resources into disadvantaged areas. All the signals are that if there are to be changes, then these will involve, at best, an elite transformation without a real commitment of resources to the township schools and to club teams like Jaguars. This is not to argue that there is no push from the bottom. Jaguars are an example of this desire to perform at the highest levels. But with the erosion of feeder schools and the lack of resources to keep youth rugby going, Jaguars will find themselves increasingly under pressure to remain in the Premier League.

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All this signals that if there are to be changes, these will involve at best an elite-level transformation, without a real commitment of resources to the township schools and club rugby teams like Jaguars that need them most.

One of the central challenges is that, without a strong intervention by government or rugby officials, the truck of professional rugby could be uncoupled from the trailer of what is left of amateur club rugby in black areas. Without funding, the SARU Charter will remain another set of good intentions, at best 'de-racialising' rugby through the development of a network of 'non-racial' elites.

Back on 'home ground', the future for a club like Jaguars looks bleak. They will barely survive the 2009 season, and will in time tumble down the table. Cut off from feeder schools, unable to convince talented young players to come to the club, and facing growing financial challenges, it is difficult to see how Jaguars will keep going as a club, let alone continue to produce Springboks.

The Jaguars' home ground came to be known as 'the House of Pain'. This attests to their fighting spirit at a time when the odds were stacked against them. One can only hope that this spirit sees them survive in the present difficult period, otherwise the name of their home ground could soon come to have a completely different meaning.

Notes

1 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.

2 The Sharks are the professional arm of provincial rugby while the KZNRU takes care of club rugby in the province.

3 'Truck and trailer' is rugby jargon used to explain obstruction at an attacking maul. What happens is that the ball carrier at the tail of the maul becomes de-linked from the maul, either by detaching completely or by not being bound to a teammate by his shoulder. By detaching from the maul the player is using his players as a shield to obstruct opposition from being able to fairly contest for possession. This is illegal and results in a penalty being awarded to a defending team.

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4

‘Transformation’ from above: The upside-down state of contemporary South African soccer

Dale T. McKinley

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> ...we have what must rank as one of the most amateurish ‘top flight’ leagues in South Africa. For all its supposed glitz, glamour and big money sponsors, the Premier Soccer League is still a tragic lesson in buffoonery. And as long as the league (and SAFA) lurch from one administrative bungle to the next, it’s hard to see any spin-offs for the national team. (*Sunday Tribune* 11 September 2005)

A brief history

FOR THE BETTER PART of the past century, the most popular sport in South Africa (in relation to both public entertainment and active participation) has been soccer. From its initial introduction into South Africa as a sport played almost solely by the propertied (white) gentry, soccer quickly became, by the turn of the twentieth century, the sport of choice amongst the black population and white lower classes. Not surprisingly, this rapid spread in popularity set off alarm bells within the corridors of (white) political and

economic power, as 'soccer became emblematic of threatening, socially integrative forces within society...' (Morell 1996: 114). For the next several decades, soccer became the *bête noir* of the racist white establishment, who successively used all means at their disposal, including the extensive powers of the apartheid state, to promote and support (white) sports such as rugby and cricket as well as to suppress and control the social, economic and political reach and impact of the (black) sport of soccer.

The results of such attempts at racialised, socio-political engineering – which included specific legislation designed to ensure racial segregation and material inequality in South African sport – were predictable: woefully inadequate soccer infrastructure and trained personnel, especially in black urban and rural areas; an almost complete lack of any meaningful/sustained development programmes for black students/youth; a racially divided institutional/administrative framework, which had, by the 1980s, produced four different soccer bodies to oversee the amateur and semi-professional side of the sport; and complete institutional and practical isolation by the governing bodies of international soccer, which ensured that South African soccer remained a wholly domestic affair.

None of this, however, could prevent the game of soccer in South Africa from becoming the *de facto* national sport (albeit mostly involving the black male population), nor could it stop the gradual breaking down of racial barriers on the field of play amongst widely supported (semi-)professional and mostly 'township'-based teams. By the late 1980s it was clear that, for the most part, the game of soccer was effectively operating outside the direct control of the apartheid state.

In 1987, all four of the different soccer bodies in the country – the South African Soccer Association, the South African National Football Association, the Football Association of South Africa and the South African Soccer Federation – met with the exiled leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) in Lusaka, Zambia. This meeting not only constituted the first tentative step towards the institutional unification of the sport inside South Africa (Dunywa interview),[1] but presaged the political shifts that were

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to take place in the coming years, which would finally usher in the end of formal apartheid.

It took another four years, however, for formal unification of all soccer bodies in South Africa to happen. In December 1991, the South African Football Association (SAFA) was founded at a meeting of all soccer bodies in Johannesburg. In SAFA's own words: 'It was only natural that the game finally be united, as the sport of soccer had long led the way into breaking the tight grip of racial oppression.'[2] Indeed, given its history, it came as little surprise that the sport of soccer led the way – a full two years before the apartheid state was to finally disappear – to South Africa's gradual re-acceptance into the international 'community' arena, as well as to the eventual (formal) de-racialisation of all sports in South Africa. Within a year, the newly formed and unified mother body of South African soccer had gained membership of both the continental (Confederation of African Football – CAF) and global (Federation of International Football Associations – FIFA) governing bodies of soccer.

Over the next several years, South Africa's various national teams (from the senior men's side, Bafana Bafana, and senior women's side, Banyana Banyana, down to the under-17 boys' team) hosted a number of international games and participated in the various CAF and FIFA competitions. By 1996, the country's first-ever fully fledged soccer business corporation for professional clubs (led by South Africa's biggest and most popular clubs at the time, Orlando Pirates and Kaizer Chiefs), the Premier Soccer League (PSL), had been formed. A number of senior men's players began plying their trade in overseas professional soccer leagues, and club teams like Pirates and Chiefs quickly gained a continental support base and received widespread international attention.

The general performance of these teams on the international stage indicated that, in spite of its long isolation from international competition and uneven development at the domestic level, South African soccer had emerged from the shadows of apartheid in pretty decent shape: in 1995, Orlando Pirates won the premier club competition on the continent, the African Champions Cup; in 1996 the senior men's national team won the

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Africa Cup of Nations; in 1997, the boys' under-20 team were runners-up in the African Championships; and, in 1998, the senior men's team qualified for the World Cup Finals in France where they performed admirably, despite exiting in the first round.[3]

Five years into the new, democratic South Africa, soccer seemed to be the only sport in the country to have 'delivered' for the majority of its people, notwithstanding the metastasised patriotism and temporary national euphoria surrounding the victory of the Springboks at the 1995 Rugby World Cup. After all, what better confirmation of post-apartheid national pride and self-confidence could there be than a successful showing on the continental and global field of the 'people's' game?

Unlike most of South Africa's other major sports, such as rugby, cricket, athletics, field hockey, swimming and tennis, soccer did not enter into the post-apartheid era as a sport in dire need of racial transformation on the field of play. Indeed, it was the only major sport, circa 1994, in which the vast majority of players, at all levels of the game, were black.[4] In many ways, this reality was reflective of the apartheid system's longstanding social, economic and political peripheralisation of the game of soccer alongside an exactly opposite approach taken to the country's other major sports. For many white South Africans (alongside some sections of the Indian and coloured populations), soccer had become a 'black man's sport', a part of 'black culture'.[5] In an ironic symbolism, then, soccer could be said to be the one sport in South Africa that had 'defeated' apartheid. And yet, the combined effects of the apartheid system's sustained efforts to ensure racial segregation, organisational division and socio-economic inequality in sport meant that such a 'victory' came with other 'costs'. The good early showings of South African soccer in the international arena masked transformational deficiencies at a more fundamental level.

Transforming what?

By the late 1990s it was clear that, despite the unification of the previously divided soccer bodies several years earlier and the admirable performances on

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the continental and global fields of play, the much expected transformation of soccer as a whole had barely gotten off the ground. At a time when sustained and meaningful financial, institutional and strategic support and guidance for soccer were most needed from the newly democratic government (as a means to overcome the entrenched legacies of apartheid social engineering), that same government was busy pursuing macroeconomic policies that effectively made it a non-player in the soccer arena.

As part of the government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic framework, and following the neoliberal economic advice of the various international financial institutions and Western governments, national grants and subsidies to local municipalities and city councils were drastically decreased (McKinley 2005: 182). What this meant in practical terms was that public resources (both human and material) available at the local level for sports such as soccer were virtually wiped off the map – in other words, the 'people's' sport was effectively privatised. Decrepit soccer infrastructure at municipal level and public schools could not be adequately addressed, training programmes for community and school coaches were left in the hands of volunteers, and the provision of basic soccer equipment and grassroots development programmes for the legions of township and school-going youth players had to rely, for the most part, on individuals, sympathetic community groups and hoped-for support from the private sector.

In turn, this produced a situation in which SAFA – a fully incorporated private body – became (whether by default or conscious design) the central role player in efforts to address the massive organisational and developmental needs of the game of soccer in South Africa, in regard to both human and material resources. (The country's other main soccer body, the PSL, had been set up to look after the specific interests and needs of the main professional clubs.) And, much like the response of local government structures to being thrown in at the deep end of self-sustainable service provision, SAFA's response was to turn its 'transformation' mandate inwards, focusing the bulk of its 'transformation' efforts on what was, in relative historical and

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institutional terms, the 'easiest' target – administration. In the words of the two-time CEO of SAFA, Raymond Hack, apartheid-induced 'administrative abnormalities' were systematically removed through a 'natural progression of inclusion [and] synthesising administration' (Hack interview).[6] It did not take long for this kind of transformation to be implemented and, on paper, it looks impressive:

- a 23-member National Executive Committee (NEC) as the top decision-making body, designed to manage and oversee all aspects of the game;
- 18 separate committees and sub-committees of the NEC dealing with, amongst other aspects of the game, finances, legal matters, medical issues, youth affairs, international affairs, security, technical issues, referees and competitions;
- 11 full-time staff members dedicated to soccer 'development' and 4 full-time staff for soccer 'education';
- 6 different professional, semi-professional and amateur leagues (Premier League, 1st–4th divisions and a Women's League);
- 8 national teams (Men: Senior, U-23, U-20, U-17, U-14, U-12; Women: Senior and U-19).[7]

It is axiomatic, whether in soccer or any other sport, that in order for any administrative 'transformation' to have positive effects beyond its immediate bureaucratic/structural intent, it has to be coterminous with, or at least followed by, practical transformation where it counts – i.e. at the grassroots level. As such, it was to be expected (even more so given the example set by the ANC government at the national level) that SAFA would follow up such structural and bureaucratic 'transformation' with a range of written developmental and educational frameworks and plans or programmes. One prime example was the 'Youth Development Policy Framework' (SAFA 1999) which invoked everything from 'nation-building' to 'Ubuntu' to the 'African Renaissance' as a means to 'encourage mass participation, identify talent, educate and develop, encourage play, manage resources and ensure

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participation at national and international level'. The framework made a long list of plans and promises which included:

- *Talent Detection*: SAFA will employ scientific processes, systems, measurement, principles, models and tests to detect and develop talent;
- *Funding*: SAFA will solicit funding for the Youth Development Programmes and other activities from current and potential sponsors, government and other corporate bodies, both locally and internationally;
- *Facilities and Equipment*: SAFA will establish development centres in all 25 regions that comply with international standards;
- *Schools of Excellence*: The SAFA/TRANSNET school will be retained and strategies put in place to ensure it runs at maximum capacity. As a long-term goal, SAFA will, in partnership with the government and big business, replicate the SAFA/TRANSNET school in all geo-political provinces;
- *Soccer Clubs*: They will be required to participate in and support implementation of this programme;
- *Schools*: SAFA will assist with all relevant technical development and provide guidelines for football development. (SAFA 1999: n.p.)

Like all bureaucrats who take themselves seriously, top-level SAFA officials have subsequently claimed that they have delivered on these, and other, 'transformational' programmes designed to provide practical support and redress to the soccer 'masses' (Hack interview). Unfortunately, the reality is that while there have been certain improvements in, for example, the number of coaching and player training courses as well as competitions taking place at community and school level, the kind of holistic structural transformation promised (and so desperately needed) has simply not happened. None other than long-time soccer administrator and current SAFA director of football development, Zola Dunywa, admits that seven years down the line, SAFA is 'still struggling to implement' the very same

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'Youth Development Policy Framework' that is supposed to form the centrepiece of soccer transformation in South Africa (Dunywa interview).

As will be discussed in more extensive contemporary detail in the next sections, there are two main, and inter-connected, reasons for the abject failure to deliver real transformation in South African soccer. On the one hand, there is a lack of political will on the part of the post-apartheid government (i.e. the public sector) to make the national sport a public concern, by actively addressing – through institutional and fiscal support and policy intervention – the developmental deficit, infrastructural needs and material inequalities that afflict the soccer community at the grassroots level. On the other hand, there has been institutionalisation of a top-down, bureaucratic and self-serving approach (within the context of a commodified, market-driven sports philosophy) to the actual development and management of the game of soccer.

Whither development?

In the period leading up to South Africa's first-ever democratic elections in 1994, the ANC and its allies in both the trade union movement and at the community level had adopted a progressively redistributionist developmental framework – the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – which set out the basic principles and policies that the new democratic government was to pursue in addressing the multiple legacies of apartheid. In the words of former President Nelson Mandela, the RDP represented 'a programme of government…a (developmental) framework that is coherent, viable and has widespread support…It is a product of consultation, debate and reflection on what we need and what is possible' (ANC 1994: Preface).

As applied to 'Sport and Recreation', the RDP set out in clear terms both the apartheid inheritance as well as what needed to be done to ensure transformation and redress:

> One of the cruellest legacies of apartheid is its distortion of sport and recreation in our society, the enforced segregation of these activities

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> and the gross neglect of providing facilities for the majority of South Africa's people. This has denied millions of people and particularly our youth the right to a normal and healthy life. It is important to ensure that sporting and recreational facilities are available to all South African communities…This cannot be left entirely in the hands of individual sporting codes or local communities…Sport and recreation should cut across all developmental programmes and be accessible and affordable for all South Africans…Particular attention must be paid to the provision of facilities at schools and in communities where there are large concentrations of unemployed youth. In developing such policies it should be recognised that sport is played at different levels of competence and that there are different specific needs at different levels. (ANC 1994: 72–73)

Yet, 16 years on these fine words have, for the most part, remained in the realm of stated principles and proposed policy when it comes to addressing the development needs of soccer. Across the soccer landscape – from politicians, players, trade unionists and journalists to fans and general sports enthusiasts – there is now a broad consensus that South African soccer is in a 'state of crisis'.[8] Even the government itself has finally recognised that there has been a systematic failure to carry through its own democratic mandate to transform the sporting landscape. In a 2006 speech to the National Assembly, the Deputy Minister of Sport and Recreation, Gert Oosthuizen, admitted as much:

> Sport is still being trivialised in our country. To realise the benefits that can possibly accrue from our sector, we need three things; resources, resources and more resources…What we need is: infrastructure organisation, programmes, facilities, equipment and kit; human resources sufficient thereof, of good quality and with an appropriate disposition; and, finance that underpins both infrastructure and human resources…As a Department we have the smallest budget of all national government departments. We are

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> committing some R10 per person per year to the participation of our people in sport and recreation activities presently. R10 can never make a substantial contribution to participation rates in sport and recreation... (Oosthuizen, cited in Mbeki 2006)

No surprise then, that the government pushed through a new piece of legislation, the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 2007, which 'seeks to empower the minister (of Sport and Recreation) to issue guidelines or policies to promote the values of equity, representivity and redress in sport and recreation' (*The Star* 8 August 2006). However, such legislative action has not translated into meaningful and sustained soccer development programmes or into practical socio-economic redress for the millions of soccer-playing youth. The fact is that the post-1994 abdication of public sector support and proactive involvement in relation to soccer has ensured the absence of the kind of 'accessible and affordable development programmes' in schools and (poor) communities that the government set as its minimum transformation target so many years ago.

When ex-national coach and SAFA Technical Committee member Ted Dimitru organised a soccer development workshop for schools in Soweto in early 2006, he found that 'most schools can provide only two footballs for their teams that are used for training, as well as matches [and play] on gravel pitches without proper goalposts and equipment'. Dimitru wryly noted: 'Incredibly, the education department is providing schools with tennis balls, badminton equipment, cricket bats, rugby balls, etc., despite the fact that the large majority of schools do not have the facilities or the traditions for such sports. It is hardly surprising that, under such hostile circumstances, the teachers involved in school football have never been offered any basic instruction on coaching' (Dimitru 2006).

Given that schools in a central, urban setting like Soweto would generally be considered, amongst poor communities, the most developmentally 'privileged' and easily 'serviced' by government, it does not take a developmental expert to figure out the state of soccer

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facilities, equipment and development programmes for those schools and communities located in far-flung small towns and rural areas. Indeed, during the course of field research in 2005 on the state of basic services in selected schools in the two poorest provinces in South Africa – the Eastern Cape and Limpopo – the author was asked by desperate school officials to donate basic soccer equipment, and found a complete lack of any soccer development programmes or decent facilities in these areas.[9]

As noted earlier in this chapter, instead of taking charge and driving through the necessary development programmes, the national government effectively handed over its mandate to under-capacitated and under-financed local governments, the private sector and a corporatised, for-profit, governing soccer body – SAFA. At the level of public soccer infrastructure available for the vast majority of players in the country (i.e. local, community stadiums, which are mostly owned by local municipalities) this has meant that 'there has been hardly any investment in them for the last 10 years' (Phillips interview). Even for a previous top soccer official like Trevor Phillips (a former CEO of the PSL), there is simply no escaping the (distorted) irony: 'There are 45 million South Africans and the country has some of the best rugby and cricket stadiums in the world but shit soccer stadiums…yet 40 million South Africans really don't care much about rugby and cricket' (Phillips interview).[10]

When it comes to actual development programmes on the ground, it would appear that SAFA CEO Raymond Hack is alone in asserting institutional and practical success. While Hack claims that 'the development programme of SAFA far exceeds anything in the past' and that 'this goes all the way down to grassroots level' (Hack interview), the organisation's director of development, Zola Dunywa, flatly contradicts his boss: 'The public perceptions of the development programme are true…the main problem is that the programme is not coordinated [and] is not implemented due to a lack of funds [from SAFA].' The end result, says Dunywa, has been that SAFA has had to go to the National Lotteries Board to access funds for a new 'development of excellence' programme,[11] and that all the main youth development programmes and competitions are sponsored by corporations

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such as MTN, Chappies, Coca-Cola and Spar, but 'are not matched by SAFA' (Dunywa interview).

For women's soccer, the situation is even more bleak. Despite the existence of two national teams and a 'high performance centre', as well as a staff complement to its Women's Football Committee, SAFA's budget for women's soccer development in 2006 was, according to committee chairperson Natasha Tsichlas, less than R300 000. For Tsichlas though, the problem went beyond a lack of adequate financial resources. 'A lot of people still don't believe in women's football,' she said (*City Press* 4 June 2006).[12]

Others are more blunt. For the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest national trade union federation, South African soccer is 'in a crisis', with players having 'lost basic technical skills' (COSATU 2006). Soccer journalist Bareng-Batho Kortjaas has said that 'this country has had no systematic development of players. All we have done is hold a jumble sale of wrong ideas, chance taking and cutting corners in the hope that things will fall into place. Instead of falling into place, things have fallen all over the place...SAFA must stop fooling itself and admit that it has no development plan' (Kortjaas 2006). According to former PSL CEO Trevor Phillips, 'no one is running development programmes...there is no structured development programme out there, they don't exist' (Phillips interview).

If the most basic of development programmes across the country remain in a state of 'intensive care', then what is supposed to be the flagship of soccer development in South Africa – the SAFA/Transnet Football School of Excellence (based just outside Johannesburg) – has been, by all accounts, a very sick patient. Established at the beginning of the 1990s by SAFA, with financial assistance from the transport parastatal Transnet, the 'School of Excellence' was initially seen as a success story in progress, producing a series of professional players (including 36 national youth players and 16 Bafana Bafana players). However, according to SAFA's Dunywa, when 'SAFA management stepped in things started to become problematic since they took the funds away' (and redirected them to other SAFA operations) (Dunywa interview). Not surprisingly, Dunywa's boss has a radically different

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interpretation, claiming that 'the school is not controlled by SAFA and there is no provision in the SAFA budget for the school...it is a challenge and we are busy overcoming it' (Hack interview) – an interpretation which, if indeed true, only serves as a stinging indictment of SAFA's budgetary management and developmental vision.

Irrespective of SAFA's 'cloak and dagger'-like internal bickering, over the past few years the school has become indicative of all that is wrong with the state of soccer development and administration in South Africa. At the time of writing, none of the three coaches at the school, tasked with training over a hundred boys, has high-level youth coaching or goalkeeping qualifications, the infrastructure at the school was in a general state of disrepair and the national youth side (comprising school players) has consistently performed badly at the international level (*Sunday Times* 5 February 2006).[13] Former Bafana Bafana coach Carlos Queiroz has effectively accused SAFA of incompetence and gross mismanagement when it comes to the school and its overall youth development programme: '...they will upgrade the facilities for the World Cup but there is no system for identifying decent kids, no coach education, no technical director, no development programme and one centre of excellence built 15 years ago that is crumbling' (*Sunday Times* 5 February 2006).

While there might be some debate about Queiroz's no-holds-barred denunciation of SAFA, it is difficult to imagine how a development programme could be anything other than minimalist when the 2005 annual SAFA budget for development was a miserly R3 million (Dunywa interview). Besides the obvious problems of a lack of strategic vision and committed practical management surrounding soccer development in South Africa, it is such fiscal austerity, combined with the failure of the public sector to invest adequate funds for development programmes, that has produced a situation in which soccer development is effectively a financial hostage to the needs and demands of the private corporate sector.

The absence of a strategically coherent, practically efficient and financially sustainable development programme emanating from the

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main soccer body in South Africa tasked with such development, has placed a huge onus on professional soccer clubs to develop players.[14] However, most professional clubs simply do not have, or cannot access, the financial resources to initiate and sustain development programmes, and their programmes are, not surprisingly, geared towards the financial and on-field interests of the clubs themselves and are directly linked to each club's relationships with its corporate sponsors. In turn, the possibilities of expanding even existing development programmes at the club level are tied to the bottom line – i.e. the amount of money that can be generated by clubs. As Trevor Phillips notes, a key problem in this regard is that 'white corporate capital controls the money and they deal with sports such as soccer through their "social responsibility funds"...but these are not really taken seriously, except for rugby and cricket...and where is black corporate South Africa?' (Phillips interview)

The end result of all this is that, while those in the South African soccer world descend into the blame game,[15] the 99 per cent of soccer players in the country who are involved at the amateur, grassroots level are being cheated of their hopes and dreams.

A sea of mediocrity and 'retrogressive egos'?

Since the period immediately after 1994, the general decline in the state of South African soccer, both on and off the field, has been precipitous. From a global ranking of 16th in 1997, the national men's team fell to a ranking of 73rd in the world in August 2009.[16] Continentally, Bafana Bafana can no longer even claim to be amongst the top-quality national sides, with even soccer minnows like Botswana (with a total population of less than two million) proving to be difficult to beat on the field of play. Almost all the other national teams have also performed badly in continental and global competitions, the ironic exception being a privately sponsored South African 'street kids' side, which won an international competition staged in Germany just before the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

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While the majority of performances of South African soccer teams on the field have been nothing short of embarrassing for a country that counts itself as the most wealthy and 'developed' on the continent, the situation off the field has been even worse. Including the newly hired national men's team coach – Brazil's Joel Santana – there have been 15 coaches at the helm of Bafana Bafana since South Africa's re-admission into the international sporting arena just over 14 years ago. When the previous coach, Carlos Parreira, took over in 2006, COSATU had this to say: 'The coach is taking over a ship that has ground to a halt. The poor performance of the national squad reflects the deeper crisis running from the premier soccer level down to the amateur level' (COSATU 2006).

Indicative of the relative priorities that SAFA has chosen to focus on in dealing with this crisis, is the fact that even though it announced an R87 million profit for the 2005/06 financial year, its entire annual soccer development budget stood at R3 million, while ex-coach Parreira was variously reported to have received anywhere from R12 million to R20 million per annum from his SAFA employers (*City Press* 13 August 2006). For the straight-talking Phillips, it is clear where the main problem lies: 'SAFA's preoccupation has been navel-gazing…80 per cent of funds spent by SAFA go toward administrative costs…I thought 2010 would be a catalyst, but SAFA is endemically corrupt and institutionally incompetent' (Phillips interview).[17]

Even though Phillips' final assessment of SAFA might be a tad harsh, there is ample evidence over the past several years to strongly suggest that SAFA administrators have been more interested in political point-scoring and individual and institutional power-mongering than in getting on with the job of improving the actual state of South African soccer where it counts. Ex-Bafana Bafana coach Stuart Baxter, whose tenure was marked by repeated clashes with his SAFA employers, has stated that he got calls from SAFA telling him which players to pick: 'When they realised I wouldn't do that, they turned against me… there was too much poison…some people did not like the colour of my skin… they said I was racist and every[one] started believing it.'[18] In a similar vein, another ex-Bafana Bafana coach, Carlos Queiroz, fired this sarcastic comment

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at South African soccer officialdom: 'One of the problems is that they think they are much better than they really are...they think the world champions are the only ones above them. The trouble is there is nothing there...'[19]

From within South Africa's soccer 'world', there has also been a sustained chorus of criticism all the way from the president of the country down to the ordinary soccer lover. Business tycoon Tokyo Sexwale (previously one of the main benefactors of the second tier of South African professional soccer, the 'Mvela' Golden League) has, more than once, lashed out at 'the rot' amongst SAFA's administrators (*City Press* 28 May 2006). Fellow business tycoon and owner of PSL club Mamelodi Sundowns, Patrice Motsepe, turned down an offer to serve on SAFA's 'commercial wing' (although it still remains unclear as to its formal constitution and operations) ostensibly because he did not want to be 'involved in the politics of SAFA...[due to] the association's track record of failure'.[20] Even members of the national Parliament have landed some telling blows. During a mid-2006 parliamentary debate on the country's national sport, SAFA was described as 'pathetic, unprofessional and untrustworthy' (*City Press* 4 June 2006).

The persistent assaults have also been felt from within the top echelons of SAFA itself. SAFA vice-president Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana publicly admitted that SAFA had 'failed dismally' in its administration of soccer, and directly attributed the decline in the performance of Bafana Bafana to this failure (*City Press* 4 June 2006). Likewise, SAFA's own director of football development has laid the blame directly at the doorstep of his own organisation: 'We have a top-down approach...Nobody should be blamed but us' (Dunywa interview).

Chronic infighting within SAFA,[21] and well-documented personal and institutional rivalries between some of South Africa's most famous soccer kingpins such as Irvin Khoza (owner of PSL club Orlando Pirates) and Kaizer Motaung (owner of PSL club Kaizer Chiefs) have only added more fuel to the fire of public discontent with the way in which soccer is being run in the country.[22] Matters have been made even worse by widespread public perceptions that those at the apex of soccer officialdom are little more than a

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group of money-grubbing egoists whose main purpose is to ensure that they remain comfortably ensconced in their well-paid bureaucratic positions. Such perceptions are not entirely without grounds. Many of the same faces have remained at the helm, in various positions, ever since the early 1990s, and sponsorship deals between the PSL and private corporations have seen some of the same individuals receiving huge payouts. Further, it is certainly no secret that a tidy proportion of the billions in public expenditure on stadiums and associated sundries for the 2010 World Cup have, in one form or another, greatly benefited those who reside at the top of South Africa's soccer world. The result, which is now becoming ever clearer, has been the institutionalisation of a status quo approach to the administration and management of the game.

One of the most frequently repeated slogans on numerous South African television and radio soccer programmes, 'for the love of the game', paradoxically captures the parlous state within which the 'beautiful game' now finds itself. Simply put, those who have the privilege of being in charge appear to have forgotten the very reason why they are there. The much-loved (now deceased) South African soccer star Pule 'Ace' Ntsoelengoe put it best: 'Soccer in SA needs to go back to where it was...the love of the game needs to be restored, especially in the administration. Soccer fans want to see us serve much better than we do today. The challenge is not how much money I leave behind when I die but to leave a legacy for my children and the youth of this country' (*The Star* 10 May 2006).

Conclusion and recommendations

It is an unfortunate fact of our early 21st-century existence – whether in South Africa or anywhere else on the globe – that major sports such as soccer, just like almost everything else, have become dominated by the need to make, and accumulate, capital. Instead of soccer being seen and treated as a basic recreational and social need, and as an integral component of people's overall socio-economic development, we now have a situation where both participation and progress are moulded and ultimately determined by the

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degree to which they serve individual and commercial interests. Historically, and particularly in relation to South Africa's past, the beauty of the game of soccer was directly linked to its being, at the most fundamental level, the 'people's game', not a game of commercial prostitution mostly dominated by self-interested bureaucrats, wanna-be soccer kingpins and prima donna players. And yet that is precisely what a large part of South African soccer has become – it has been turned upside-down.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the present state of the game in South Africa is one of deep crisis. If a government that is in the process of spending billions to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup of Soccer cannot ensure that schoolkids in the most needy of communities have decent soccer facilities and equipment, or that meaningful development programmes are in place for players in those communities where soccer is one of the most basic forms of social relations and recreational activity, then it should be clear that things have gone horribly wrong. When the main soccer body in the country can pay its own staff millions per month, criss-cross the world attending meeting-after-conference and find the resources to pay outrageous salaries to national coaches, yet simultaneously allocate insignificant financial resources to its development programme while it makes record profits and allow the country's only academy of excellence to virtually disintegrate, then there should be no question that there is a need for radical change.

While the government is making noises about 'guidelines or policies to promote the values of equity, representivity and redress in sport and recreation' (*The Star* 8 August 2006), it is not at all clear what practical measures might follow that are directly related to the game of soccer. For its part, SAFA continues to spend most of its time and energy (as well as most of its resources) on administrative functions and internal squabbling over position and power, while making endless promises about seriously implementing full-scale development programmes that have been warming its desk drawers for years.

Beyond the government and SAFA, there is no shortage of opinions about what needs to be done to address the present crisis, a crisis that, it is now generally agreed, does exist. Almost every soccer writer and pundit in

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the country has his or her own ideas about how to turn the game of soccer around and make Bafana Bafana into a 'world class' outfit. Long-time soccer writer and analyst Luke Alfred has set out a six-point 'plan' that, he surmises, will reverse the experience of the last 10 years in which South African soccer was transformed 'from kings to village idiots'. For Alfred this would include: 'grassroots development; proper leagues; coaching and competition throughout the country and across age groups; concerted efforts to improve facilities both by government and the private sector; local soccer needing outside help; [and] recruitment of the best coach that money can buy' (*Sunday Times* 5 February 2006).

For others, like PSL club boss Kaizer Motaung, the emphasis should be placed on resuscitating the national men's team by hiring a South African coach who has 'a thorough understanding of the general socio-political landscape within which our football is administered' and by establishing a 'technical support structure…to provide systems and plans that ensure that our young talented players are carefully selected, groomed, nurtured and cared for until they reach levels of seniority into the National Team'.[23] Former PSL CEO Trevor Phillips, with his eye also firmly on the national men's team as South Africa heads towards the 2010 World Cup, suggests that players for 2010 should be identified now by clubs and then be 'leased' from the clubs to form a team that can play internationals as well as games against other PSL clubs – 'We need to make players 24-hour professionals.' Phillips also calls for a specific and separate operation to deal with soccer development, alongside the adoption of grading criteria for financial support to professional clubs that are linked to, and favour, development of young players (Phillips interview).

COSATU, in line with its approach to political and economic problems facing its own constituency, has publicly stated that 'the first step' in addressing the crisis 'must be to convene a soccer indaba, in line with [our] long-standing demands. The players with international experience, the club coaches, SAFA and other stakeholders such as the players' union must be roped in to explore ways to improve all aspects of soccer development' (COSATU 2006).[24] Alongside this, it has called for a 'new strategy' for South

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African soccer, whose centrepiece 'must be the creation of provincial and national academies to identify players with potential in the schools and amateur levels' (COSATU 2006). Unfortunately though, COSATU has done little to give practical content to its stated intent.

Taking all of the above into account, the following recommendations could provide the basis on which to begin a much-needed (re)transformation of South African soccer:

- The national government must begin to put 'meat' on the 'bone' of the RDP's approach to sports such as soccer. The first step in this process would be to engage in a nationwide 'audit' of soccer infrastructure, equipment and administrative capacity at the community and local government level, as well as at the level of primary and secondary schools, so as to compile a graded inventory of needs.
- This should then be followed up with the provision of necessary fiscal and capacity support, over time, to relevant local government structures (working in conjunction with community organisations), as well as to public schools, in order to upgrade local community and school soccer facilities, purchase adequate equipment and support a systematic programme of community and school-level soccer development for the youth (both boys and girls).
- Flowing from the above, there should be implementation of a nationwide programme for the hiring and training of community-level soccer development personnel, alongside the technical skills training of relevant school staff – in partnership with SAFA – that would be an immediate and necessary outcome as part of a longer-term programme for sustainable, publicly supported community and school-level sports (soccer) development and competition.
- The Department of Sport and Recreation should immediately direct SAFA, as part of the above, to commit to a five-year programme for the establishment of soccer academies in each of the country's nine provinces that would accommodate the (holistic) training of both players and coaches. Such a programme should be supported, in

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kind, by both the government and SAFA, and should be coordinated in conjunction with local government sports authorities and relevant community organisations (this would include establishing criteria for participation in such academies).

- All major professional clubs must, through the PSL and SAFA, commit themselves to a 'Development Charter' that would tie financial support – whether directly from the private sector or from the PSL itself – for these clubs to the implementation of meaningful and sustainable youth development programmes. Failure to consistently adhere to such a 'Charter' should result in point penalties being levied on the club in PSL competitions.
- In order to democratise power and invigorate the decision-making process within SAFA, membership of SAFA's NEC should be subject to a formal quota (not less than 50 per cent) of community-level soccer officials, second- and third-tier club representatives, as well as professional player representatives.
- There should be a formally set division of SAFA's annual budget such that expenditure on administrative salaries and associated costs is capped at no more than 30 per cent of the overall budget, and expenditure on practical development and educational programmes is progressively increased, such that within a five-year period this component consumes a majority of the budget. SAFA's constitution must be amended to formally accommodate these provisions.
- All senior management positions within SAFA should be tied to performance-related conditions (linked to implementation of agreed-upon programmes), based on fixed-term contracts that are renewable every two years.

Regardless of the implementation of some (or all) of these measures, the ultimate bottom line for South African soccer, if it is to move beyond the crisis in which it now finds itself, lies in a change of attitude and consciousness of those involved in the 'beautiful game'. The dominant, and unfortunate, attitude that now

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exists in South African society, and which has effectively taken over the game of soccer, is one of self-interested individualism, where personal gain and money hold centre stage, whether on or off the field. What is needed is radical change, a return to a collective discipline, motivation, pride and passion that is at the heart of a progressive society and the game of soccer itself.

Notes

1 Mr Dunywa was part of the delegation of soccer officials that visited Lusaka.
2 SAFA, Introduction, http://www.safa.org.za
3 All information on competitions is taken from SAFA's website, http://www.safa.org.za.
4 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.
5 For a classic example of this kind of thinking, see the opinions expressed by ex-Springbok rugby player Uli Schmidt in Grundlingh, Odendaal and Spies 1995: 24.
6 Mr Hack served an initial term as SAFA CEO in the 1990s and then returned for a second term several years later. At the time of writing, he remains the CEO.
7 See SAFA's official website, http://www.safa.org.za.
8 There are many examples of references by various individuals, writers and organisations from across the racial, class and political landscape of South Africa to such a 'crisis'. A recent and well-publicised one comes from none other than the (ex-)president of the country himself, Thabo Mbeki; see Mbeki (2006).
9 For the full research report, see McKinley and De Villiers 2005.
10 It should be noted that the several billion rands that the various levels of government have now dedicated to refurbishing existing stadiums, and building new ones, as part of South Africa's hosting of the 2010 World Cup, will not positively impact on the infrastructural state of most local community soccer fields and stadiums, which are used by the vast majority of soccer players in the country.
11 Although it is unclear exactly what 'excellence' programme will be forthcoming from the LOTTO funds, it is interesting to note the public announcement in mid-2006 of a R2.1 million cash injection from the National Lottery to start an 'academy of sporting excellence' at Adams College (a private school), in conjunction with an outfit named TotiSport (an organisation that helps young people develop their sporting skills and become professionals). A newspaper

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article reporting on the announcement claimed that the sports academy 'will be up and running by 2007 and will focus mainly on the development of soccer in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup'. See 'Academy to shine in sport', *Daily Sun,* 25 May 2006. Since then there have been no further developments regarding an academy at Adams College.

12 Chapter 5 of the present volume offers an analysis of the current state of women's football in South Africa.

13 In the course of research for this chapter, the author was unsuccessful, over a period of two months, in securing interviews with officials at the School of Excellence. It became clear that the administration and overall management of the school left much to be desired.

14 Given such a situation, it is hardly surprising that SAFA officialdom would highlight the (apparent) existence of a 2010 development programme for players between the ages of 17 and 22 (Hack interview). While such a programme might well exist on paper, it has clearly yet to see the light of day on the field.

15 All one has to do to confirm this sad state of affairs is watch sports commentary programmes on television or read the sports pages of any daily newspaper. It would appear that those in positions of influence and power within South African soccer have little better to do than attack and blame each other for the development mess.

16 See FIFA world rankings at http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/lastranking/gender=M/fullranking.html#confederation=0&rank=185&page=2, accessed 10 September 2009.

17 While there is certainly a clear degree of rivalry and enmity between the PSL and SAFA, there is no denying that Phillips was a sharp administrator and financier. Having left the PSL on a decent institutional and financial footing in 1998 (after a two-year stint setting up and stabilising the organisation), he was asked to return to take over a now ailing organisation in 2002. According to Phillips, upon his return the PSL was R60 million in debt; after he had been at the helm for four years, it had a healthy R20 million surplus, more member clubs and better competition (Phillips interview).

18 Broadbent R, Baxter paints gloomy Bafana picture, *Sunday Times,* 5 February 2006

19 Broadbent R, Baxter paints gloomy Bafana picture, *Sunday Times,* 5 February 2006

20 Madywabe L, Motsepe too busy to serve on soccer board, *Mail & Guardian Online,* 12 May 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=271514&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__sport/, accessed 8 July 2006

21 During one episode of such infighting, there were widespread media reports of attempts by several senior SAFA staff members to get their CEO, Raymond Hack,

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fired for dereliction of duty and lack of leadership. See Sibusiso Mseleku, Safa staff all out to sack Hack, *City Press*, 21 May 2006.

22 The title of this section of the chapter is a paraphrase of the closing line of an article written by Kaizer Motaung, 'Beyond 2010 – Let's Get It Right This Time – Countdown to Germany', posted on the official Kaizer Chiefs website, http://www.kaizerchiefs.com on 8 June 2006. The full sentence reads: 'I would be pleased if we can prevail beyond the trivialities of entertaining mediocrity and massaging our often-retrogressive egos that are hindering our national team.'

23 Kaizer Motaung, Beyond 2010 – Let's Get it Right This Time, 8 June 2006, http://www.kaizerchiefs.com, accessed 10 July 2006

24 Over the last 10 years or so, South Africa has witnessed a series of 'national indabas' designed to 'address' a host of social, political and economic issues. These have most often involved a set of pre-identified and pre-set 'stakeholders' (government, big business, trade unions and 'civil society') who have come together in such 'indabas' ostensibly to forge a 'consensus' around the issue at stake. While it would appear that there is a widespread belief amongst many South Africans that such 'indabas' are both a necessary and an indispensable element of the country's new democracy, there is little to suggest that the outcomes of these 'indabas' have resulted in much practical benefit for the majority of South Africans.

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Zola Dunywa, director, football development, SAFA, Johannesburg, 21 July 2006

Raymond Hack, CEO, SAFA, Johannesburg, 21 July 2006

Trevor Phillips, CEO, PSL, Johannesburg, 3 August 2006

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Women's bodies and the world of football in South Africa

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> Banyana Banyana – the pride of women's sport in SA! If one takes into account how our country's top female players are paid out in the petty-cash tin by SAFA, it is a wonder that Portia Modise [the Banyana Banyana captain] and her teammates turn up on match day at all! (*Sunday Independent* 25 February 2007)

ONE OF THE MOST enduring images of South African sport in the 1990s is that of Nelson Mandela donning the colours of the national rugby team, in a gesture of reconciliation that was to mark a period in which sport came to function as a means of nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa. In fact, it would be hard to find any significant text on South African sport or reconciliation that doesn't invoke this image. This singular symbolic moment helped to naturalise the belief that black and white would be included in the construction of this 'rainbow nation' as equal partners and citizens of a new democracy. Since the early 1990s, Mandela has been snapped shaking the hands of members of the national male rugby and soccer teams and sporting their colours on many occasions. Towards the end of October 2006, the South African women's national soccer team, Banyana Banyana, got its *first* meeting

with Mandela. 'The girls' had been waiting *eight years* for this chance at getting a little taste of 'the Madiba magic'. For them, the brief meeting with the great leader symbolised their final acceptance and recognition by their country, a memory they would cherish and hold high in their upcoming African Women's World Championship games in Nigeria. In interviews with the media at the time, Fran Hilton-Smith, a former coach and manager of the national women's team and currently head of women's football at the South African Football Association (SAFA), said, 'It's a dream come true. We firmly believe this will give us the impetus to do well.' Team captain Portia Modise said, 'We've come to have him give us some of his magic. We do have a lot of chances to go to the finals and lift the trophy.'[1]

Not only did the team's audience with Mandela make many of its players' lifelong dream come true, it also gained Banyana Banyana a great deal more media coverage than they usually received. Internet searches conducted at the end of October 2006 for material on Banyana Banyana yielded several articles, based on this historic meeting, that celebrated the team and the talent and success of its players. But just a few months earlier, at the start of research for the present chapter, similar internet searches had yielded far fewer articles on Banyana Banyana, and had presented a very different image of the women involved in football in South Africa. In particular, articles sourced by the authors portrayed the world of football as a male-dominated, heterosexist one from which women are generally excluded, and in which they have to struggle to gain inclusion. Yet everywhere in the mainstream media's coverage of soccer women's beautiful bodies abound, selling the sexiness of the game and its myriad spinoffs.

This chapter examines the various understandings that have emerged of how the inclusions and exclusions of women in the world of football manifest themselves in South Africa, and to what ends they operate. The chapter is based on a review of literature sourced from libraries, internet searches and mainstream media archives, as well as interviews with key figures in South African women's football. While it attempts to cover all issues relevant to the field, it is by no means a comprehensive

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audit of the women's football sector in the country. The discussion focuses mainly on the experiences of the national women's team and of other outstanding individuals in the field, and offers an overview of the main issues at stake in the development of women's football in South Africa. In doing so it hopes to highlight the particular issues at stake for women, and issues related to gender more broadly.

Theorising exclusion

Turn to page 10 of almost any edition of *Soccer Life* and you'll be sure to find a picture of a semi-clad girlfriend of a famous male footballer, with a caption saying something like 'Showing fine form, so-and-so's fiancée suns herself aboard a luxury yacht'. Almost every soccer magazine has a column or page showcasing the 'fineness' of the 'feminine form'.[2] In the recent World Cup women's bodies featured prominently, holding up the schedules of matches in magazines and newspapers, glistening in bikinis or less, becoming the cover spreads and feature stories of men's magazines profiling football. 'Samba, Sex & Soccer', screamed the June 2006 edition of the men's magazine *GQ*, which came complete with a 'Brazilian bombshells' pin-up calendar of World Cup match fixtures. And the recent trend for South African (male) professional soccer teams to have nubile young cheerleaders is also putting women's bodies to 'good use' in providing 'a different way for women to play a role in the game',[3] selling its attractions through their sexiness.

While the 'soccer babe' has come to be constructed as the preferred role for women to play in the world of football, the stories of the women who actually play the game have been relegated to the small print of the sports pages of newspapers and magazines, if they're lucky. In these stories, the mainstream media has generally portrayed women footballers as victims of a bigger and more powerful system of inequality, discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion. From the few mainstream newspaper articles profiling women's football in South Africa there emerges the image of a

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poor, struggling, usually black, young woman facing problems of under-resourcing, poor training facilities, poor support mechanisms and so on.[4]

Such representations are indeed useful, as they personify some of the very real structural inequalities that face female footballers. However, what they fail to provide are the analytical tools necessary to interrogate why such gendered discriminations and exclusions persist in the first place. Particularly striking is the complete absence of discussion about how the commodified, controlled, disciplined, heterosexualised female body is nonetheless at the very centre of the fetishisation of soccer all over the world. The question becomes, then, not why women are *excluded* from the world of soccer, but how and why is the *inclusion* of some women tightly regulated to suit the needs of desiring (male) consumers? This is a question we will try to address in the latter part of the present chapter, where we offer a striking example of women shaping new forms of inclusion for themselves in the world of football, forms that do not require them to submit to the dominant constructions of 'soccer babes' or 'victims of the system'.

In spite of the fact that more women are participating in more sports than ever before, much more attention is still given to the role of sports in the lives of men than to the importance of sports for women (Hargreaves 1994: 1). Much has been written about the relationship between sport and politics in South Africa. Unfortunately, the contributions of sportswomen are largely invisible in these accounts. It is only since the late 1990s that scholars have begun to research the various histories of South African women and sport (Jones 2003: 130). More generally, research and documentation on African sport as a whole have failed to take account of the role of women in football and other sports played on the continent, and most of what has been produced is not in wide circulation (Saavedra 2004: 226).

The small body of academic literature on women's role in the world of football (and sport more generally), while providing some important analytical tools for the study of women and gender in the world of football, prioritises 'exclusion' as a category in terms of which to analyse the role of women in the sport. In general, most approaches understand the world of football

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to be a male-dominated one, in which the gender divisions and inequalities of the broader society are reflected, and through which these divisions and inequalities are replicated and perpetuated. In the words of Cynthia Pelak:

> Soccer in South Africa is one of those flagship masculine sports, like ice hockey in Canada, which serves as an ideological cornerstone for the maintenance of men's dominance. Through the historical exclusion of women, soccer has been marked as men's/boys' territory...Football is also more than 'a game' in South Africa. It is an institution that facilitates and shapes the distribution of political and economic power. (Pelak 2005: 57)

While it has been accepted historically that young black South African men play sport for their physical pleasure in the late afternoons, young black women have been expected to be at home, cleaning and making preparations for the evening meal.[5] As Pelak argues:

> ...[the gendered division of household labour,] which burdens women and privileges men, is a critical factor in limiting South African women's access to sports. Without school-based soccer opportunities for girls, like those available to boys, the development of women's soccer in South Africa has been limited. The most popular school-based sport for South African girls of all racial and class backgrounds is netball, a quintessential feminine sport. The strict boundaries between so-called 'male sports' and 'female sports' in South Africa are classical examples of how dominant groups construct social, physical, and cultural boundaries to build collective identities and naturalise their privilege. (Pelak 2005: 58; see also Jones (2003) and Roberts (1992))

Theorists such as Pelak (2005: 58) also point to ways in which girls and women are 'marked as outsiders' to the game of football. For many girls, their first experiences of such marking happen while they are playing football with boys. In an interview conducted by Pelak for another study on women's football, a 20-year-old black woman football player based in Cape Town said the following:

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> When I was young, around six or seven years old, I basically played soccer in the streets, very unorganised, with two stones, with guys until I was 11 or 12, when they realised I was a girl. After that, they didn't come call me. I would all of a sudden find them playing and I would get dressed and go out and um, they would be like, 'nah, nah, we aren't playing anymore'. I could tell the hostility. They were not passing me the ball, you know. Not that I was playing any worse. I was playing better…Even now when I go back home [to Johannesburg] and there are guys playing in the streets and I'll put on my boots and I will play. There is always someone who says, 'Ah, what are you doing?' It's just an oddness. So, I constantly need to prove myself in the game. (Pelak 2005: 58)

Pelak comments:

> The cumulative effect of treating women footballers with hostility not only constructs women as outsiders and discourages their participation, but reinforces dominant gender ideologies that demand clearly marked differences between men and women. (Pelak 2005: 58)

When women do enter the traditionally male world of football, their participation is often trivialised or devalued. In South Africa, for example, many of the now famous first female football teams were formed to play 'curtain raisers' to 'the real games' being played by the professional male teams. Marsha, a 25-year-old player from Cape Town interviewed for Pelak's study, says:

> Even when we play club games, we can feel like it is like bringing the kids. It is still that kind of feeling, like we will kick the ball over there, and they, the men, will play the real game over here. Or, while we are waiting for them to warm up we can get the women to kick and play. That segregated feeling is there, the tension is there. (Pelak 2005: 58)

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While theorists such as Pelak emphasise the exclusivist nature of soccer in gendered terms, they also point to the dangers inherent in feminist theories that rely on an understanding of women as a homogeneous category in order to make their arguments of male dominance and female exclusion in the world of football, and sport more generally. Instead, they argue for a multi-faceted approach to understanding the world of football and the place of women in it, one that examines issues of race, class and gender, and the way they intersect, when analysing the experiences of women in the world of football. Such an approach is critical to an understanding of the position of women in South African football historically and at the present time, given that racial and class inequalities have defined the ways in which gender oppression is experienced by different women – a reality demonstrated by the experiences of the individuals and teams discussed in the present chapter.

While the experiences of women football players often speak to exclusions and discriminations based on sexuality, the few texts that have been produced on women's football and women's sports more generally tend to exclude issues related to sexuality (Pfister & Hartmann-Tews 2003; Hong & Mangan 2004; Pelak 2005). With regard to South Africa, there is very little that has been written about sexuality in the field of women's football. An exception is the work of Jennifer Hargreaves (1994).

Theories that prioritise the exclusion of women in football (Jones 2003; Pfister & Hartmann-Tews 2003; Saavedra 2004) can also be criticised for their failure to acknowledge the various ways in which women have been able to play the game successfully, in spite of the dominant constructions of them as outsiders to the game. In prioritising exclusion, such theories fail to acknowledge and explore the ways in which the inclusion of women in the field of soccer occurs. In doing this, they fall into the same mould as the mainstream media texts that foreclose the agency of women in a field that undoubtedly works towards their exclusion. The example of the Chosen FEW discussed in the last part of the present chapter should demonstrate that exclusion from significant participation in organised football is far from being the only option open to women committed to playing the game.

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A history of exclusion and marginalisation

It is fairly common today, on any given sunny afternoon, to find an informal soccer match starting up on the open grassy fields that dot many residential areas in South Africa. It's the reason why the municipal City Parks agency has adopted the strategy of landscaping open ground in Johannesburg's inner city – to keep footballers off their 'world class' grass! Needing not much more than the desire and some rudimentary skill, anyone is able to join such a game. It is not unusual to see a lone woman join a game, rolling up her sleeves and entering the fray, only to be marvelled at by onlookers for her ability to keep pace with her male teammates, or rebuked for daring to imagine that she could be 'just like the boys', or being asked why she is not at home where 'she ought to be'. For her, it is not just desire and a bit of skill that are required; she must also be able to stand up to the criticism of daring to enter a space from which women players are usually excluded.

In South Africa, the history of women's football has largely been written through the strength, tenacity and resilience of a few women who have been able to succeed despite the tremendous odds stacked against them by a sport that is shaped by the patriarchal relations of the capitalist world in which it is played, and strongly marked by the particular racially discriminatory history of South Africa.

Under colonialism and apartheid, the distribution of sporting facilities and resources was determined according to a rigid racial hierarchy in which whites received the greatest benefits, with coloureds following, then Indians, and finally Africans. These racially differentiated allocations, and the resultant inequalities, were further affected by differences related to gender and class, as well as to whether one lived in a rural or an urban environment. White middle and working class women enjoyed greater access to certain sports than black women, and in certain cases (for example swimming), even than black men. Today, the legacy of apartheid lives on in the continued differences that exist between black and white women in the world of football, and sport more generally. These differences have played

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themselves out in the development of women's football as a sport since 1994. For example, according to Fran Hilton-Smith:

> When South Africa was put back into FIFA in the early '90s, there was a huge upsurge of black women playing football and logically the game moved to the townships where the numbers were. Many white girls were not comfortable travelling in the townships and moved to play indoor [football]. Now that the living boundaries have been levelled, many white girls are now coming back to outdoor and also from some cultures that did not play girls' football in the past, e.g. Indian girls. (Hilton-Smith interview 6 October 2006)

The unequal distribution of material wealth in South Africa along racial lines has meant that the development of women's football in a democratic South Africa has had to contend with the enduring problems of racial discrimination entrenched by apartheid. This legacy will only begin to be addressed in the world of women's football as South African society transforms itself more generally.

Apartheid meant not only three decades of racially segregated football in South Africa, but also the isolation of both men and women of all racial categories from international competition and exposure. In 1958 and 1959, South Africa was barred from participating in the first tournaments of the newly formed Confederation of African Football (CAF) for its refusal to field a multiracial team. In 1961 South Africa was formally expelled from CAF. The non-racial South African Soccer Federation (SASF), formed in 1952 and representing 46 000 players, tried unsuccessfully to get the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) to recognise it as South Africa's representative, and expel the predominantly white Football Association of South Africa (FASA), established in 1892 and representing just 20 000 players. While FASA initially received support from the FIFA leadership and European affiliates, with growing pressure from non-European affiliates FIFA first suspended and then in 1964 expelled South Africa for its discriminatory policies (Darby 2002: 71–81). South Africa was only readmitted to FIFA

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in 1992, when football in the country was united under a new, non-racial organisation, the South African Football Association (SAFA).

In the excitement of this return to the community of world football, the specific history of women's soccer in South Africa has largely been lost. And yet, apartheid not only meant extreme inequalities and differences in the material resources provided to different race groups, but also differences in the resources made available to men and women.

> Under apartheid, South African society was not only segregated by race, but also by sex, in a system that exacerbated patriarchal 'traditions' across different cultural groups. Interestingly enough, this did not mean that women were excluded from sport in general. In fact, due to the influence of the British public school system and the Christian missionary schools experience, sport was considered an important part of education and central to the development of a national identity. Hence anyone attending a government school was required to practise a sport until she graduated. However, the activities that were encouraged for girls were limited to those considered feminine or ladylike, for example, netball, tennis, hockey, athletics, softball, volleyball. Football was excluded. (Saavedra 2004: 242)

However, while much has been written on the history of the struggle for non-racial football in South Africa, little has been written on the parallel struggle for recognition and resourcing of women's football, in particular in the period before 1992 (Alegi 2004; Couzens 1983; Pelak 2005; Raath 2002). Women only begin to appear in the popular history of South African football in the early 1960s, with the formation of the short-lived all-women teams, Orlando Pirates Women's Football Club and Mother City Girls. Significantly, Mother City Girls played 'curtain raiser' matches prior to the games of Mother City, one of the Western Cape's professional male football teams playing in the non-racial South African Soccer League (SASL).[6] Over the next 30 years, more women did enter the world of football as players. While there has been little to document their experiences, it is clear from available

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evidence, such as the history of organisations of the period, that women's football developed along segregated lines in the 1970s.

In 1974 the South African Women's Football Association (SAWFA) was formed. It represented white and coloured women only, with white people in control of the organisation. Cape Town and its surrounding areas seem to have been the 'heart of the women's game, where football was particularly popular among Coloured girls and women', and regular competitions were organised in the Eastern and Western Cape long before they took place in other regions (Saavedra 2004: 243). In the early 1990s, black township women organised their own leagues and competitions. As the number of teams increased, they formed the South African Women's Soccer Association (SAWSA) in 1991. According to Saavedra, '[a]s with other sport codes in South Africa, in the aftermath of apartheid, these organisations and the interests attached to them fell into a power struggle with each other and the new national organisations to establish control, authority and access to resources' (2004: 243).

While newspaper articles and research works on the history of football in South Africa since 1994 still focus overwhelmingly on the men's game, there has definitely been an increasing amount of attention paid to women's football since the early 1990s. This is exemplified by the official SAFA website, which records the history of women's football since 1992 in some detail.[7] However, this history certainly takes second place to that of the male game, and is portrayed as being dependent on the development of men's soccer.

Some theorists have attributed this increase in attention to the convergence of various local and international factors that led to a growth of the 'opportunity structures' open to women football players. For example, Cynthia Pelak argues:

> South African women's football makes a particularly interesting case study because the recent global expansion of women's soccer coincided with the emergence of a national discourse around gender equality in South Africa. As a broad-based women's movement emerged during the early 1990s and gender equality became recognised as an autonomous aspect of democratisation of post-apartheid South Africa,

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> FIFA started sponsoring the World Cup competitions for women's soccer and the International Olympic Committee started including women's soccer as a full-medal sport. The convergence of these processes meant a shift in the opportunity structures for organising women's soccer in South Africa. (Pelak 2005: 54)

However, these opportunity structures opened up not just for women, but also for men, something that was to pose certain problems for the manner in which women's football in South Africa began to develop; as women's football became a lucrative enterprise, many men found it appealing to establish female teams without necessarily possessing any talent or skill with regard to women's football. This phenomenon is explored in greater detail below, and is traced in particular through the example of the famous Johannesburg-based team, Soweto Ladies.

In 1992, on SAFA's readmission to FIFA, a national men's team, Bafana Bafana, was almost immediately organised and entered into the World Cup qualifying rounds. In the same year, South Africa participated in the first Women's World Conference on Football in Switzerland in October, marking its formal admission into women's world football. As a result of the struggle between SAWFA and SAWSA, both associations were dissolved, with existing local clubs and young teams being reorganised under an appointed committee that became the new South African Women's Football Association (SAWFA) and an associate member of SAFA.

In 1993, the first non-racial competitive league matches for women were played. The national women's team, Banyana Banyana, was selected, and the first international friendly was played against Swaziland on 30 May 1993 in Johannesburg; Banyana Banyana won the game 14–0. Later in 1993, the team travelled to Zimbabwe and won two friendlies against their host nation. In 1994, Banyana Banyana entered the qualifying stages of the Women's World Cup, losing no matches. They eventually made it to the third round by beating first Zambia in Johannesburg and Lusaka in 1994, and then Angola in 1995. However, they lost to Nigeria in the third round at the end of 1995.

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While the players fared badly, factional struggles within SAWFA continued, as did difficulties with SAFA regarding expectations related to communications and other forms of resource support. In July 1996, these problems were brought before the Pickard Commission, a structure appointed by the Minister of Sport and Recreation, Steve Tshwete, to investigate the reasons behind the problems plaguing the administration of football in South Africa. The outcome was not wholly satisfying:

> For the women's game, the Pickard Commission recommended two options: 1) find means to make associate membership more dynamic, or 2) restructure women's football by incorporating existing, but often weak, provincial structures into SAFA's provincial associations, and create a subcommittee on women's football which would be accountable to the National Executive Committee of SAFA. (Saavedra 2004: 244)

Discussions continued throughout 1996 without resolution. Finally, SAFA decided that SAWFA would continue as an associate member. But this decision was not upheld for any significant period of time. When Banyana Banyana failed to qualify for the Women's World Cup in 1997, SAFA changed its mind and decided to go for the second option recommended by the Pickard Commission. It established a women's steering committee, and subsequently began organising training camps for women, competitions for women at senior provincial level and more international matches. An under-19 level was also introduced, with the goal of a national under-20 team, Basetsana, being chosen to start shaping the core of a future Olympic squad. Fran Hilton-Smith explained how she and a colleague approached the Pickard Commission with their problems, specifically concerning the sexual harassment of women players by male coaches (this issue is explored in greater detail below):

> ...we went to the Pickard Commission to demand that women's football be run by women. And that was approved by Judge Pickard at the time. But it never really happened like it should have. Women's football has just been given a kind of lip service. In fact, what

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> happened then, which shouldn't have happened, and didn't help us at all, was that women's football, which was until then a separate body and an affiliate of SAFA – we ran our own affairs while still under them – was disbanded and made a standing committee of SAFA. The committee had a chairperson, but this chairperson didn't have a voice on the NEC. So it didn't really help us at all. And it was such a pity because we had this huge problem of sexual harassment at the time. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

In 1998, Banyana Banyana made it to the inaugural CAF Women's Championship finals in Nigeria. However, the team finally lost to Cameroon and Ghana, with Nigeria winning the tournament. In 1999, possibly as a response to this poor performance, SAFA held a Women's Football Indaba, the result of which was a policy blueprint that was to be implemented by the Women's National Committee. In 2000, South Africa hosted the CAF African Women's Championship in Vosloorus. The final match between Nigeria and South Africa was abandoned with 18 minutes of play remaining as a result of fans protesting Nigeria's second goal and invading the pitch. Nigeria was awarded the match and the cup. In spite of this loss, SAFA seemed to be proud of the achievements of the team at the time, with announcements being made that it would bid to host the 2007 Women's World Cup (Saavedra 2004: 245).

Recent years have not seen SAFA make good on any of its promises, and Banyana Banyana seems to have been on a downhill path since 2000. Fran Hilton-Smith argues that the absence of female coaches and the appointment of ill-suited male coaches to the women's national team were the primary factors leading to the team's poor performances. In her view:

> When they took me out of being the national coach in 2000, they appointed male coaches who were not of the right calibre. And that's often a problem in women's football – that there's not enough women coaches…we found with the male coaches that came to women's football – we had Gregory Mashilo there for two, maybe three, years and Augusto Palacios – and women's football in this country, in most countries…is a

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> specialised sport. As I work for FIFA, I have travelled to many countries around the world, many developing countries, and the men there have no idea of women's football. Yes, it's football, but there's a lot of psychological, a lot of issues, that are very different in women's football. And having these two guys, specifically in the last five years, has set us back tremendously. It's set us back right back to the beginning. Because the team played last year in the African Women's Championships and they sank to their lowest level. They didn't win a single game. And therefore something had to be done. That is what we are currently doing in preparing the team for the next African Women's World Cup in China next year. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

Hilton-Smith went on to show how 'women's football is an afterthought' by describing how the appointment of ill-suited coaches contributed directly to the decline of the team. A striking example that she gave was that of Styles Phumo, who was appointed to coach Banyana Banyana even though he was already coaching the under-20 men's team and assisting with Bafana Bafana. Phumo chose to leave Banyana Banyana on the eve of an important match that clashed with a game being played by the under-20 men's team. Hilton-Smith said of this episode, 'As with most male coaches, it's no special thing to coach the women's national team. They want to be with the men's team.' So it was no surprise that Phumo left Banyana Banyana in the lurch. When this happened, Hilton-Smith and Sheryl Botes (a former national player and former coach of Basetsana) stepped in to coach Banyana Banyana. Since then, Hilton-Smith has begun training former players as coaches, and has urged SAFA to support the training and appointment of more female coaches. For Hilton-Smith, the lack of attention paid by SAFA to the important issue of coaching for the national women's team is an indication of their general disregard for and marginalisation of women's football (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006).

Another significant factor that has contributed to the perpetuation of soccer as an exclusivist sport is the manner in which money flows through the sport. In particular, the issue of sponsorships has been a limiting

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factor in the development of women's football, and contributes towards the continued absence of a professional women's football league in South Africa. In 2001, many believed that things were about to change for women's football when Sanlam entered the picture as a major corporate sponsor of the first national women's football league. Many see this as a result of the overwhelming response received by Sanlam after its sponsorship of the 2000 African Women's Football Championships held in South Africa, in which Banyana Banyana finished second overall (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006). Over 300 teams would compete from 25 SAFA regions, with the 9 provincial champions competing with each other for the national title in the Sanlam Halala Cup tournament. At the time, SAFA expressed its hopes that the league would contribute to the long-term development of women's football, with its president, Molefi Olifant, stating that the league would 'stabilise and strengthen women's football at regional level and...lay the groundwork for the formation of a professional league by 2003'.[8] There is still no professional women's football league in South Africa today. However, in 2003, dissatisfied with the way in which it had been treated by SAFA, Sanlam withdrew its sponsorship. According to Fran Hilton-Smith, dissatisfaction arose on the part of Sanlam when Vodacom entered the picture with intentions of also sponsoring women's football. SAFA reneged on certain agreements that it had made with Sanlam, precipitating Sanlam's withdrawal of its support. Today there is still only one national women's league, for which it has always been difficult to secure funding. Between 2001 (when the league began) and 2003, Sanlam was the sole sponsor. When Sanlam ended this support, Vodacom came on board, providing funds only until 2007, at which point the league was again left in a crisis when Vodacom withdrew its support. Recently ABSA has taken over the sponsorship of the league.

In addition to corporate sponsorships, government has also historically contributed some money towards the development of women's football. However, this has been given to SAFA, with no serious or comprehensive approach to resource mobilisation for the development of women's football that would include addressing critical issues such as the

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introduction of soccer for girls at school level. The amount of money made available has also been rather small. In recent years, it is unfortunate that Banyana Banyana's development has continued to depend on the strengths or weaknesses of SAFA at any given time.

> Fran Hilton-Smith says:
>
> I feel strongly that the government should sponsor women's football irrespective of what's happening in men's football. If they've got problems I don't see why they should become our problems. And what we're doing now is opening our own banking account for women's football where, if say government gives us money, we will account for our money because we don't want to be painted with the same brush...we need more government support and we certainly need women's football to run itself – under SAFA, yes, as the mother body, but we need to run our own affairs, and I'm hoping that that will happen because without that we're going nowhere. We need to be able to appoint our coaches, not SAFA. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

Outside of SAFA, there is little support given by government to the development of women's football. In the words of Hilton-Smith:

> As we speak, we have no growth at all. There's no structured girls' soccer in schools, there's no little leagues, there's no nothing. The only thing that's coming up now is a project started by the director of development together with Wits Lotto, and we're identifying girls under 15 because FIFA has introduced for the first time the under-17 World Cup for girls, which commences in 2008. So these girls that we identify will be the under-17 national team in 2008. But, generally there has been little to no development in women's football. It actually is quite a dismal picture. And, given our resources and facilities, we should be the top national team in Africa. For sure. It is just because it doesn't get the attention that it needs that we're not there. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

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In this context, Hilton-Smith approached the National Lottery Fund independently and was able to raise R2 500 000 a year for the following three years to open a high-performance centre in Pretoria. Of this initiative she said:

> I realised that if we don't have the high-performance centre, we're going to get nowhere. Specifically because we have no leagues, or youth development, or whatever, so this high-performance centre – we initially put in the under-20 national team. They live there, they go to school there, or university, and my vision now is when we pick these under-15s that they will also feed in there.

But, in Hilton-Smith's view, the high-performance centre was being poorly managed and run, primarily because of the appointment of managers who did not have the necessary skills and knowledge to run an elite high-performance facility:

> So for two years, although the centre's been running, it has definitely not been running as an elite high-performance venue, and the players are nowhere near the level at which they should be now. In fact, for Basetsana now, who are qualifying this year, we've actually looked at players outside the academy, which should never be happening if it was run properly.

While a single high-performance centre may improve South Africa's chances at scoring more international goals in women's football, it is only able to reach a select few of the many talented South African girls out there. It does not in any way address the far more fundamental levels of inequality and difference that are perpetuated through a lack of resources, for example at school level. And it channels resources towards a highly elitist form of competitive sport that can only ever be restricted to the fortunate few.

When research towards this chapter began in February 2006, women's football offered little hope for development or success. Fran Hilton-Smith said then:

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> There aren't any plans in place. As we speak we're about to play Mozambique, and there's no coach, there's no manager, there's no nothing. So, the only way forward I see for women's football is that it runs independently, possibly as a standing committee under Anastasia Tsichlas, but we need to run our own affairs...I think that this is going to be a turning point for us because the previous chairpersons of women's football, Ria Ledwaba and the late Kidi Shoma, were not on the national executive and had no voice there, which made it extremely difficult for us to progress because we would have meetings and make resolutions and decisions, but those chairladies were not able to present those at an NEC meeting, whereas Anastasia Tsichlas is on the NEC. So she at least has a voice there where decisions are made. So, we're hoping that that will change things. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

In the months after this interview was conducted, SAFA appointed Anastasia Tsichlas chairperson of women's football at SAFA, and Fran Hilton-Smith as administrator of the game. Together with the appointment of a new and suitable coach, as well as an improved technical team and more training camps and practice time, Banyana Banyana seemed to be back on the map.

With just a little more resource support, the team made it to the semi-finals of the 2006 African Women's Championship games and just lost out on a spot at the 2007 Women's World Cup in China (*City Press* 5 November 2006). Mainstream media coverage of Banyana Banyana increased, Nelson Mandela met with the girls, and South Africa seemed happy to embrace the team. In an email interview conducted in October 2006, Hilton-Smith said that the recent improvement and success of the team had been based on 'total dedication, and a committed technical team who are very strong and varied, including a psychologist, doctor, physiotherapist, and physical strength trainer, a good coach and assistant coach, and of course me!' (Hilton-Smith interview 8 October 2006). The appointment of former Jomo Cosmos and Bafana Bafana player Augustine Makalakalane as the team's

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coach was widely celebrated as one of the key reasons for the success of the team (Hilton-Smith interview 8 October 2006; Modise interview; Carelse interview; Jijana interview). Although this was another male appointment, players and other women involved in the sport felt that Makalakalane was well suited to the task of coaching Banyana Banyana (*Saturday Star* 8 March 2006). In a newspaper interview, Portia Modise, the Banyana Banyana captain, said the following about Makalakalane: 'Not only is he a coach, but he is a friend as well...With him on our side, we will definitely do well in our games' (*The Star* 8 June 2006).

But these successes have occurred in an environment in which women's football continues to be marginalised as a result of the prevailing gender inequalities, stereotypes, myths and chauvinism in the broader society. Fran Hilton-Smith's view in 2006 reflected this:

> I think that women's football is still seen as a subsidiary to men's football and as the poor relation to men's football. The women's national team is definitely not given the same treatment as the men's national team. There's a huge gap between Bafana and Banyana with regard to everything – sponsorship, support, publicity, whatever, and to a large extent I can appreciate that there is a difference between Bafana and Banyana, in particular in the public interest of specifically securing more sponsorship. Sponsors want to sponsor Bafana because they're high-profile. And Banyana, in fact, got the sponsorship from one of the main sponsors, for example Vodacom – they got that sponsorship because SAFA at the time said to Vodacom, 'Look, if you want to sponsor Bafana you're going to have to piggyback Banyana.' So, it's still that kind of a scenario that Banyana doesn't get the same recognition, funding, sponsorship, support as Bafana, and it's something that with the new committee we hope to change. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

In September 2006, on returning from their victory in the Council of Southern Africa Football Associations (COSAFA) Cup in Zambia, Banyana

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Banyana voiced their unhappiness with their pay and the differential treatment they received. In an interview given to the mainstream media, Portia Modise complained bitterly about the pay differences between Bafana Bafana and Banyana Banyana. Since 2000, Banyana Banyana had been receiving a daily allowance of R300 per match, with the figure being adjusted to R500 for away matches. Players received R2 000 each if they won a match, R1 000 if they drew, and nothing if they lost. Bafana Bafana players were getting R40 000 for a win and R20 000 for a draw (*City Press* 3 September 2006). Modise was quoted as saying, 'All that the ladies want is a healthy environment and to be taken seriously, like the men's soccer team.' In response to the public outcries of the women's team, SAFA subsequently agreed to increase payments to Banyana Banyana players during the African Women's Football Championship in Nigeria later that year. Players would now receive R5 000 for a win, and R2 500 per draw, in addition to a R500 daily allowance. If they were to reach the semi-finals (which they did), they would receive R15 000 each (*City Press* 29 October 2006).

For Banyana Banyana players, the obviously differential treatment given to the national male and female soccer teams by SAFA, the government and the corporate sector is unacceptable. At the same time, players have remained hopeful that these attitudes will change. Portia Modise expressed this optimistic view:

> Our experience, to tell you the honest truth, is very bad because when you are a woman in this country, they don't take you serious, but we are hoping for the best because, you see, now women are getting power. Not having much support as the national team is not good because we are also representing the country. We're not doing a different thing to Bafana Bafana. We're doing the same thing, representing the country. With us, I think it's a problem because we are women. They believe that we have to be in the kitchen; why do we have to play soccer? But I think things are changing now. It's coming better and better. But we're still struggling now. I can't say that it's better. We're still struggling a lot 'cos by now we should have

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> been having our cars, having our homes, but we're still struggling for those things. We also have families that we have to look after and they are looking up to you, as you are representing the country, maybe to bring something back home. And you don't have that something to bring back home because you don't get enough money to take care of yourself. And that is a problem with women's football and that is my experience. (Modise interview)

Poor pay and the lack of a professional women's football league make it impossible for women to make a living from soccer. In the words of Fran Hilton-Smith:

> Another problem that we've had is that most of the women, because we don't have a professional women's league, they can't make a living out of football, and therefore they have to work. And this has been very very difficult. A number of them, when they have to [go to] camp...will lose their jobs. In a year like this one, where there are so many international games, players will have to be in camp for most of the year and they will be unable to work. So this is a major problem. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

There are many stories to be told amongst women soccer players of the difficulties that they experience and the creative means they employ in order to survive and continue playing football. Rose Jijana, celebrated as one of Banyana Banyana's star players by the mainstream media, had the following to say:

> Outside of Banyana Banyana, I'm playing for my team on weekends. And really, I want to say I'm struggling to make a living. I'm struggling 'cos I don't have a job. I only rely on Banyana Banyana and sometime it takes us long to play. We play, maybe, after six months, you know. What are you eating? To look after yourself you have to eat a balanced diet you know. We really are struggling a lot. But, I think that if SAFA can make a plan – 'cos we've been playing for this team

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> for a long time, and at the end of the day people at home expect you to be driving a car, living – we don't even have homes. I want my own house, my own car; I want to maintain my life. But I think things will be better. Let's hope so. (Jijana interview)

Fran Hilton-Smith says that she has tried to initiate various projects whereby players could work for government or sports institutions, but has received very little support from the powers-that-be. In such an environment many players become disillusioned, with one of the 2006 players having turned to alcohol in a big way (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006).

Other problems faced by women footballers include the fact that they receive very little resource and emotional support in a context that is generally poor and deprived. Insufficient funds are an overwhelming problem for black women footballers, who often cannot afford proper clothing and equipment, nutritionally sound meals, transport to practices and matches, and treatment in the case of injury (Hilton-Smith interview 8 March 2006; Masuku interview 8 March 2006; Modise interview; Carelse interview; Jijana interview).

In spite of these problems, women have continued to play and to excel at the game. Many of the players view their talent as something with which they can contribute to their country and through which they can attain national respect and honour. In Modise's words:

> We cope because we have the talent. We're not doing anyone a favour by playing football. We're playing just because we love the game. If ever we were doing it just because we wanted the money maybe it was going to be a problem. But we're doing it because we wanted to represent our country. We wanted to be somebody in our country, we wanted to be recognised. (Modise interview)

While SAFA, the government and the mainstream media may have worked to deny Banyana Banyana their space in the imagining and construction of the 'rainbow nation', players and others associated with women's football

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claim that there is widespread support for Banyana Banyana amongst South Africans. In Hilton-Smith's words:

> The women have incredible support from the nation. And in fact, every day, I can say this without hesitation, every day people stop me in the street – I haven't coached the team for two years now – but they ask 'how's Banyana Banyana doing, how are these top players doing?' So they're household names. The captain, for instance, Portia Modise, was nominated as one of the top hundred women in the country. She's an icon. There is a huge support for women's football. It just doesn't get the support that's needed from the people who are supposed to be developing it. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

But if the increasing presence of Banyana Banyana in the mainstream media, as well as Nelson Mandela's embrace of the team, are anything to go by, it would seem that things are changing. As 2010 approaches and the scandals and dismal failures associated with Bafana Bafana escalate, the successes and improvements of Banyana Banyana may well provide new ways of showcasing and selling South African football. Portia Modise says, 'I think that things are going to change 'cos now everyone is looking up to us because Bafana Bafana was beaten. So now they're saying "at least we still have girls to represent us" but we're happy that they've come to their senses that they're going to start believing in us' (Modise interview).

Playing the game – inclusion at what cost?

Describing a 1962 *Drum* article profiling the Mother City Girls, Martha Saavedra writes:

> Started as a bit of 'fun', the women became extremely 'keen' on the game and were longing for more competition. Never losing a match, they played young schoolboys and mixed-sex scratch teams made up mostly of boys. Despite the somewhat condescending tone and the emphasis on the sexual attractiveness of the women, especially in the

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> photo captions, the unnamed author of the piece seems to be genuinely impressed with their skills. Indeed, their sexual attractiveness is heightened by their abilities on the pitch in contrast to much discourse that would categorise their skills and aggressive play as distinctly unfeminine and, hence, unattractive. (Saavedra 2004: 243)

And the current stars of the game describe their introduction to it in similar terms:

> I started playing soccer when I was 10 years old. Eintlik [actually], I've grown up playing soccer. It was my sport. I never chose to play it, but I was born with it. That's why I play it. I believe it is a talent that was given to me to follow. (Modise interview)

> I started playing soccer when I was 9–10 years old. I was also born with a talent of soccer, 'cos every day when I would come home from school, it would be soccer, soccer, soccer, soccer crazy. (Carelse interview)

Talented young women, who enter the field of football in order to nurture this talent and to enjoy the experience of a team sport, learn early on in their lives just how their bodies will come to be disciplined and made to function in this world. While many young girls start out playing soccer in boys' teams, often showing as much potential as their male counterparts, adolescence and pressures to conform to the hetero-normative development of 'a woman' often lead to girls being excluded from the world of football completely. South African schools continue to stream young girls into sports considered to be more 'feminine', such as netball, and very few opportunities exist at school level for young girls to play soccer. Many successful women footballers start out playing in male teams, and tell of how they begin to be ostracised by both young men and women as they enter adolescence, for being 'different'. In these experiences of adolescence, discrimination based on sex and on sexuality occur.

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In South Africa, as democracy unfolded and women's football exploded onto the international scene, the opportunities for women to play football opened up and girls began to play in their own teams. However, the separation of women into a space apart from men does not seem to address the problems that begin to emerge in adolescence with girls playing in boys' teams. Instead, women tend to have to conform to certain normative gender stereotypes in order to be included in the world of women's football. For many players, playing the game is a constant negotiation of how they are seen and/or read as gendered beings, and of how they are able to make their bodies functional within the dominant patriarchal, heterosexist, capitalist order.

It would seem that one of the major problems with the way in which women's football has developed in South Africa has its roots in the dominance of men in the founding and establishment of the first female teams. According to Fran Hilton-Smith:

> When SAFA first got back into the world arena, suddenly there was a huge interest from the black population to play a part in women's football. And, a lot of men, African men specifically, saw this as a gap to promote themselves by getting into women's football. And what I found at the time was that the majority of men, excluding obviously a number of well-meaning guys, but generally a lot of the men that we got in women's football were men that had been kicked out of men's football because they were no good. So they came into women's football and they started their own teams…And all they were doing was collecting all these women as their property. And they were sleeping with them in order for them to play. And they were trading them with other coaches. It was like a slave market…because, if you wanted to play on a Sunday, which they wanted to play, then they'd sleep with the coach or manager because you wanted to play. I also introduced a policy then, when we had regional tournaments or inter-provincials, that one of the two officials – either the coach or the manager – had to be a woman. And, I thought that was a bright idea initially. But then I realised that

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> all that was happening was that the male coach was appointing his girlfriend as the manager, and it didn't help me at all. So then I had to make sure that coaches and managers were properly qualified. So we introduced coaching courses to ensure that we got the right coaches. And this seems to have worked now. Of course you will still have sexual harassment where there are sports coached by men where there are women, but it is certainly nothing like it was in the beginning. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

Sexual harassment was an issue faced by many women footballers of the early 1990s. The experiences related by Phumla Masuku, a founding player of Soweto Ladies and Banyana Banyana and former captain of Soweto Ladies, are common to many of the women footballers of the early years of the sport in the country:

> I started playing soccer at a very early age. I remember myself playing under-8 with boys. Since then, I grew and kept on developing until a stage when I played for the second-division boys' [team] – I had a team while I was still growing up, and the team was called 'Phumla'. We played up until 1989 when this guy – he was a journalist of the *Sowetan* – approached me and told me that he wanted to make a team for girls only so that they can play a curtain raiser for a match between Kaizer Chiefs and Cosmos. So, that guy managed to get a team together. He brought all the girls together who were playing for boys' teams and he made them one team. And he decided to call that team 'Soweto Ladies'. (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

In 1990 the Soweto Ladies played their first game. In 1991, the team played its first international match. According to Masuku, the team grew and became 'role models' for other players, with the growth of other teams following their success. In 1992, as captain of the Ladies, Masuku went to Sweden where the team was victorious. While 1993 was supposed to have been another year of success, with the team returning to Sweden to defend

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the trophy, Masuku's subsequent experiences were to mark a decline in her life as a player.

> So much was happening that year. Our manager was trying to do funny stuff with other girls, you know. Even myself, I was one of those girls. He pursued me. I told him straight that I'm a lesbian. By then I knew that I was a lesbian even though I was not doing it, you know, out. I always knew, and I told him that it wouldn't be appropriate. 'I'm the captain, you're the manager,' I said. And, by then he was having a steady girlfriend. So for me, it didn't make any sense. You know, it created so many conflicts. When we were overseas, we were all there as players. We had treated the trip as a camping site because no one was sexually active except for the manager and that player. And that was problematic...but we kept on playing under those circumstances. (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

In 1994, together with another player, Gloria Hlalele, Masuku was banned from playing for the Soweto Ladies when the two players publicly accused their coach of sexual harassment. This bold action on their part also prevented them from being offered positions with an overseas team. There are many similar stories to be heard from South Africa's women footballers. Masuku has, together with other lesbians in the organisation Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW), begun to record and document some of these stories (see below).

One of these has been the story of Gloria Hlalele. Hlalele is one of South Africa's greatest soccer players. She started playing soccer at the age of eight in a boys' team. In the 1980s she was prevented from playing professionally for a male team because she was a woman. She went on to help establish the famous and talented Soweto Ladies, and was instrumental in setting up Banyana Banyana. Gloria Hlalele and Phumla Masuku are lesbian. In the case of Hlalele, she strongly believes that her sexual orientation has been a reason for her exclusion from professional playing and coaching of the sport. In spite of her talent, which has been recognised as good enough

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to coach men, she has been excluded from the sport, firstly as a child, for not being man enough, and later as a woman, for not being woman enough. Masuku, captures this 'double bind' in which many women footballers find themselves:

> Everything started years ago. It was when Jomo Sono wanted to sign up Gloria Hlalele to play with boys. There were questions like 'Won't her husband want her at home to shag when she's on the field?', 'What happens if she falls pregnant?', and things like that. Those were the questions that discouraged the professional teams from signing up women players. And when everything was introduced as Banyana Banyana or women's football in South Africa, there was that stigma of saying South African players are lesbians. And it's not true. Yes, the main percentage are lesbians, but we do have heterosexual players who are very good, and it's not fair for them because they are suffering – for what? (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

For many women, then, 'hiding who they really are' becomes a necessary means of survival in the heterosexist world of football.

Sexuality has become a hot topic of conversation in the mainstream media precisely in relation to the ways in which the bodies of the Banyana Banyana players should be (or could be) made more functional to the procurement of greater sponsorships for the team. In March 2005, the then chairperson of SAFA's Women's Committee, Ria Ledwaba, said to the media that Banyana Banyana players should 'act and dress like ladies', primarily in an attempt to secure greater sponsorship. Amongst her proposals for the transformation of the team were 'workshops' to teach the players general etiquette and ways of 'behaving like ladies', as well as a shapelier soccer kit. In response, Portia Modise, in her capacity as captain of the national squad, stated that how the players chose to behave and dress off the field had no effect on their playing on the field. She also claimed that 60 per cent of the team were lesbian, and that in fact a majority of soccer players worldwide were lesbian. However, she felt that the sexual orientation of players was of

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no concern to anyone else and that this was being made an issue by SAFA management purely to shift responsibility for not securing sponsorships and properly developing the national team. In her words, the sexual orientation and appearance of the team had become a 'scapegoat' for SAFA's poor management and leadership of the team (*City Press* 3 March 2005). In an interview in March 2006, Modise said:

> You know, I think, they realised that whatever they said was out of order. It was out. They wanted someone to blame and there was no one to blame. It was our technical team to blame because they didn't give us enough time to prepare. I think that those issues of 'you must look like ladies' – you can't change me; you can't. You can't expect me to wear high heels and perform in the field. That is impossible. This is a man's game. Like it or not, this is a man's game and we're going to wear like men. If they have a problem with that then they must cancel women's football...I can't wear a mini-skirt and play, showing my bum to the crowd. It's impossible. (Modise interview)

Fran Hilton-Smith echoes Modise's words, and argues that just demanding a change of behaviour and dress on the part of the players misses a whole world of discrimination that women players face in choosing to play football. Having played football herself, she explains how playing the game naturally shapes one's body into an athletic and androgynous form, and that the most comfortable and functional clothes in which to play happen to be those historically associated with the male form. She also highlights the fact that many young girls begin to 'dress and act like boys' in teams in order to avoid being sexually harassed by male coaches:

> There's two issues to this story – one, I did a lot of research into it, and one of the reasons the girls portrayed themselves like boys was that in the time or just after we got back into football, it wasn't then acceptable for a lot of the women to play football because it was seen as a men's sport. And there weren't a lot of women's teams. So what happened, if I can take the example of Portia Modise, the captain of

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> Banyana, she played most of her life in boys' teams because there weren't many women's teams. Secondly, to play in the boys' teams you had to look like a boy. So they developed this kind of boyish attitude because they wanted to play football. And also, I discovered when we started to have all-women's teams this thing continued, because they realised that they wouldn't be sexually harassed by the managers and coaches of the teams because they weren't appealing to them. So that propagated that as well. Certainly, there are girls who are lesbian in the women's national team. Equally there are men who are whatever in the men's team but nobody talks about that. I think that Ria, and the federation was very angry at the time – she was called to book – and I was angry about it because it was not – you don't need to wear high heels and be a model to play football. It's a physical sport. You have to have some kind of physical demeanour. And the problem for us, that you don't encounter if you look at the American women's national team, their advantage is that they all have long hair and that kind of stuff that detracts from them looking like boys, but generally now the bulk of the national team are African women who have short hair and because they are working out they are naturally going to have muscular development that is different...the sport promotes a more physical-looking person. So for me that issue about their sexuality is totally irrelevant and shouldn't even come into the picture. And that is what was said to Ria. (Hilton-Smith interview 22 February 2006)

In the eyes of activists in the field, the issue of sexuality would not be an issue for sponsors if SAFA was more vocal in its support of the team, regardless of the sexual orientation or physical appearance of its players (Masuku interview 9 February 2006). In Masuku's words, 'The mother body itself, SAFA, doesn't believe in homosexuality. The sponsors are pulling out because of the response that they are getting from the mother body. If SAFA was very supportive and said "who cares if they are lesbians; they still give us what we want", it would have been different.'

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However, SAFA itself is riddled with the contradictions of our patriarchal, capitalist society that is upheld by heterosexist norms of human appearance and behaviour. Masuku highlights some of these contradictions:

> I think it's all about discrimination and being stereotyped. Who's acting like a lady? Have you seen Ria? You'll never see Ria wearing skirts or stilettos. I have known Ria since I was 18; I'm 31 now. I've never seen Ria walking by her husband, wearing skirts or bandanas or something. She always looks like a butch woman. Who can say she's not a lesbian? I could easily claim that she's a lesbian because she dresses the way we dress. Is it okay for us to say 'Ria, you are a lesbian'? It's not. As much as it's not okay for her to say that to us. Yes, I can take it, but that's me. I don't mind it being known that I'm a lesbian. But it's not the same for everyone. And for other people it's not fair. What about the heterosexual players who are very talented, who had dreams and hopes that they'll go far with soccer? The other thing is, about boys, if you watch each and every game from the Premier Soccer League, they have these braids – they braid more than we do. Their braids are so beautiful. Can you say that they are gay? Most of them are usually being profiled – 'I'm a metrosexual. I wear a g-string.' Can we really claim that they are gay? It's not fair. Seeing Irvin Khoza – you know he has a wife and some kids – but seeing him wearing a pink shirt, should we really come out and say that he's gay? No, we can't. And it's not right. Being in South Africa right now, in a democracy, we shouldn't be having such things. Our challenges should be poverty, not discriminating. The only thing you should do is to look at what a person can offer and you work with that... It's sad because it took me 30 years to be the Phumla that I am. If Ria would try to retransform me, it would take me another 50 years. So, I won't achieve my goals. I won't be successful in life. (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

Over time, and through the consistent efforts of a few strong and dedicated women within the mainstream world of soccer such as Portia Modise

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and Fran Hilton-Smith, these attempts at disciplining women's bodies and rendering them functional to the heterosexist norm have come to be questioned and challenged. However, the struggle within the mainstream remains one waged by a few individuals who 'play the game within the game', understanding the inequalities and prejudices that exist and finding ways of advancing within the system, and of drawing attention to the contradictions within it. To a large degree, it has been those women who have chosen to remain silent about their sexual orientation, and to render issues of sexuality secondary to the game and to issues of the development of talent, that have maintained their positions in the game.

Networks of mutual support

In negotiating the mainstream, individual women who achieve success often do so as a result of unseen networks of support that have arisen informally amongst women who play the game, and amongst those who believe that their talent is worth nurturing. Theorists such as Pelak (2005) have pointed to the existence of networks of 'everyday acts of mutual support' that allow for the success of a few talented women. Cynthia Pelak argues: 'The women's football community is not waiting to be treated with fairness. Based on a shared consciousness of structural inequalities, women and men within the sport have built strong grassroots networks. Through an ethic of care and everyday acts of mutual support, participants negotiate structural and ideological constraints' (Pelak 2005: 64). She goes on to illustrate this through the experiences of women footballers in the Western Cape, with instances of such networks including the informal mentoring of younger players by older women at a community level, the sharing of transport duties by parents, and the sharing of shoes and other soccer gear.

Few of these initiatives exist at a formal level, and few support networks are overtly critical of the mainstream. However, while the majority of young female football players don't ever speak about their experiences in this world that tries to 'make them who they are not' or that profits from their sexuality

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as young girls, either conforming or retiring to other sports and activities, there are a few young women who have chosen to organise and play football separately, outside of the mainstream. One such initiative has been that of the Chosen FEW, a Johannesburg-based team of black lesbians who play football as a political statement against the mainstream. While they see the importance of efforts at transforming the mainstream, the subjugation of their bodies to the function of upholding a heterosexist norm is not something that they wish to endure. Instead, they choose to confront the diverse issues and problems they experience as black, poor, lesbian women with a talent and passion for soccer in the space that they have claimed for themselves and not with regard to their construction by the mainstream. This is a constant struggle, as they cannot completely escape the mainstream and the fact that they have to live in a world defined by heterosexist and racialised capitalist relations.

FEW has provided the space for the emergence of a talented women's football team, through its creation of a broader support system and network for the young women football players who make up the team, allowing for the team and the organisation to become a new and 'different way of life' amongst a collective of women within existing society. FEW therefore provides basic life skills, computer and photography training for young black lesbians; holds regular workshops and discussions on issues relevant to the lives of black lesbians; and runs campaigns to improve the lives of black lesbians such as 'The Rose Has Thorns' campaign, which addresses the problems faced by survivors of hate crimes and aims to increase awareness in society about the crimes of hate inflicted against black lesbians. For Phumla Masuku, her introduction to FEW marked 'a turning point' in her life as it allowed her the space to work in a collective with other women, learning and sharing, and growing as a person. In her words, 'FEW is a safe space for any women. And FEW has done a lot for empowering women, especially hate crime survivors' (Masuku interview 9 February 2006).

When Masuku joined FEW, the idea of a football team did not exist. It arose as more women began getting together and informally playing around with a soccer ball. In her words:

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> We started as a joke, but there was talent. And there was ambition. And I kept on thinking about how we could use this as a political statement because when I walked around and asked everyone 'what made you leave soccer?' most of those reasons were common – there was no development, there was no growth, you cannot earn a living out of your talent like boys do, and, mostly, our backgrounds are so poor – for you to play soccer, it is quite expensive, and people give up because they don't have the money. So, we decided to come out as a lesbian team – women who are proud. (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

She goes on to show how, over time, they came to learn about opportunities to play soccer outside of SAFA, including many opportunities for lesbians to play. While the Chosen FEW has thus far participated only in independent matches, players have plans to enter the SAFA national league this year. Masuku says:

> I don't think we need to completely separate ourselves from the mainstream because, as much as other players are not lesbians, they are still women, as much as lesbians. We are all women regardless of our sexuality. I think the only way to make people understand is for us to participate, to be there. Being in the mainstream league, we will be able to see for ourselves, monitor the situation very well. Where we're supposed to be critical, we'll be critical. Where we're supposed to lobby, we're going to lobby. We cannot challenge them from outside. We need to be in there, and win the games, and that's when we're going to make our statement because, going there as 'Chosen FEW', as out lesbians, they will need to live and learn from that because before they know that we are lesbians, we will have displayed our talent. (Masuku interview 9 February 2006)

While the Chosen FEW clearly represents a challenge to mainstream gendered and heterosexist representations of the world of football, it also provides a space in and through which football can be imagined and played

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unconstrained by the commodified relations that have come to determine the nature of competitive sport. While the team has been unable to escape the demands of capitalist society (as individuals and as a collective), with many players unemployed and the team needing to fundraise for jerseys and other equipment, the very existence of the team has planted the seed in the minds of many that soccer can be played in a manner that does not have, as its primary motive, the goal of making money. In this manner, soccer has become a means for a group of young, black, lesbian women to come together in the sharing of their talents as well as the problems that they face in their lives. In the space that they have created for themselves, they are able to confront these problems as a collective. This is a process of constant struggle, in which relationships amongst the women comprising the Chosen FEW are as much a matter of negotiation as is the broader world of women's football.

Marginal inclusions

In choosing to play as out lesbians, the Chosen FEW have sought inclusion in a broader international community of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) people. While their experience of inclusion has afforded players opportunities they would not otherwise have had, it has also revealed a much more complex picture of inequality and exploitation that transcends easy definitions and classifications, revealing further schisms that emerge along lines dividing north from south. The following experience of the Chosen FEW is offered here as an example of how representations of race, class and gender operate differently in different contexts within the world of football, serving the interests of profit and the market. In these different contexts, however, it is women's bodies that are again made to function in the interests of capital.

In July 2006, the Chosen FEW participated in the 2006 Gay Games held in Chicago, Illinois. After struggling to raise the funds needed to send a team to the games, and receiving very little media attention at home, the players' reception overseas was overwhelming. Not only did the team receive

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great attention for being the only all-black lesbian soccer team participating, but it also became the representative for the continent of Africa. While the team did well, and players returned excited about their experiences, members of FEW have raised problems with the role that the Chosen FEW came to play in Chicago. Members draw attention to the fact that while so much money was spent bringing the Chosen FEW to the games, not a single black lesbian from Chicago was present at the games, and the Chosen FEW came to represent and speak for all black women at the games. In this manner, the Gay Games did not allow for real networks and connections to be formed between black women from the global south, but exploited the Chosen FEW to create the impression that the games were representative, satisfying the needs of its global corporate sponsors.[9] In an analysis of the ways in which women's football interacts with broader economic and political forces at work in the sporting world, Sabine Neidhardt says:

> In this particular scenario, the Chosen FEW come to stand in for all black women, for all African lesbians. On the one hand, this means that 15 black lesbian players become not only hypervisible, but a necessary function of white gay imperialism. Chosen FEW can now be boxed, marketed, and sold to both the sponsors as an attraction to bring queer consumers to the market, and to white (western) gay and lesbian spectators and supporters as their own contemporary 'mirror.' In this way, the hypervisibility of African soccer queens participating at the Games in the US gives legitimacy to, almost offers some vindication for, the imperialist trajectory western capitalism has been on in the last 500 years, specially now considering that anti-imperialist sentiments are growing and spilling from all corners of the global South. (Neidhardt 2006: 2).

It is ironic that while the Chosen FEW are shunned at home, and most of the team's players are poor, in Chicago they were fêted as celebrities and as symbols of the 'rainbow gay and lesbian nation' and its sponsors. Again, an example of the manner in which women's bodies are made functional to

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the logic of the market, a logic that assumes different forms dependent on changing contexts and conditions. While the Chosen FEW have not managed to oust the soccer babes from the pages of local magazines and newspapers, they were made to serve the same function as these soccer babes in Chicago. This illustrates how the terrain of women's football is one that women have to negotiate on a daily basis in their lives, as they come into confrontation with the deeply gendered, racialised, sexualised and commodified relations that define contemporary society.

Some conclusions

As South Africa prepares to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup, women's bodies feature everywhere. From the recent swell in numbers of beautiful female cheerleaders for male soccer teams to Nelson Mandela's embrace of Banyana Banyana, the celebration of women in the world of football seems to hold promise for 'the nation's' coffers. In trying to understand the different positions that women assume in the world of football, this chapter has attempted to trace the history of women's football in South Africa through the lenses of inclusion and exclusion, in particular at the level of how women's bodies are imagined, represented and incorporated in order to sell those values and beliefs foundational to capitalism, and in the process to generate profit for a range of interested parties. While mainstream media representations and academic theories tend to prioritise exclusion as an analytical lens through which to understand the unequal position of women in soccer, this chapter has tried to show how both exclusion and inclusion work to uphold those ideas and stereotypes of women that allow the sport to continue as a male-dominated one, in the main, and that function in the interests of upholding the hetero-normative ideal on which capitalism thrives. Such an approach has also allowed us to see the world of football as a space in and through which women are sometimes able to challenge mainstream representations and constructions of 'what women are like', and to find ways of working together within the individualising world of competitive football.

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As 2010 approaches, and 'our nation' works to include women in various ways in preparations for the event, we need to ask how, and on what basis, women are being included in and excluded from the sport. For each of the different groups of women that choose to enter the world of football, this question will need to be asked and answered in terms of a specific context, and choices will have to be made about how inclusions can occur. How these choices are made, at both an individual and a collective level, will be dependent on the specific configuration of the legacy of apartheid society, its fundamentally racist, sexist, homophobic beliefs, values and institutions, and its current perpetuation in the form of neoliberal macroeconomic policies, that women encounter as they pursue their dream of playing the game.[10]

Notes

1 'Madiba Magic' for Banyana, 24 October 2006, http://www.news24.com/News24/Sport/Soccer/0,,2-9-840_2019521,00.html, accessed 15 November 2006

2 *iDiski* is one of the very few South African soccer magazines that fairly regularly profiles star women footballers, showcasing their talent and skill, and not their physical appearance or sexuality.

3 Jessica Motaung, marketing manager of Kaizer Chiefs football club and famous South African beauty queen, quoted in *Sunday World*, 28 August 2006

4 See Merton M, Cinderellas want to get to the ball, *Mail & Guardian*, 2001; Ndibi K, Banyana are playing for pittance, *The Star*, 11 March 2004; Ndibi K, South African women's game a joke – Smith, *The Star*, 25 October 2005.

5 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.

6 The SASL was formed in the 1960s by people opposed to the apartheid policies of the South African government.

7 See http://www.safa.org.za

8 http://www.safa.net/safa_general/index.asp?sectionid=59

9 Major sponsors of this year's Gay Games included Ernst & Young and CitiBank (representing the financial sector), GlaxoSmithKline, the manufacturer of the HIV drug Lexiva (representing the pharmaceutical industry), and the Los Angeles Police Department recruitment team (representing the security sector).

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10 This chapter would not have been possible without the cooperation of the outstanding women at the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW). In particular, Phumla Masuku contributed her time, experiences, insights and substantial body of knowledge to this project, for which we thank her immensely. We would also like to thank Fran Hilton-Smith for providing us with her time and insights, as well as allowing us access to the Banyana Banyana team. Thank you also to Portia Modise, Antonia Carelse and Rose Jijana for taking time out of their training schedule for interviews.

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Interviews

Antonia Carelse, Banyana Banyana team member, Edenvale, 8 March 2006

Fran Hilton-Smith, former coach of the national women's team and currently head of women's football at SAFA and manager of the national teams, Johannesburg, 22 February 2006, email interview 6 October 2006, email interview 8 October 2006

Rose Jijana, Banyana Banyana team member, Edenvale, 8 March 2006

Phumla Masuku, sports co-ordinator and coach of the Chosen FEW, Johannesburg, 9 February 2006, 8 March 2006

Portia Modise, captain of Banyana Banyana, Edenvale, 8 March 2006

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6

Jumping over the hurdles: A political analysis of transformation measures in South African athletics

Justin van der Merwe

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> [S]ince only a handful of black athletes...had achieved Olympic qualifying standards, the complexion of our team was going to be overwhelmingly white...Was this what we had fought for? Had we worked so hard to lead a team, which was 95 per cent white, back into the Olympic movement? Eventually, I suggested NOCSA should apply to the IOC for permission to bring to Barcelona an additional development team, comprised of 25 black athletes with potential who would march in the Opening Ceremony but not actually compete... So, somehow, somewhat breathlessly, we reached Barcelona, and conveyed a powerful image of reconciliation. The ostensibly equal mix of blacks and whites that marched into the Olympic stadium on a warm and emotional evening might not have been an accurate representation of what we were in 1992, but it was an honest expression of what we wanted to be. (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 129)

THIS CHAPTER EXPLORES THE successes and failures of the measures put in place to address the desperate state of South African athletics, and attempts to reflect critically upon them. The analysis focuses firstly on the

national level and secondly on the local level. On the national level, the discussion follows South Africa's re-entry into international athletics, and the transformation dynamic that was to frame the restructuring processes in post-apartheid South African athletics. The discussion then tracks South Africa's momentous participation in the five Olympic Games since readmission, as significant moments that permit reflection on the broader transformation processes in athletics.

On the local level, the analysis offers a case study of one athletics club, the Worcester Athletics Club based in the Boland in the Western Cape province, and explores the successes and failures of transformation measures at this level. With Worcester being in a predominantly coloured area, the analysis also explores how a coloured identity is negotiated 'on the field' and in sporting clubs in relation to an understanding of black identity.[1]

The national story

Since the 1950s, when South Africa's race policies in sport became formalised in legislation, sporting activities had had to comply with the broader policies of separate development; there was to be no inter-racial mixing in sport, and black teams were barred from competing against white teams. Visiting teams were expected to respect South Africa's laws and customs, as South Africa respected theirs. Thus began an intractable discriminatory process whereby the seeds of today's discontent were sown. By the 1970s, South Africa's race policies had led to its isolation in the athletics world and the country was banned from participation in the Olympic Games for more than 30 years.

With movements towards unity already afoot in the early 1990s, spaces were opening up within South African athletics. The creation of a non-racial development body targeting disadvantaged athletes, the South African Amateur Athletics Congress (SAAAC), which was to join the already established South African Amateur Athletics Union (SAAAU) and the South African Amateur Athletics Board (SAAAB), meant that the structures comprising South African athletics were undergoing widespread

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restructuring consistent with the broader societal power shifts taking place, and athletics was mooted as a forerunner of more widespread initiatives aiming to bring about racial reconciliation.

Passing the baton: (re)inventing athletics as a proponent of racial redress

Athletics South Africa (ASA), which is still in place today as South Africa's main athletics body, was formed after the apartheid-era SAAAU was disbanded in 1992. The fact that ASA, unlike the bodies that preceded it, was not a three-pillar system (covering long-distance running, track-and-field, and cross-country) allegedly caused a lot of dissatisfaction among white officials. But many black individuals and groups involved in athletics welcomed the new system because they hoped it would eliminate the exploitation of black athletes. The SAAAU had been the umbrella organisation for the South African Track and Field Association, South African Cross Country Association and South African Road Running Association (SARRA). When athletics was unified under ASA, the first ASA chairman, Mervyn King, suggested that these organisations – including the SAAAU – disband and surrender their assets. All but one obliged; the SARRA decided to remain independent (*Sowetan* 1 December 2004).

The problematic birth of non-racial sporting codes in South Africa after the phasing out of apartheid structures was later to become the source of much acrimony within the athletics administration. One of the central areas of conflict related to the fact that Leonard Chuene, the president of ASA, believed that road running had been responsible for resisting attempts at transformation – an accusation which, although made as late as 2004, referred all the way back to the time of the initial unity talks '…where cross-country and track-and-field didn't have a problem with uniting with blacks. But road running was against it – they wanted to remain independent' (*Sowetan* 24 November 2004).

Despite problems of this kind with the formation of non-racial athletics bodies, the foundations were being laid for South Africa to undergo steady change on a national level. The primary custodians overseeing

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transformation were to be the Department of Sport and Recreation, ASA, the National Olympic Council of South Africa (NOCSA) and the South African Sports Commission (SASC). South African sports administrators were to play a central role in trying to ensure steady and amicable transformation within all tiers and facets of South African athletics.

Yet, upon re-entry into the sporting world in the early 1990s, the administrators and the politicians were faced with an awkward predicament. On the one hand, they quickly realised the potential for sport and sporting events to elevate the country's profile internationally, and engage in some much-needed nation-building and developmental feats. On the other hand, it was clear that long-term structural measures would have to be implemented to make South African sport more representative of the nation as a whole.

The fairly inconsequential domain afforded to sport during the negotiations period, coupled with the acquiescence of sporting bodies to the shift of political control from an apartheid government to a democratic government, effectively allowed for the perpetuation of existing inequalities and power structures once sporting isolation ended. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the re-entry of South Africa into the world sporting arena, and the hasty return to international competition, meant that the national sporting bodies were exposed to the prevailing pressures of globalisation and therefore driven to place commercial and competitive interests above questions of representivity. Secondly, within the country, there was a failure to put in place thoroughgoing and coherent measures to deal with the depth of inequalities within sport.

Whilst introducing cosmetic forms of transformation in terms of a fairly robust discourse of racial redress, the negotiations around sport did not effectively yield well-defined parameters for sport in a democratic South Africa. Administrators and politicians were caught between wanting to act expeditiously on the international stage, and being cognisant that real transformation would only be achieved through long-term grassroots reform. It was this trade-off that haunted, and continues to haunt, South African sporting administrators and politicians.

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South Africa and the 1992 Barcelona Olympics

At first glance the interface between civil and political rights and the Olympic Games appears to be fairly tenuous. Yet closer inspection reveals that the tenets of equality and non-discrimination, despite attempts by political regimes such as Nazi Germany to hijack the Olympics throughout the history of the Games, are central to the ideals inherent in the Olympic movement. From ancient Greece, when outstanding physical feats were seen as a means to transcend the reality of one's social position and thereby elevate one's status in society, to more recent times when such ideals were formally enshrined in the Olympic Charter by the founder of the modern Olympic movement, Pierre de Coubertain, international athletics has long been regarded as a site in which the oppressed and marginalised could contest the terms of their participation in society (Nafziger 1978). Thus the dominant narrative of the modern Olympic movement, much like the transformation process in South Africa, is synonymous with the realisation of equality and non-discrimination. After more than 30 years of exclusion, South African administrators and politicians were keenly aware of the powerful message participation in the Olympics would send to the newly democratised nation, and the world at large, and sought to utilise this to their advantage.

Therefore it was no surprise that in the early 1990s, state and corporate elites were very keen to take part in the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, even if the political transition was as yet incomplete. South Africa's inclusion in international athletics in this period was a prime example of re-entry into the sporting world precipitating the more formal political negotiations. This was partly attributed to the open arms of a magnanimous international community and the marketing prowess of 'Mandelamania', whose symbolic significance was said to override various practical constraints to South Africa's participation; yet it is also indicative of the catalytic role envisioned for athletics during the transformation process. Symbolically, South Africa's inclusion in the Barcelona Olympics signaled its re-entry into the world and the broader power shifts taking place within the nation.

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Yet, behind the scenes, the road to Barcelona was a politically challenging one for athletes and administrators alike. After decades of subjugation in sport, South African administrators were working hard to field an internationally competitive representative team, amidst ongoing lobbying from anti-apartheid campaigners.

Sam Ramsamy, who had been a leading protagonist in the sports boycott against apartheid South Africa and was later to become the chairperson of NOCSA, recalls in his biography the ongoing political tensions in South Africa in the early 1990s, particularly after the events of 17 June 1992 when 40 people were massacred in political violence in Boipatong. In spite of the mounting pressure to abandon South Africa's Olympic dreams, Ramsamy would push for South Africa's participation as it was deemed in the best interests of transformation (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 128–130).

In the lead-up to the event, Ramsamy recalls being concerned about the racial composition of the team and consequently calling a meeting with the then head of the African National Congress (ANC) Sports Desk, Steve Tshwete, otherwise known as 'Mr Fix-It'. Ramsamy was reluctant to march into the Barcelona Stadium with a team that was 95 per cent white after working so hard for a multiracial sports team. Eventually an agreement was reached between NOCSA and the International Olympic Council (IOC) that South Africa would be allowed to have an additional development team of 25 black athletes walk into the stadium alongside the official team. These measures were only cosmetic, as the team of 25 development athletes was not actually taking part in the games. Ramsamy laments the fact that only a handful of black athletes would truly represent South Africa at these Olympics (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004).

Yet the somewhat rushed and under-prepared South African team did manage to win two medals at these games. Not surprisingly, they went to established white athletes – Wayne Ferreira and Pietie Norval who won silver in the men's tennis doubles, and Elana Meyer who won silver in the women's 10 000 m final. The winner, also from Africa, was Derata Tulu from Ethiopia. Meyer, an unassuming Afrikaans-speaking woman from Stellenbosch and a teammate of Zola Budd, was to grab the headlines and become an early

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symbol of the 'new' South Africa – undertaking bold and courageous feats on the international stage. Meyer will be remembered for placing not only gender issues, but also race on the agenda by running a lap of victory holding the national flag with her Ethiopian counterpart, and stating, 'We are two women from Africa and this is an example for all of Africa', thus adding to the extraordinary iconic impact of the double win for Africa (*Cape Times* 16 August 2000). As Ramsamy says, referring to the whole Barcelona episode: 'The road to Barcelona had been paved with uncertainty, haste and conflict but, at least, we returned home smiling' (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 130).

The post-mortem

Given the hurried nature of preparations for the Barcelona Olympics, transformation measures had yet to begin in earnest. The gulf of inequality within South African athletics had to be substantively addressed; the somewhat superficial structures hastily assembled in the name of 'unity', thereby enabling South Africa to join the community of states at the games, were proving to be the source of much acrimony. In the wake of the Barcelona Olympics, the Johannesburg newspaper *The Star* rather candidly summed up the broader mood within South African athletics:

> With the Barcelona honeymoon barely over, cracks have already started to show in athletics' unity marriage of convenience. Left versus right, black versus white, African National Congress versus National Party, new South Africa versus old South Africa – the cracks are threatening South Africa's new found place in the sun...unity is about as substantial as morning mist. (*The Star* 19 August 1992)

The rather unsuccessful reshuffling of athletics structures was viewed as a microcosm of the rest of South Africa, with the abiding lesson being that, despite the carrots the international community might dangle, and mounting domestic pressures, the unification process should be a slow and steady one for fear that some of the hard work could come undone or cause unintended consequences. At the heart of this division was the split between

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the SAAAC and the SAAAU – the two organisations that were hastily patched together to provide the unified ASA necessary for world approval.

Thus the seeds of strained relations between the top athletic structures – something that was to become a feature of the South African athletics landscape – were already being planted as early as 1992. On the field, the initial successes and excitement that followed the Barcelona Olympics also meant that South Africa would focus initially on developing international athletes, whilst perhaps somewhat overlooking grassroots development.

The furore that had erupted within athletics structures after Barcelona was reinforced by allegations by the chairperson of the SARRA, partly in order to vindicate their decision not to join the ASA, that athletics unity was 'the worst case of sports unity in South Africa', citing politics, personal ambition, dishonesty and feuds as the causes of this (*Pretoria News* 31 August 1992).

The 1996 Atlanta Olympics

During the lead-up to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics the broader public mood within South Africa was a particularly buoyant one, the country recently having won the 1995 Rugby World Cup and the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations in soccer on home soil. Unlike the period preceding Barcelona, this time South Africa had the time to prepare and put in place the appropriate structures and mechanisms to ensure greater representation. Although on the whole transformation was still lacking, given the depth of inherited inequality, South Africa had managed to identify and provide support to prominent black athletes who were deemed to be 'medal hopefuls', under the auspices of what became known as Operation Excellence.

In the period building up to the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, NOCSA spent R24 million on identifying potential medal winners and providing them with proper access to facilities and coaching. Although Operation Excellence was partially aimed at black athletes, it targeted only elite athletes and the overriding criterion for selection was merit. Other organisations such as the SASC, the Sports Trust and member federations were responsible for targeting sports development more holistically at grassroots and school level.

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Ramsamy believes that with this approach they were able to achieve a lot in a short space of time (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 131–134).

Two success stories were to emerge from NOCSA's Operation Excellence at the Atlanta Games, and find a place in the hearts and minds of black and white South Africans alike. Josiah Thugwane and Hezekiel Sepeng were widely celebrated for their medal-attaining feats, having seemingly overcome great odds to rise to the heights of Olympic glory.

Hezekiel Sepeng was the first black man to win silver for South Africa, coming second in the men's 800 m finals. However, it was the diminutive and endearing Josiah Thugwane who, on the final day of the Olympics, was to become the first black man to win gold for South Africa, in the marathon. Both men were quickly framed as quintessential 'new' South African icons. Journalists waxed lyrical and indulged in all manner of hyperbole, sparking an avalanche of nation-building rhetoric. The two athletes were quick to enter the lexicon of mainstream political discourse as examples of what the 'new' South Africa could achieve, and caused state elites, already aware of the effects of the recent Rugby World Cup and Africa Cup of Nations victories on the national mood, to sit up and take notice of the symbolic power such sporting icons carried as a means to strengthen South Africa's newfound, fragile national identity.

Thugwane's life story rapidly became a metaphor for the broader South African experience, and was to find resonance in the lives of millions of South Africans. Thugwane was abandoned at birth and grew up illiterate, living in a shack and working as a janitor on a mine. Four months before he won the Olympic race, he had a typical South African experience when he was hijacked and the thieves opened fire, grazing his chin. This, however, did not prevent him from taking part in the games. After his Olympic victory, Thugwane bought a house in the middle class suburb of Middelburg, where former neighbours threatened to rob him because of his perceived newly acquired wealth. In January 1997 he was attacked by a fellow motorist and subsequently moved to Johannesburg (Merrett 2003: 47).

Thugwane retreated from the limelight, partly to avoid putting himself in danger, and took on the role of coaching and mentoring young

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athletes. Despite his short-lived success, his triumph over adversity was the 'symbol' society and the media so craved. It is a sobering example of what ordinary South Africans face in their everyday lives – a chilling downside to 'successful' sports transformation in deeply poor communities.

Although Thugwane's story does reverberate well beyond the athletics track, and he was initially successful in enhancing South Africa's burgeoning national identity, however fleetingly, his subsequent experiences raise questions about the impact and meaningfulness of such an occurrence in providing significant and long-term inspiration to other aspiring athletes facing similar challenges (Merrett 2003: 46–47).

And yet, despite the various paradoxes that were emerging across the new South Africa, a fairly stable and coherent national identity was slowly developing. South Africa had successfully negotiated the tricky transition period and averted an imminent civil war. Sport's role in helping to strengthen and mould this malleable identity was quite clearly evident.

However, after the initial burst of international acclaim and domestic legitimacy garnered for the new regime and its state elites through sport, politicians and administrators had to settle down to the nitty-gritty of transformation – reversing discriminatory practices of the past, and speeding up the processes of transformation – by adopting a bottom-up approach. The timing was also apt, with the honeymoon period of the transition coming to an end and questions increasingly being asked about the practicalities and efficacy of transformation measures. In spite of the existence of much goodwill for developmental initiatives and a robust rhetoric for change, transformation measures needed definable hard targets. Vague wishes and positive feelings were not enough.

First and foremost among the challenges facing ASA was the belief that a strong contingent of white sports administrators were trying to undermine or resist transformation. This was seen as coming from the individuals who had once headed the sport, and who, it was alleged, viewed the black officials as politicians instead of administrators. The incumbent administration cited this lack of belief in their ability to manage the sport professionally as the

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reason why certain sponsors had withdrawn when they took over. The new officials further alluded to the fact that the sport was structured to feed into broader white capitalist interests, with black athletes often exploited and only give the chance to compete at the top level if they were employed in mines or as security guards (*New Nation* 22 November 1996).

These sentiments fed the perception that clubs such as Golden Harmony, which is a prominent nationwide athletics club belonging to Harmony Gold, the fifth-largest gold mine in the world, had exploited black mineworkers economically and then set up road running clubs through which to churn out 'stable horses' from whom they could make money (*Cape Times* 17 November 2004). These approaches were consistent with the broader migrant labour system that prevailed during the apartheid era, whereby sports such as athletics and soccer were seen as a mild form of social control on the mines or an 'appropriate' way for mineworkers to spend their recreational time. Interestingly, Thugwane himself is the product of the mine athletics system (Merrett 2003: 45).

Politics appeared to have permeated the very fabric of South African athletics. Athletics commentators lamented the fact that public interest in the sport was dwindling, with crowd attendance at athletics meetings on the decline (*Rapport* 13 December 1998). There were also ongoing and often raucous allegations of racism between the top management and various officials and coaches within the broader ASA structure (*Sowetan* 21 April 1999). This took place at a time when the Ministry of Sport and Recreation was considering introducing legislation to give it stronger powers of intervention in sports affairs when things went wrong.

The 2000 Sydney Olympics

Buoyed by the successes attained thus far in the sporting world, South African state and business elites sought to host the 2000 Olympics in Cape Town. Although, with hindsight, it is clear that hosting the Olympics would have proven to be logistically problematic for South Africa should it have been awarded the games at that stage, the bids (albeit failed) for both the

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2000 Olympics and the 2006 Football World Cup were consistent with the transformed image of itself South Africa sought to project internationally (Corneilessen 2004; Griffiths 2000).

Mirroring these measures domestically were the ongoing interventions by South African administrators and politicians. In the lead-up to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, NOCSA went one step further in ensuring a greater depth of transformation, by developing a two-tiered system of transformation within the Olympic sporting codes. Firstly, they planned to target athletes who were deemed to be potential medal winners. Secondly, below that level, they aimed to create opportunities to (a) foster emerging talent; and (b) address the inequality of the past by creating opportunities for previously disadvantaged black athletes and for teams that, through development, would include a significant proportion of black players. This was how Sam Ramsamy would later justify NOCSA's omission of the South African men's all-white hockey team from the 2000 Olympics, stating that they met neither of the above criteria – a controversial decision that weighed heavily on NOCSA in the build-up to the 2000 Olympics and was the source of much discomfort within the Olympic camp in the period preceding the event (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 148–155).

Despite South Africa's failed bid to host the games, and the controversy surrounding the men's hockey team, NOCSA pushed ahead for a successful campaign on the field. These ambitions, however, were to fall short, in terms of both the medal stakes and transformation goals. South Africa attained five medals at these Olympics – two silver and three bronze – and all of them went to white athletes, with athletics and swimming stealing most of the limelight. Ramsamy recounts how the transformation controversies that preceded the event were to colour the popular judgement of the team's performance and their failure to win any gold medals (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 148–155).

With the transformation efforts starting to appear sporadic, disjointed and sometimes ad hoc, athletics bodies were highly critical of each other and often found themselves at loggerheads. Still in the wake of the 2000

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Olympics, the tensions that had been brewing between NOCSA, ASA and the government manifested themselves through acrimonious, protracted and fairly public spats. NOCSA accused ASA of incompetence, lack of discipline and mismanagement of funds (*This Day* 27 October 2003), whilst NOCSA and the government had further fallouts when Ramsamy failed to attend a sports summit at which one of the major talking points was transformation – retorting that NOCSA already had plans to boost South Africa in the 2004 Athens Olympics.

Picking up the pace...

In light of the deteriorating working relationship between the government and the broader athletics administration, coupled with the ever increasing pressure of transformation issues, the then Minister of Sport and Recreation, Ngconde Balfour, threatened to introduce legislation giving him greater and more explicit powers to intervene in sporting matters. This was perceived as a move to counter what he described as a tendency 'to pay lip service to transformation'. In the 'excellence versus transformation debate... [t]ransformation can no longer be left to the goodwill of individuals' (*The Star* 13 February 2002).

These threatened interventions were suggestive of an imminent harder stance and were to strike a chord amongst the broader public. Given the prominence that transformation concerns had come to have in national debates, then-President Thabo Mbeki urged the public to be patient and let the process unfold amicably as short-term defeats would mean long-term gains. Yet, as one journalist quipped, 'Proud South Africans already stung by the whitewashes on the cricket field, disappointment on the soccer pitch and carnage in the Super Twelve tournament, couldn't fathom the logic of losing being okay' (*Sunday Times* 31 March 2002).

Legislation to address the issue was seen as a last resort, and in order to avoid having to strengthen legislative measures, the Ministry of Sport and Recreation was looking to enforce transformation charters in various sporting codes. Athletics, along with 22 other national federations, therefore

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had to sign performance agreements in early 2002, similar to the quota agreements that already existed in rugby and cricket.

These issues were to find further resonance after South Africa returned from the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester with a meagre 3 of the 46 medals it had won attributed to black athletes (*Beeld* 9 August 2002).

The 2004 Athens Olympics

During the months leading up to the 2004 Athens Olympics, NOCSA and ASA were still fighting. After the team returned from Abuja, Nigeria, where the 2003 All Africa Games were held, with a medals haul of 174, and having recently done the country proud at the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) Championships, one would have thought that the officials would be able to put their differences aside and celebrate the achievements of the athletes. Yet the feud continued, and was often characterised as hampering the development of the sport (*This Day* 27 October 2003).

Although 30 per cent of the total number of athletes taking part in the 2004 Olympics were 'previously disadvantaged', as opposed to just a handful at the 1992 Olympics (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 156–157), just before the athletes were to leave for Athens Ramsamy was quoted in the media as not being entirely satisfied with the overall pace of transformation (*Pretoria News* 22 July 2004).

The change that had occurred, albeit incremental, Ramsamy attributed to the two-tiered system put in place by NOCSA and the dedication of federations to transformation, despite the lack of funds and dwindling public interest in athletics relative to the likes of rugby, football and cricket. Ramsamy expressed the view that only central government could make a significant difference in the sport, by earmarking funds to facilitate transformation for Olympic codes that are often referred to as 'minor sports' (Ramsamy & Griffiths 2004: 156–157).

South Africa would go on to win six medals at the 2004 Olympics – one gold, three silver and two bronze – only one of which was achieved by a black

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athlete. Many journalists stated that South Africa's overall performance at the Athens Olympics, apart from swimming, left much to be desired, and that a lack of funds and resources was evidently a greater problem than any perceived weakness resulting from a drop in standards for the sake of transformation.

The problems elucidated in the above discussion bear this out, and cast some light on the major political tensions within South African athletics at the national level. These issues and others will be further illuminated through a case study of one athletics club at the local level – the Worcester Athletics Club – in the next section of this chapter. They continued to play themselves out in the national and international contexts, as well.

Four years after Athens, the 2008 Beijing Olympics were seen as a major failure for Team South Africa, which won only one silver medal, awarded to long-jumper Khotso Mokoena. The team's abysmal performance was, however, somewhat masked by the outstanding performances by the paralympians – particularly Natalie du Toit and Oscar Pistorius – who won a total of 30 medals, 17 of which were gold. The overall poor performance was blamed on inexperience, administrative problems, a lack of facilities and inadequate training.

The mounting talk of the need to grant government stronger powers in sport did finally lead to legislative changes, with the passing of the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act of 2007, which granted the Minister of Sport and Recreation powers to intervene where the conduct of federations threatened to bring the sport into disrepute. Perhaps never was this truer than during the Caster Semenya débâcle, when the line between politics and athletics was blurred. The incident became a vehicle for a populist groundswell of anti-imperialist rhetoric, due to the supposed European standards that were being imposed on a black South African woman. Caster Semenya was an unassuming 19-year-old woman who won gold at the IAAF Championships in 2009, only to have her victory queried and be subjected to a gender test by the world regulating body. The incident exacerbated the already ruinous public image of ASA and led to the further haemorrhaging of sponsors, the latest casualty being Nedbank, which pulled out as a direct result of ASA's handling

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of the matter. Many politicians called for the suspension of ASA head Leonard Chuene after it emerged that he had lied to the public about not having gender-tested Semeneya prior to the championships, and had effectively withheld the result of an ASA test that indicated she was inter-sexed – a result which, if acted upon appropriately, would have clearly saved her and the country all the subsequent embarrassment and distress. The desire to win medals, particularly after a series of poor showings, proved too great, and ASA allowed her to run despite knowing that she ran the risk of being gender-tested by the IAAF. The incident exemplified many of the themes highlighted in this section: race and gender representivity in athletics, continuing political interference in the organisation of the sport, the loss of sponsors, and the ongoing feuds that have become such a prominent feature of athletics in South Africa.

The local story: a case study of the Worcester Athletics Club

> I matriculated in 1976 so I was heavily affected by apartheid. I was running for my life at that stage – away from teargas and bullets... (Karriem interview)

Worcester is a large town situated in the Boland, a largely rural area just outside Cape Town. It has a population well in excess of a hundred thousand people. It produces wine and other liquor products, and processes fruits and vegetables from the surrounding farming region. There are also textile and metal industries in the area. The town was founded in 1820 and was named after the Marquess of Worcester, a governor of the Cape of Good Hope Colony. A technical college and the Drostdy (1825), which is a national monument and the home of the Afrikaner Museum, are also in Worcester.

Established in 1968, the Worcester Athletics Club is based in the tranquil and serene Boland Park Sports Ground and is known throughout the Boland for its track-and-field facilities. It has a long and proud athletics tradition, attracting people from as far afield as the coastal regions of the Western Cape and the interior to come and compete there. The club's immediate feeder communities are the town itself and the surrounding

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farming communities, the majority of whose inhabitants are farm workers, classified as 'coloured' in terms of apartheid-era racial categorisation, and deeply impoverished.

The Worcester Athletics Club provides an interesting case study, primarily because of the complexities and nuances of coloured identity and the way it is configured in broader transformation debates. When we talk about 'race' we tend to distinguish in crude binary fashion between the categories black and white. The idea of a coloured identity disrupts this binary in interesting ways. Associated with this is the idea of coloured identity as being in the 'in-between state', which implies that races are in themselves fixed categories to begin with. Rather ironically then, ascriptive identity, while being the very thing that attempts to rigidly classify races, simultaneously exposes the fluid nature of racial identity by pointing to the intermediary category that coloured identity supposedly occupies.

The case study will highlight how racial classification and access to resources are intimately connected, and how ascriptive identities are both a tool for reclaiming resources yet also representative of outdated modes of classification. Since, strictly speaking, those claiming, or being ascribed, a coloured identity are neither black nor white, arguments over differential access to resources are somewhat obscured in relation to their situation. It will become clear, in considering the case of the Worcester Athletics Club, that considerations of race must be seen in relation to a number of other axes of power, or focal points for constructions of difference, such as class and gender.

For example, just as athletics was conflated with paternalistic labour relations on the national level – for example, through the role of the mining houses in nurturing and controlling individual athletes and teams – the huge wine farms in the Boland area appear to exercise a similar type of social control. The socio-economic relations in the area are fraught with the enduring legacies of rural apartheid. The owners of the wine farms represent the interests of white capital, and employ the largely uneducated coloured locals through a feudal system whereby those who live on the land work for the

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farmer who owns that land, and are dependent on the owner for all aspects of their subsistence. Some farmers in the Boland used to rely on the 'dop' system whereby farm workers were partially remunerated with wine instead of money (London 1999), and efforts to eradicate this system still continue.

Background

During the apartheid era, athletics in Worcester was segregated along racial lines. There was a whites-only club and a coloured club, and the two clubs never competed against each other. The South African Council on Sport (SACOS) was the umbrella body representing the interests of non-racial sport at the time and the coloured club, the Worcester Amateur Athletics Club, was an affiliate of SACOS.

In the early 1990s, consistent with the broader national trends, it was decided that local Boland athletic clubs would amalgamate under one union and the two Worcester athletics clubs would merge. As a corollary to this process, the three pillars of athletics were to be housed within the same club.

As has been the situation at the national level, since the political transition and subsequent merger of organisations long-distance running and cross-country have flourished, attracting adequate participants and sponsors. But track-and-field has struggled to stabilise itself, and the club has not hosted a track-and-field event for six to seven years.

When the merger took place in the early 1990s, there were some people who terminated their membership of the club rather than adjust to a new 'mixed' club. But the majority decided that the change was for the better. Today the club boasts in excess of a hundred members, of whom an estimated 60 per cent are coloured, 40 per cent white and 20 per cent female. The club does not have any African members to speak of – despite the presence of the nearby township of Zwelethemba (Koopman interview).

There are plans afoot to merge the club with those in the neighbouring areas of Rawsonville and De Doorns, forming a Breede River Valley Club consistent with the municipal boundaries. The Hex River club has already joined the new structure. It is believed that this move will

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enhance the club's access to funding that local government has earmarked for sports in the area. The club is governed by the broader Boland Athletics Administration and is one of the largest clubs in the region, along with Stellenbosch and Paarl. Despite being one of the smallest regions, Boland remains a national powerhouse for athletics, having produced long-distance athletes like Elana Meyer and Farwa Mentoor. In terms of the 2009 championships held in Stellenbosch and Pretoria it is ranked as the second-highest region in the country with regard to junior athletes, and fourth with regard to seniors (Karriem interview).

Training and transformation

Just a stone's throw away from the club, beyond the manicured lawns of the Boland Park Sport Ground in the coloured community of Eslen Park children are doing 'tik'[2] – a scourge which Kosie Koopman, the long-distance running coach at Worcester Athletics Club, cites as a major barrier to attracting and maintaining the youngsters' interest in athletics (Koopman interview).

As is the case in most recreational sporting clubs, there is just a handful of dedicated individuals who give up their free time to ensure the smooth running of the club. They all have full-time jobs and run the club after hours, yet do it gladly for the love of the sport and because they want to give something back to the community. They form the coaching and administrative section of the club. Often these people have to contribute funds to the club out of their personal finances.

Koopman, who is a former national champion and who coaches the young long-distance athletes at the club, is one such dedicated individual. He describes his life as being rather difficult, and says that athletics gave him the direction and discipline necessary to get to where he is today. His parents died when he was young, and he had to live 'in the bush'. It was then, partly out of necessity, that his passion for running began – he recalls having to run long distances to get to school. He recounts how he dropped out of school and went to work, only to discover that he had no time to run –

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a point which ultimately convinced him to return to his studies. Despite these setbacks, Koopman remained determined to make a success of his life and running soon became a way of channelling this positive energy – a means to transcend his circumstances (Koopman interview).

In 1973 Koopman took part in, and won, the Western Province Championships. He also won a marathon that same year. From such modest beginnings, he has risen to become a respected member of the community. Today he runs his own business, coaches long-distance running at the club and is writing a thesis, as a requirement for his coaching diploma through the University of the Free State, on the *'agtergeblywende marathon atleet'* ('the marathon athlete left behind'), about the constraints facing marathon athletes. Although doing his utmost to instil the values in the Worcester youth that got him to where he is today, he feels that the lack of resources poses a constant challenge (Koopman interview).

Consistent with practices at most recreational clubs, transformation is generally left to the discretion of the club. The coaches keep an eye out for talented black athletes, but there are no formal structures or mechanisms in place to ensure that this takes place. In an area where the majority of the population are coloured and white, there is a serious lack of good African athletes (Koopman interview). Zwelethemba, a township reserved for people classified as African under apartheid laws, used to have its own club. It disbanded due to funding problems – a fate which beset many other clubs in the region. When the club disbanded most of the African athletes wanted to play football. Of those who were not lost to football, Koopman can recall seeing only two talented athletes. He signals his desire to attract them to the club – a goal he suspects will be achieved only through financial incentives, although there is a large interest in running on the part of black athletes. Many black athletes view the possibility of winning prize money as their big chance in life – an opportunity to accumulate funds that can be used for long-term investment – bearing in mind that an athlete is at his or her peak only for about five years (Koopman interview).

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A Worcester success story

Undoubtedly, one of the Worcester Athletic Club's greatest success stories is that of Farwa Mentoor – the renowned coloured Comrades Marathon athlete. Mentoor's story is significant because she is not only coloured, but also female, and excelled in a highly masculinised sphere of activity at a time when women struggled to enjoy equal rights with men.

Under apartheid women's opportunities in sport were limited, much as they were in the economic sphere. Due to a combination of socialisation and their perceived lack of ability in or inclination towards sport, women were routinely excluded from the sphere of organised sport. Those who did partake were sometimes seen as unfeminine or 'butch'. Although Farwa Mentoor did not grow up in Worcester, and had more opportunities in terms of education than perhaps the average rural woman in the region, her story does find broader resonance with the coloured female community and the struggles they have endured within sport.

Mentoor's passion for running started when she was a young girl growing up in Mitchell's Plain – a coloured residential area in terms of apartheid legislation – on the Cape Flats. During her school years she took part in track-and-field events under the banner of SACOS, at a time when black inter-schools meetings were held separately from those of the white schools (Mentoor interview).

Having risen to success within the coloured leagues, she recalls watching the top white athletes on television and wondering how she would fare by comparison, hoping to one day have the opportunity to prove herself on the national stage – on an equal basis. It was at this tender age – despite her keen ability and enthusiasm for the sport – that she would encounter various constraints on her running due to the prevailing political system. Under apartheid the movement of people was controlled. As a coloured athlete one could not run anywhere one wanted to, out of fear of running into a suburb where the presence of a black runner was not accepted. It was mainly for this reason that she kept to track-and-field events until later in life, when she was able to experiment with longer distances (Mentoor interview).

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During her college years in the early 1990s, while studying at the Worcester Teachers' Training College, the political system was opening up and she was able to compete with the white athletes through the 'mixed' Inter-Collegiate competition. She won a 1 500 m race, which gave her the necessary self-confidence to compete, no matter what the race of her opponents might be.

It was at this stage that she joined the Worcester Athletics Club and was introduced to Kosie Koopman. By the time she joined the club, it was already amalgamated. However, transformation was slow to catch on, particularly when it came to attracting coloured female athletes. At that stage she was the only woman amongst a group of 20–30 male athletes. This is where she was introduced to and fell in love with road running, and decided to give up her ambitions within track-and-field. It was here, under the tutelage of Koopman, that long-distance running became a way of life and her fascination with the Comrades Marathon began (Mentoor interview).

After graduating from the Worcester Teachers' Training College, like many other women who were athletes when younger, she lost interest in running, got married, had children and started teaching. It was only in 2000 that she started training seriously again, and successfully took part in races in the Boland and other Western Cape areas. At that stage she was still teaching while running on a competitive basis, but she then made the bold decision to leave teaching in pursuit of a full-time career as an athlete. Given the attractive cash incentives the Comrades Marathon presented, the thrust of her endeavours was to focus on training for this event. Through perseverance and determination she was able to rise to success in the Comrades. After coming fourth in her first Comrades – a feat which she steadily improved on in subsequent years – she was noticed and quickly framed as an emergent talent (Mentoor interview). Shortly after her first attempt at the Comrades she received a phone call from Nick Bester, a former Comrades great and now head of Golden Harmony Club, asking if she wanted to join the club. She gladly accepted the invitation. This provided her with the necessary financial support to allow her to focus exclusively on her running career.

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Top athletes in Golden Harmony receive a monthly retainer, which is set relative to how well they perform. Beyond that there are various bonuses, such as sponsorships and prize monies. Reflecting back on her route to the top, Mentoor attributes a lot of what she has achieved to Kosie Koopman and the Worcester club (Mentoor interview). She disagrees with the negative sentiments expressed by ASA about Golden Harmony and their alleged resistance to transformation and exploitation of athletes, attributing this view to internal political tensions between the organisations. However, she does concede that the issue feeds into a broader argument about race. In Golden Harmony's defence, she points to the club's dedication to transformation through developmental programmes – particularly in the Eastern Cape. She also points to the poor organisation of road races hosted by ASA – such as the 2006 South African Marathon held in Port Elizabeth – as an obstacle to their maintaining and attracting new sponsors. If the athletes and general public are unhappy with the organisation of the event, the sponsors will soon get wind of this and pull out. By comparison, events hosted by the clubs established by Harmony Gold, Mr Price (a clothing chain) and Liberty Life (an insurance company) tend to give their sponsors a lot of 'mileage' and are well organised. Track-and-field, although suffering in terms of interest, is well organised by ASA (Mentoor interview).

With regard to transformation, Mentoor believes that today the situation is totally different from when she was at school and people were afraid to run. She feels that coloured voices are also gaining increasing weight within ASA structures, as there is a fair amount of coloured representation on various committees within ASA.

An uneasy alliance

As is the case at the national level, many problems arise between the three pillars of athletics in the Boland region. While the club feels pressure from ASA and Boland to increase the speed of its athletes, thereby enhancing their track-and-field capabilities, it is the slower runners – through their long-distance events – who are bringing in the most money. One can view

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long-distance running as a large pyramid scheme, in which the thousands of people paying entry fees are essentially paying towards the prize money awarded to the first three athletes (Koopman interview).

Therefore, as the situation currently stands, if the Worcester Athletics Club were to propose hosting another long-distance race on their athletics calendar, ASA would refuse. It might allow such an event only if it were a relay race over a long distance, i.e. four people running over a 40 km route, not if it were one person running the entire route (Koopman interview).

In total the club sponsors seven races, with the majority being long-distance events. The club's two largest and most profitable races are the Rainbow Race, sponsored primarily by Rainbow Chickens, and the Voorsieners Race – both long-distance events. Sometimes the club hosts events that end up running at a loss. Interestingly, only one race hosted by the club is sponsored by a 'non-white' person – indicating the nexus between athletics and the colour of capital in the region (Karriem interview).

The main problems holding back track-and-field are the cost of equipment and the lack of sponsors. Piet Kemp, who heads the track-and-field at Worcester Athletics Club, and whose son is an aspiring athlete, says he has sent out at least 20 letters and faxes to major businesses asking for financial support to enable his son to compete on a national level, but has not received one reply. As an indictment of the dwindling popularity of track-and-field, he cites an occasion when he advertised free training sessions over the school holidays, but not one person arrived to make use of the opportunity (Kemp interview).

Related to the dwindling popularity of track-and-field is the fact that long-distance running has taken on a leisure and recreational quality, since it does not require the rigour involved in track-and-field. This is a vicious cycle, because as the popularity of the sport suffers so the sponsors pull out – and so the cycle continues.

Interestingly, and somewhat paradoxically, Kemp believes that during the apartheid years there was more support from schools in terms of logistics and financial support, but since 1994 the onus has tended to fall squarely on the parents to provide the necessary support for their children to take part

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in the sport. What he is alluding to, and what becomes apparent at the club level, is the apparent lack of state structures and union organisation after 1994 to guide and regulate the sport at grassroots level (Kemp interview).

As a senior administrator at the club, Faezal Karriem, explains, the state was more prevalent or hands-on during the apartheid era at the local level, because of the way in which non-racial sport sought to organise and mobilise itself as a united front in response to apartheid. Under apartheid, SACOS was the body regulating black athletics nationally. Within the broader structure of SACOS, the United Schools Sports Association of South Africa (USSASA) was the body regulating athletics for black schools. Although athletics at school level was racially segregated as at the national level, USSASA was well organised and could act as a united, non-racial front in the interests of all youths classified as African, coloured and Indian (Karriem interview).

What has often been the case since 1994 is that duties relating to the organisation of sporting activities that were formerly assigned to USSASA are delegated directly to the schools. Yet schools are unable to carry a heavier administrative workload, and have more important things to spend their money on. Thus the emphasis is increasingly falling on the parents to pick up the slack.

This appears symptomatic of the transition from a highly interventionist, centralised state to a liberal democratic one. The old structures representing the narrow interests of an elite are being phased out, and new, all-inclusive structures worked in. This creates a vacuum that is perhaps most acutely felt at the local level, and in particular by the poor and marginalised in local communities. Those who were impoverished and oppressed are given the freedom to rule, yet the structural means and opportunities to do so are not yet in place – hence putting the onus on schools and on the personal wealth of committed individuals, and to some extent on business. Therefore the ability of local clubs to truly improve their members' lives and 'pull themselves up by their bootstraps' remains limited.

Cross-country, although arguably doing better than track-and-field, is also in a poor state. It, too, is faced with problems of sponsorship, the

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absence of coaches dedicated to the code and a lack of adequate transport resources (Karriem interview).

Integration and the club's relationship with Boland Athletics

The question of integration is particularly pertinent within recreational sporting clubs. At certain sports festivals the lack of integration is apparent when the white athletes fly to a venue and the coloured athletes travel in groups on buses (Koopman interview).

A perceived lack of integration is perhaps more of a problem amongst the younger athletes. However, Kosie Koopman believes that the parents play a big role in shaping the attitudes of the children. Juniors and seniors train together in the evenings in mixed groups. In the afternoons Koopman gives private lessons to about 10 people at a time – amongst them it would not be uncommon to find the son of a white wine farmer and the son of a street sweeper running alongside each other (Koopman interview).

The broader administrative section of the club, ostensibly the people running the club, are seen as being predominantly white – the chairman is white, the treasurer is white. Meanwhile the sports council of local government is predominantly coloured. This causes tensions between the club and local government. The perception is that local government attempts to hamper the club on purpose, because it views the club as being run by a group of whites. This is said to manifest itself through the sports council grudgingly allowing the club the use of the clubhouse, which is actually the property of local government (Karriem interview).

The coloured people who are involved in running the club – although attesting to working well with the white members – run the risk of being viewed as 'sellouts'. This is a perception that goes all the way back to the time when the two Worcester clubs were amalgamated. Some hold the notion, albeit incorrectly, that the coloured club members walked across to join the white club, and not vice versa, or that the process was one of mutual agreement. This type of tension is partially to blame for the fact that track-and-field has never got off the ground; because the club is viewed as being run by whites,

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it struggles to obtain the full support of local government, particularly in the form of funding. This feeds into a bigger argument on how the current government is struggling to make the shift from the SACOS and USSASA structures to more contemporary structures, accommodating the interests of black and white athletes jointly. The old structures are in the process of being disbanded and making way for new, all-inclusive ones (Karriem interview).

It is worth noting, and consistent with what happens at the recreational level, that Boland Athletics encourages transformation, but does not prescribe any hard measures – these are left to the clubs' discretion. The main approach Boland is currently encouraging is greater gender representivity, in terms of both administration and athletes. Boland Athletics prescribes that 50 per cent of members of its affiliate clubs must be juniors. It has a close relationship with ASA, and what ASA says is echoed in Boland. This is attributed in part to the fact that Richard Stander, the current CEO of Boland Athletics, is the former CEO of ASA (Karriem interview).

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to analyse the successes and failures of transformation measures in South African athletics. On the national level, it was shown how, despite the initial post-apartheid honeymoon period, when the apartheid structures were disbanded and new, inclusive ones created, there was a lack of clarity and a poorly defined relationship between sporting bodies themselves and the various tiers within the sport – thus creating the conditions for a poor working relationship within post-apartheid athletics. This has led to much internal squabbling and has often acted as a hindrance to transformation and the effective management of the code. This has resulted, in part, in a haphazard and piecemeal approach to transformation lacking in integration and coherence, and has ultimately led to squandered opportunities and wasted resources.

Although NOCSA's two-tiered system has had some success, it is clearly not enough, and overall, transformation is still happening too

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slowly, and lacking in depth and penetration. The capacity to bring talented black athletes from grassroots level through the ranks still remains highly questionable, 15 years after the advent of democracy.

Unequal relationships have been further perpetuated given the sport's strong conflation with prominent areas of the economy, as demonstrated by the 'non-neutral' role of mining houses in black athletics. If the deeper structural problems in the economy are not adequately addressed, transformation success stories such as that of Josiah Thugwane will continue to be the exception – and may even seem to be just an isolated fluke.

The sport has also struggled to draw in the private sector, largely as a result of its flagging popular appeal – especially when compared to cricket, rugby and soccer, which have become more popular and wealthier since 1994 – but also because of the pervasive perception that it is a poorly managed sport, which acts as a strong deterrent to sponsors; the one exception to this is road running. The monopoly of government and semi-government bodies in regulating the sport in post-apartheid South Africa has clearly failed to create the attractive conditions necessary for private investment, and the effects are being felt in terms of dwindling interest on the part of potential participants, spectators and sponsors.

These problems and others were further explored in the chapter by relating them to various 'local realities'. The discussion has highlighted how the lack of state structures and union organisation, coupled with various paternalistic labour relations, continues to make possible the selective support of athletes as a form of social control, and to perpetuate unequal relationships at the community level. Although coloured people were once discriminated against, they are not the true beneficiaries of transformation and have to rely largely on personal wealth to gain access to resources and opportunities for sporting success, such as going to the right schools or being able to afford special coaching. As a group, coloured people tend to fall through the cracks in transformation debates; special attention should be given to understanding the complexities and difficulties facing this group, as it is often assumed that they will benefit from transformation yet in reality this is not really the case.

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Whilst the majority of hurdles placed in the way of transformation are likely to be overcome in time, South African politicians and administrators will have to be mindful that, in trying to attain their transformation goals, the intention should not be to 'reinvent the wheel', but rather to identify certain vantage points from which both sustainable and efficient progress could be made. These should include identifying areas that are already considered black, coloured and Indian sporting strongholds, and pumping resources into them, instead of trying to develop every area in the country evenly. The case study of the Worcester Athletics Club highlights the contribution that Boland could make to the national sporting scene as one such area, in which the infusion of the necessary resources could speed up the attainment of transformation goals.

Notes

1 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.

2 'Tik' is a form of the drug methamphetamine (crystal meth) that has rapidly permeated communities across South Africa. Whole households are prey to addiction, and many children grow up with the drug, and its social consequences, shaping their daily lives.

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7

Beyond the nation? Colour and class in South African cricket

Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed

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> ...cricket does not reflect the age. It is the age... (James 1986: xi)

THE STORYLINE OF SOUTH Africa cricket, like the broader narrative of the political defeat of apartheid, often gets told in beguilingly simple terms. Mandela met De Klerk. Graeme Pollock met Basil D'Oliveira.[1] Apartheid had been stumped. Past and present merged. The covers were pulled off to reveal a level playing field. Another 'small' miracle. Critical voices of dissent were drowned out by the over-arching language of nation-building.

There was an iconic image following South Africa's loss to England in the World Cup semi-final in 1992, before apartheid was officially dismantled: Steve Tshwete, the then head of the Sports Desk of the African National Congress (ANC), and Kepler Wessels the then captain, 'in an emotional embrace after South Africa had bombed out of the semi-final against England on a ludicrously unjust rain rule' (Alfred 2001: 158). For Luke Alfred, this moment illustrated that:

> ...cricket in South Africa has allied itself to reform both without and within, and if the road to post-apartheid nirvana hasn't always been easy, it is the road that cricket has chosen to take...The new team

> were part of the new post-apartheid nation, and rooting for that team, in some admittedly insignificant way, was to keep casting a vote for change, for a nation qualitatively different to that of the apartheid state. (Alfred 2001: 158–159)

This chapter takes a critical look at cricket's journey since those heady days. It considers the twists and turns, the pitfalls and gains that have occurred along the way. It examines whether cricket is still on 'the road to post-apartheid nirvana', or whether the global changes that have taken place since then mean that the road of national transformation, with an emphasis on broadening the base of the game into 'previously disadvantaged areas', is fast reaching a dead end. We begin with a brief overview of the steps that led to the creation of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCBSA), and thereafter focus on contestation around issues of transformation and representivity.

Cricket in South Africa: the changing global and national context

In Victorian England cricket was seen as a particularly useful way of morally 'disciplining colonials' and inculcating ideals of stamina, manliness and vigour into these 'lazy and effete' populations. Its spread to the Caribbean, Australia, the Indian sub-continent and South Africa had an underlying 'quasi-official charter that was moral and political' (Appadurai 1995: 27). In South Africa, cricket came to represent British class ideology in relation to Afrikaners and racist exclusion in relation to blacks.[2] While all South Africans played cricket, white players represented South Africa (Nauright 1997: 26–27). Cricket was also popular among Indians, coloureds and Africans in the Eastern Cape, who developed separate cricket structures and cultures. A South African Cricket Board of Control (SACBOC) was formed in 1947 to organise inter-race tournaments between Africans, Indians and coloureds, while non-racial provincial units replaced racially based bodies in 1961 (see Desai et al. 2002; Odendaal 1977; Reddy 1999).

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South Africa was isolated from world cricket from 1970, when the British home secretary bowed to public pressure and asked the English Cricket Board to call off South Africa's tour to England because of its apartheid policies. During the 22 years of isolation that followed, international teams were paid huge sums of money to break the boycott. Most black South Africans developed a deep hatred of South African teams and openly supported the opposition during 'rebel' tours. 'No normal sport in an abnormal society' became the slogan of the non-racial South African Council on Sport (SACOS), which was formed in 1973 to both organise sport locally along non-racial lines and facilitate an international sports boycott (Nauright 1997: 140).

The rapid political change that took place from the late 1980s was matched in cricket. The cancellation of a tour by English 'rebels' led by Mike Gatting at the beginning of 1990 was followed by the first unity meeting between non-racial and white cricket bodies in September 1990, the inauguration of the UCBSA in June 1991, 'readmittance' to the International Cricket Council (ICC) in July 1991, a tour of India in November 1991, participation in the World Cup in Australia in February 1992, and a tour to the West Indies in April 1992. ANC officials agreed to South Africa's return to international cricket before a political settlement was reached, in part to assuage white fears of cultural swamping by a majority African population (Nauright 1997: 154). Grant Farred makes the pertinent observation that 'the use of such terms as *readmission* and *return* [were] tantamount to legitimising the apartheid past; it implicitly authorise[d] white post-apartheid hegemony. It invalidate[s] the SACOS struggle, obliterates the history of nonracial cricket, and anoints the achievements of white players' (Farred 2000: 146).

South Africa's speedy re-entry to international cricket upset many SACOS stalwarts. During negotiations the two sides had agreed on a 'Statement of Intent', which called for, among other things, 'respect for the sports moratorium against cricket tours to and from South Africa'. SACBOC members felt that the moratorium would force whites to take seriously their pledge to redress imbalances. Being welcomed back into international cricket at this early stage meant that black administrators lost

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an important leverage point during negotiations. There was bitterness in some quarters that the beneficiaries of apartheid continued to profit. Veteran anti-apartheid campaigner Hassan Howa felt that the tour to India was 'dishonest. It represented only those who enjoyed the great benefits of racial discrimination. It was not a South African team but a White South African team' (*Saturday News* 15 November 1991). Former president of the non-racial Natal Cricket Board (NCB) Ahmed Kharwa was equally critical during a public meeting in Ladysmith in November 1991:

> As sportsmen and administrators we accept and recognise the importance of unity as South Africa moves towards democracy. However, we feel betrayed by the breach of faith by the ANC in lifting the sports moratorium prematurely. It is disturbing that while the objectives of the sports moratorium to normalise South African society was [sic] far from achieved, there has been indecent haste to participate internationally. (*Ladysmith Gazette* 6 December 1991)

Kharwa felt that white players and administrators, who were 'desperate' for international cricket, had got their 'first prize too easily' (Kharwa interview). Haroon Lorgat, a past convenor of the national selection committee and CEO of the ICC since 2008, reflected on the long-term impact of South Africa's speedy re-entry into international competition:

> We started off on the wrong foot. The 1991 tour to India was inopportune and should never have taken place. It set the pace for subsequent team selections. From that point on black players always had to break through the white barriers. This set the standard. It nailed the 15 best players and black players had to displace these white players. A moratorium would have created an equal footing for all…it would have given black players a better chance to come through. (Lorgat interview)

Black administrators were in a quandary: without international cricket, they were warned by white administrators, there would be no money for

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development. Cricket tours would bankroll the spread of the game into townships.

The UCBSA was formed on 29 June, 1991, uniting the South African Cricket Union (SACU) and the South African Cricket Board (SACB). The UCBSA devolved the operational side of the professional game to Cricket South Africa (CSA) in 2006. The General Council of CSA, which is made up of the senior office-bearers and the presidents of provincial units, is the main policy-making body of cricket in the country, while the board of directors of CSA (Pty) Ltd takes care of operational issues concerning the running of professional cricket. The first UCBSA executive, which governed South African cricket from June 1991 to June 1993, included eleven whites, two coloureds, five Indians and one African. Power remained with the old (white) establishment, with Ali Bacher, the prime mover behind the 'rebel' tours to South Africa in the 1980s, appointed as managing director. Provincial units were, in the main, absorbed into existing white associations. White cricket administrators retained effective power to ensure that local and international business sponsorship would not be frightened off. It was the same on the playing fields, where teams were dominated by whites. The failure of black players to feature at provincial and national levels led to criticism by the late 1990s that the few black officials holding high positions were token appointments, while Bacher's role came under particular scrutiny. One correspondent to the press, Billy Reddy, felt that Bacher should have been made to apologise before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for condoning discrimination during the apartheid era, instead of being given control of cricket (*Daily News* 27 November 1997). Mluleki George of the National Sports Council (NSC) felt that Bacher 'used Black administrators to further his, and cricket's interests. We made the mistake of trusting him' (*Jamaican Gleaner* 7 December 1998).

An internal investigation reported in September 1997 that black administrators felt that they were accommodated in positions where they could not influence policy or attain 'ownership' of programmes, and concluded that a 'paternalistic approach was very much in evidence'

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(UCBSA 1997b). Black administrators changed their approach from around the end of 1997, paralleling the ANC's more aggressive approach to affirmative action and the creation of a black bourgeoisie; henceforth, according to Cassim Docrat, the president of the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union (KZNCU), the 'gloves were off', development was pursued 'aggressively and vigorously' and quotas were introduced to 'accelerate the process'.[3]

'Development' and elitism

At the centre of the UCBSA's transformatory agenda was the development programme. The programme aimed at 'broadening the culture of the game, democratising opportunities for all our communities, [and] ultimately assisting in establishing cricket as the "people's" game' (UCBSA 1997d). The softball form of the sport, Bakers Mini Cricket, introduced children to cricket from the age of nine. For Bacher, development was a 'beacon to us all. It was manned by people who had the love of the game emblazoned on their hearts, people who worked in extremely difficult circumstances on either side of cricket's Berlin Wall to keep the game alive in South Africa' (UCBSA 1997a). Coaches have been going around South African townships since 1986 to spread the cricketing gospel. The then Sports Minister Steve Tshwete described the development programme in 1997 as 'a shining light and an example of what can be achieved with initiative, commitment and a sense of purpose'. The programme is run by a large team of administrators and has a budget running into millions of rands raised from levies on gate-takings, contributions by players and corporate sponsorship (UCBSA 1997b). According to the website of CSA, by 2009 approximately two million children had been through the programme.[4] So where were the promised 'stars'?

The lack of black representation drew criticism from politicians, black officials and ordinary members of the public that white administrators were not sincere about developing black players as long as they could play international cricket. Mluleki George of the NSC felt that the UCBSA 'can talk a lot about development, but right now it looks more like a

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PR exercise than anything else because we are not seeing results' (*Cape Times* 24 April 1997). As a result of such complaints, the UCBSA investigated its 'development' programme in September 1997. According to the report on this investigation, white provincial CEOs felt that 'things were going as well as could be expected' but that a 'culture of entitlement' among black players was removing the 'will to make things happen' and that quotas were divisive in creating a 'them and us' attitude. Black players and administrators, on the other hand, complained that team selection was biased, black players were given nominal roles when selected, an inferiority complex among black players hampered their progress, and so did the lack of training facilities in townships and top-down management. The report concluded that 'cricket is still in the hands of the old establishment and racism is still alive' (UCBSA 1997b). It was clear that the development programme was in deep trouble and that a new path had to be charted.

The UCBSA changed its approach from the end of 1997, when it became clear that the socio-economic conditions of most black township players could not produce international cricketers. The story of Khotso 'Sonnyboy' Letshele illustrates the problems faced by many black children:

> Nineteen-year-old Sonnyboy lives in the Kagiso township in Johannesburg's West Rand. While talented in many sports Sonnyboy took to cricket because of 'food', the orange juice and biscuits provided by coaches were welcome because of the dire financial circumstances of the family. When he was chosen for various representative teams Sonnyboy's teammates remarked on the large amounts of food that he ate. His reply was that he was eating for the following day because he could not be guaranteed a meal. This was only half in jest because his parents and elder brother are unemployed. Sonnyboy has to take three taxis and travel 45 km on a two-and-a-half hours journey to get to training. The Gauteng Cricket Board provides him [with] transport fares because he cannot afford this. There is no club in Kagiso to inculcate a cricket culture. (*Saturday Star* 13 January 2001)

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Black children were handicapped by inadequate facilities, poverty and poor equipment and could not compete against affluent white children with access to excellent education and coaching. The UCBSA began placing talented black players in traditionally white schools 'with a culture of cricket', a programme funded by large corporations like Anglo American and De Beers (UCBSA 1997b). Most of the black players who have represented South Africa in the post-apartheid period, like Paul Adams (Plumstead High, Cape Town), Herschelle Gibbs (Diocesan College, Cape Town), Hashim Amla (Durban Boys High), Wayne Parnell (Grey High School, Port Elizabeth) and Makhaya Ntini (Dale College, King William's Town) are products of former white schools. Some black administrators, echoing Mustapha Khan, a national selector since 2005, complained that development was concerned with the production of 'role models' to appease the public and politicians rather than social development and the building of community structures (UCBSA 1997b). Speaking when he was convenor of the national selectors, Haroon Lorgat astutely pointed to the dangers of this policy as well as the difficulties of going beyond it:

> Black schools don't have proper systems and structures in place. Black players start with a disadvantage and the use of 'elite schools' should be a short-term thing. Cricket is a culture that has to take root and for this to happen we have to take cricket to the people...[But] cricket bodies cannot do this on their own. We need an integrated approach between the UCB and government. At the moment, government demands that sports deliver black players. This is difficult because there may be talent in black areas, but the structures are in white areas. The resources of the UCB are finite, the demands of professional players are exorbitant...the expectations of the public and government are always greater than what we can achieve. Cricket is a costly business and we need an equal commitment from government. (Lorgat interview)

Like Lorgat, CSA president Norman Arendse also believed that the government should do more for children's development:

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> I'm talking about players of colour who showed tremendous talent, promise and potential at school level, amateur level, franchise level who disappear because of socio-economic factors. I know that from playing club cricket with the guys. The best example is Dean MacHelm, the former Province left-arm spinner. He was highly rated by none other than Allan Lamb, but Dean had to travel by train to Newlands from Kuils River. And there came a time in his life, around 25, 26 years, when he was supposed to be in his prime when he had to make a choice. And unfortunately the game was not that professionalised yet to accommodate him. There are more pressing transformational issues to debate than how many players of colour are in the national team. Quite frankly, that is the least of my issues. I agree with those critics that we must address the imbalances at grassroots level. We've been let down by the state as there is a misconception that there is so much money in the game...[5]

Government policies have not addressed issues of unequal development. Research by nutrition scientists points to the significance of early childhood nutrition in determining whether a young adult's body can withstand the rigours of international sport. Whether bowling, fielding or batting, cricketers must be able to sprint for short bursts over the course of a long period of time, five days for a test match. High bone density is especially important for bowlers. Youngsters need to eat calcium (dairy products), vegetables and lean protein, while limiting the intake of complex carbohydrates and saturated fats, and drink lots of water. Given the prevailing socio-economic conditions in most African townships, this is a big ask. Promising African cricketers, like Mfuneko Ngam, have not been able to build the requisite physical strength to withstand the rigours of international cricket.

Ngam, who was compared to the great West Indian fast bowler Michael Holding because of his grace and speed, played just three test matches for South Africa between 2001 and 2003 before a series of stress

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fractures in both legs ended his career, with suggestions that the root cause was dietary deficiencies in early life.[6] Could this also plague the career of injury-prone Monde Zondeki, who has played just five tests for South Africa? Lonwabo Tsotsobe, who made a brilliant debut for South Africa against Australia in March 2009, was ruled out of the return leg through injury. Makhaya Ntini is the one African player who has largely been injury-free over a long career during which he has taken over 300 test wickets. It may not be coincidental that he is from the village of Mdingi in the Eastern Cape. As a rural peasant child, who walked miles as a herd-boy and who got plenty of milk and *maas* (a form of sour milk) from the family cows, he was more likely to have a diet that met the nutritional criteria than an impoverished child from the townships like Sonnyboy quoted above.[7]

Cricket also requires a great investment of time and money. This includes the prohibitive cost of equipment and facilities as well as time devoted to organising and playing the game (largely unpaid, provided by parents, teachers, assistant coaches and volunteer umpires). While the popularity of cricket in rural Eastern Cape suggests that it can be played by anyone, the transformation from amateur pleasure and competence to professional excellence is difficult because of the need for superior equipment and specialist coaching. It takes exceptional talent and enormous sacrifices to make the transition from social participation to career level. Wayne Parnell is an example of a 'success'. Within the space of a few months he went from captaining the South African team that played in the final of the Under-19 World Cup in 2008, to making his international one-day debut for South Africa against Australia in January 2009, being signed by Kent in the English County Championship, being the youngest player to be awarded a central contract by CSA, and being chosen for the national team for the Twenty20 World Cup held in June 2009. A brief insight into the trajectory of his life illustrates the level of sacrifice and support structures that went into the 'making' of Wayne Parnell.

Parnell was born in the blue-collar township of Booysens Park in Port Elizabeth in 1989. His electrician father, Peter, and housewife mother, Lauran, lacked the resources to support their son's cricketing career.

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The existing cricketing structures made up for this shortfall. His success, as one report put it, 'is no accident – it is the culmination of careful mentoring from an early age and represents a victory for sports development in the Eastern Cape'.[8] Eastern Province coach Christo Esau began coaching Parnell at the age of 11. Spotting his exceptional promise, he arranged a joint bursary from Eastern Province Cricket and Grey Junior School so that Parnell could access proper training and facilities. His parents were thrilled but also concerned; thrilled because, as Peter Parnell explains, 'it was way out of our league to send Wayne to Grey', and worried because Wayne had only been taught in Afrikaans up to that point and would have to learn English. Parnell made the most of his opportunities. At the age of 12 he was selected for the provincial U-13 side. At 15 he was playing for Eastern Province and South Africa at the U-19 level, and made his first-class debut in 2006 at the age of 17. Esau is thrilled: 'He comes from the northern [working class] areas and he's given the kids there hope, showing them what can be achieved through hard work. They don't have to feel like they are disadvantaged.' Others too have played a role in his success. His former English teacher, Lyn Sjoberg, for example, taught him to drive and he stayed with her when he was writing his final matric examination because he had to live close to St George's cricket ground, and his parents lived far from the school and ground.[9]

Parnell is going to be a fabulous cricketer, and the cricketing structures put in place and the support of people like his ex-teacher, together with his obvious early talent, have meant that he was not lost to South African cricket.

The other side of the story is the growing divide between 'exclusive cricketing schools' and 'other schools'. Black children from elite schools, with access to privileged education and coaching, are selected to meet 'race' quotas at provincial level and are exhibited as proof of the successful indigenisation of cricket. Running through the post-apartheid cricket narrative is this uneasy relationship between 'breeding champions' and mass participation. Increasingly there is a move away from the core objective of the UCBSA's development programme, viz. 'broadening the culture of the game, democratising opportunities for all communities, [and] ultimately assisting

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in establishing cricket as the "people's game"', to an emphasis on identifying talent and then opening pathways to high performance (UCBSA 1999). One can see how the strategy of 'breeding champions' erodes the imperative to reinforce a culture of cricket in townships as, just as in the case of the national economic strategy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), there are 'black diamonds' coming through. Where they are 'cut' and who gets 'cut off' in the process is occluded.

Commercial imperatives in the professional age, where television revenue is dependent on fielding successful teams, mean that despite the platitudes about transformation, the focus will remain on the elitist project of breeding champions. The programme has been a conspicuous failure in producing champion African cricketers. Some Indian and coloured players have made their mark (like Hashim Amla, J.P. Duminy and Wayne Parnell), but a quarter of a century after the launch of this much vaunted development programme, the question still remains, 'Where are the African stars?', given that the programme initially specifically targeted African townships. Aside from Ntini, who is at the end of his career, there isn't a single African player on the horizon, injury-free, who can be held up as a potential world star. This places the selectors and administrators in a quandary as the dominant political discourse privileges Africanisation over 'blackness'.

In contrast to 'black' Africans, to use that wonderful South African parlance, white Afrikaner cricketers are making their mark. During the 2008/09 season the best young batsman was arguably a 19-year-old left-handed Afrikaner batsman from Bloemfontein, Riley Rossouw; Roelof van der Merwe, a spin bowler made his mark in the one-day team; A.B. de Villiers was the most consistent international batsman; and the aggressive Dale Steyn emerged as the world's best fast bowler and was voted the ICC's Test Player of the Year in 2008. Steyn's fast bowling partner is another Afrikaner, Morné Morkel. Morné's brother Albie is one of the most destructive one-day batsmen in the world. They are part of a growing list of Afrikaner cricketers. Riley Roscoe Rossouw, born on 9 October 1989, was four months old when Mandela was released. He is a post-apartheid child.

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Should his progress be retarded because there have to be a certain number of black players on the field?

The administrators clearly need to do some serious thinking about their development strategy. The South African team that participated in the Twenty20 World Cup in England in June 2009 did not include a single African player. Aside from class position and nutrition, we would also suggest that the establishment of cricketing 'homes' in the Afrikaner heartlands of Bloemfontein and Pretoria in the 1980s, where the Diamond Eagles and Nashua Titans franchises respectively are currently based, has played a role in the emergence of outstanding young Afrikaner cricketers by providing proper infrastructure and teams that youngsters could identify with. Should there be a rethink on the use of elite schools, and perhaps the establishment of cricket 'homes' in Soweto and other townships across the country where well-resourced schools are also established? And to what extent is the government culpable? Should the cricketing authorities continue to insist on targets and quotas after the country's fourth general election, given that many of the youngsters at school who are subject to these race-based measures were born after the demise of apartheid? Who is more entitled to redress in the contemporary period: a rich black child from Houghton or a poor white child from the Bluff?

These complex issues need to be discussed, given the widening inequality levels within old-style apartheid racial groups and the reality that economic circumstance, rather than simply race, is becoming a factor in the South African transition.

Transformation: targets and quotas

White players and administrators dominated cricket during the 1990s. The two convenors of selectors between 1991 and 1999, Peter van der Merwe and Peter Pollock, were white, Omar Henry and Haroon Lorgat (2004–2007 selectors) have been followed by Joubert Strydom and Mike Procter; the coaches of the team since 1992 (Mike Procter, Bob Woolmer, Graham Ford,

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Eric Simons, Ray Jennings and Mickey Arthur) have been white, as have the captains (Clive Rice, Kepler Wessels, Hansie Cronje, Shaun Pollock and Graeme Smith). The racial composition of the national teams stimulated a myriad struggles to both pursue transformation and stymie it. The most public of spats were around the composition of the national team. And often there was much more at play than the stories that entered the public domain.

After criticisms from 'political bosses', Ali Bacher, then CEO of the UCBSA, conceded in 1997 that 'there is no longer the feeling of unity that once existed in South African cricket' (*Natal Witness* 11 March 1997). To defuse tensions around questions of race, representivity and transformation, the UCBSA convened a 'Vision Seminar' in July 1997 to chart a common path for cricket (*Daily News* 15 May 1997). Bacher may have thought that a position paper would satisfy people; little did he realise that he was initiating a process that would spiral out of his control. A second meeting on 12 August 1997 focused specifically on the 'lack of African representation at all levels of the game throughout this country's cricketing structures'. The meeting was chaired by Bacher and attended by Khaya Majola, Ray Mali, Doug Maku, Seppie Lusardi, Cassim Docrat, Dave Emslie and Arthur Turner. 'Black' was defined as referring to Africans, Indians and coloureds, but special targets were set for Africans. At provincial level 'coaches must be made aware of the urgency to Africanise at this level and CEOs were to monitor the progress' (UCBSA 1997c). By singling out African absence, the UCBSA was unravelling the category 'black'. Countrywide Transformation Vision Seminars during 1998 pointed to black disillusionment with white control, racism, lack of Africanisation and the psychological difficulty that black South Africans faced in identifying with bastions of apartheid such as cricket stadiums (KZNCU 1998).

The outcome was a national Transformation Charter, which the UCBSA unveiled on 3 January 1999. The preamble specified that the UCBSA, 'operating in an African context, reaffirm our moral and historic duty to ensure that South African cricket grows and flourishes among the truly disadvantaged of our society, who come mainly from *black African*

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communities' (emphasis added).[10] A Transformation Monitoring Committee (TMC) was formed to ensure that the objectives of the Charter were fully embraced, while Provincial Monitoring Committees were formed to monitor transformation at provincial level. According to TMC chairperson André Odendaal (2001: 60), their role was 'to help develop understandings and monitor progress…For those who hear about "transformation" and something quickly short-circuits in their minds, they must see it as a plan to make South African cricket totally dynamic in the 21st century.'

These developments took place against the backdrop of inconsistent selection policies which heightened the racial discourse. For example, Makhaya Ntini made a superb one-day debut against Australia in January 1998 but was left out of the next game for Brian McMillan, who achieved nothing of distinction during that series. While management argued that they were relying on McMillan's 'experience', many black people saw Ntini's omission as racist (*Post Natal* 4–7 February 1998). In April 1998, Ntini finally made his full test debut against Sri Lanka when he replaced Fanie de Villiers, who retired a day after Bacher had stated that 'in 1998 South Africa cannot field a team without a player of colour' (*Natal Witness* 11 March 1998). Many whites believed that De Villiers was sidelined to placate public pressure. Bob Woolmer, South Africa's coach in this crucial post-apartheid period, was of the opinion that Ntini simply was not good enough: 'I do not believe he has the necessary level of skill to play regular top-grade cricket…His selection was hastened by criticism of the selectors for choosing an all-white team… when Ali Bacher was quoted as saying that this was no longer acceptable…' (Woolmer 2000: 166–167). Ntini, a token selection in his coach's estimation, became the third South African to take 300 test wickets, and the first South African to take 10 wickets at Lord's Cricket Ground when he achieved this feat in 2003; in April 2005 he recorded the best ever bowling performance by a South African cricketer in a test match (13 for 132 runs against the West Indies at Port of Spain); in March 2006, he achieved the best bowling figures by a South African in a one-day international (6 wickets for 22 runs against Australia); and he has been among the world's top five bowlers over the

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past few years. He has also consistently been voted South Africa's favourite sportsman in various research polls.[11]

The theme was repeated when Herschelle Gibbs was drafted into the side against the West Indies in 1998/99 after a public outcry against the selection of an all-white team, with Bacher's old mate Steve Tshwete particularly trenchant in his criticism. Gibbs is a batsman of fabulous talent, yet his inclusion was seen as a political intervention. Fast bowler Allan Donald wrote that 'the selection was not a reaction to Mr Tshwete's threat. [Adam] Bacher had failed twice and his technical flaws had been exposed by Walsh and Ambrose. Gibbs was…not a token selection….' (Donald 1999: 218). Donald's was a minority opinion. In his biography of Ali Bacher, Hartman wrote of Adam Bacher becoming a 'victim…the truth was that Gibbs had to play in order to provide a "player of colour"' (Hartman 2004: 325). Colin Bryden, editor of the *South African Cricket Annual* and Gibbs' biographer, branded the selection 'an act of expediency' (Bryden 2003: 103). He quotes national coach Bob Woolmer saying that 'there were instructions to pick a player of colour and Gibbs was the obvious selection…' (Bryden 2003: 103). While the ANC dabbled in crude social engineering with its quota directives, the careers of Ntini and Gibbs suggest that (white) cricket selectors were either prejudiced against black talent or, as the past beneficiaries of affirmative action, were still learning to perform at the highest level as selectors.

There was another crisis in the build-up to the one-day matches against the West Indies. Ali Bacher, according to national convenor Peter Pollock, asked for an enlargement of 'the squad to accommodate a sort of disguised affirmative action [to] fit the players in with a game or two once the series was decided' (Pollock 2001: 204). The inclusion of Gibbs, Henry Williams and Victor Mpitsang left the captain, Hansie Cronje, livid (Pollock 2001: 104). It is ironic that Cronje was angry. He, after all, had been a beneficiary of the same compromise in the past. During the 1991 tour to India, he was one of four 'development' players added to the squad. From the mid-1980s, Bacher was keen to have a predominantly 'Afrikaans' province in the A Section of the Currie Cup. The likely candidate, the Orange Free State,

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was weak and to facilitate this affirmative action, it was decided to allow three players from overseas to represent the team during the 1987–88 season in order to make it more competitive (King 2005: 62).

Cronje was a beneficiary of this move, yet now baulked at having to play with one player of colour as a minimum requirement (Woolmer 2000: 169). Donald recalls that Cronje railed against political interference and 'said...that the international set-up must not be devalued for the sake of keeping the ANC happy' (Donald 1999: 219). Cronje resigned as captain. Donald, who flew to Bloemfontein with Cronje, was 'surprised how cool he was after his outburst in the meeting and I got the feeling that he knew what he was doing...' (Donald 1999: 219). Cronje withdrew his letter of resignation after meeting with his pastor, Ray McCauley of the Rhema Church, who wrote that 'the issue was resolved in my office. With Ali and a few more UCB members present, Hansie officially withdrew his letter of resignation and the UCB promised him that they would give him much more say in the future' (King 2005: 140). Hansie's team not only became distant from the debates around transformation, but this unfettered power would have tragic consequences for South African cricket when on 7 April 2000 Indian police laid charges of match-fixing against Cronje. He confessed on 11 April to receiving money from a London-based bookmaker in return for 'information and forecasts' (*Natal Mercury* 13 April 2000). On 11 October 2000 the UCBSA handed him a life ban from all cricket activities (see Vahed 2001).

Sports Minister Steve Tshwete was not satisfied with the Charter and pressurised the UCBSA to introduce race quotas. A Development Conference in May 1999 set quotas from school to provincial levels, for management, selection panels, journalists, scorers, groundsmen, umpires and coaches, with the objective of achieving equal representivity by 2003 (UCBSA 1999).[12] Quotas forced provinces to give black players opportunities to find their feet and not discard them after one or two failures. One unintended consequence of such quotas, according to a report in *Business Day*, was that the market value of black players increased disproportionately

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to their talent. They commanded at least 40 per cent more in fees than white players of similar ability (*Business Day* 10 July 2000).

There were administrative changes as well. UCBSA president Raymond White resigned following the controversy over his sanctioning of an all-white Gauteng team to play England in November 1999. This led to an urgent meeting between the UCBSA and new Sports Minister Ngconde Balfour, following which Bacher announced that the team had been changed to include a black player.[13] The late Percy Sonn, a coloured member of the UCBSA board, was appointed president (*Electronic Telegraph* 24 January 2000). White's parting shot was that the UCBSA was 'little more than the cricket organ of the ANC'.[14] In other important changes, Rushdie Magiet became the first black convenor of selectors in October 1999, and the new panel of six selectors included three blacks, including an African. The TMC viewed this as a 'major step in transformation...It is non-negotiable now that black cricketers and administrators have to be brought in at the highest levels...' (TMC 1999). The TMC recognised that change had brought to the surface 'anxieties that prevail in conservative (White) cricket circles' and reached out to players to deepen 'their understanding of transformation' (TMC 1999). The TMC met with national team players in Johannesburg in September 1999 and concluded after an 'emotional', 'informative' and 'initially tense' seminar that the 'complexity of the transformation issues left some of the players confused and unsure of their role and purpose in the broader context of South African cricket' (TMC 1999). The TMC was especially critical of media which were 'disruptive and obstructive of the transformation process' (TMC 1999).

Bacher understood the groundswell of African demands and in January 2000 announced that a black managing director would be appointed from 1 July 2000 to replace him. Bacher was to 'mentor' the new appointment for two years (*Sunday Times* 28 May 2000). This was a masterstroke. Undoubtedly the appointment of a black CEO would ease political pressure on cricket and on Bacher's position as director of the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Gerald Majola, a national selector and member of the UCBSA general council, was appointed to succeed Bacher. Majola, a person of long

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pedigree in cricket and a leading figure in the move to oust Raymond White, and who had not even applied for the post, said that board members had asked him to take up the position (*SA Cricket Action* December 2000). The question was whether the ascendancy of black administrators would signal the beginnings of a new, more aggressive transformatory strategy in cricket.

Seemingly out of the blue, the UCBSA resolved on 7 July 2002 at its National Consolidation Conference at Kievits Kroon to scrap transformation quotas with regard to national teams and senior provincial sides. At the level of B teams and below, quotas were replaced by 'guidelines'. Teams should contain at least 50 per cent players of colour, including one African player. Ironically, black leadership saw the dropping of quotas. Was it because without Bacher as a screen between white interests, the government and the black lobby, the black leadership felt the pressure of a sport dominated by white players, spectators and sponsors? Were they entrenching themselves at the cost of broadening the game to include those historically left behind? Quotas, after all, had become the vehicle through which the UCBSA was determined to pursue transformation. The TMC was 'dismantled' in recognition of the need to 'internalise' transformation issues at the UCBSA. It was considered important to deal with the negative attitudes of white cricket supporters and the white press, who were perceived to be hostile to the South African team, something that the country could little afford in the build-up to World Cup 2003 (Transformation in Cricket 2002).

Following the Kievits Kroon Resolution, the minister of sport appointed a Committee of Inquiry on 18 July 2002 to investigate the UCBSA's claim that South African cricket 'had grown beyond its own transformation expectations'. The committee began its investigation on 7 August 2002. A meeting of the parliamentary Portfolio Committee: Sport and Recreation on 17 June, chaired by Ms R. Bhengu, reported that '*the most important finding of the Committee* is that the UCBSA's statement to the effect that it had achieved transformation targets "beyond all expectations", is not borne out by the evidence.'[15] Instead the Portfolio Committee found that the development programme 'has failed to make significant inroads into black African communities' (African communities made up less than 10 per cent

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of the clubs in premier leagues) and that 'there continue to be disparities in the allocation of funds…historically disadvantaged communities continue to be under-resourced.' As a result, the 'legacy of South Africa's apartheid past continues to…compromise the ability of black and white cricketers to compete on an equal footing.' Compliance with regard to transformation targets was about 20 per cent (Portfolio Committee 2003).

While its critique was valid, the Portfolio Committee failed to comment on the fact that the government had not provided the kind of infrastructure necessary to broaden the game into disadvantaged areas, a point made, albeit subtly, by Haroon Lorgat, who pointed out that there was a 'need for an integrated strategy between government and sports bodies'. He argued that government had to buy in to the process and accept responsibility to ensure that expectations were met. Companies had to meet transformation targets in industry through employment equity plans, and there was funding for skills development. Sport was a business and a methodical approach was required. Unless this was done, there was little point in 'government officials, especially during elections, [standing] on the outside and critici[sing]. If we have a documented policy, the excuses of both sides will be removed and they will be accountable' (Lorgat interview).

The issue of race and affirmative action continued to bubble under the surface as the UCBSA set racial 'targets', not quotas. Norman Arendse, in an interview while he was president, explained his understanding of transformation, and the difference between a 'target' and 'quota':

> Our approach to these matters is flexible. We have a target of seven, not a quota of seven. Provided there is an adequate explanation, it is not for me to second-guess them. It depends also on who we play, and that is the reason why I dug my heels in against Bangladesh. If we don't give players of colour an opportunity against the weakest-ranked test-playing nation, when are we going to? That is the way to approach transformation: by looking at the opposition. You don't throw a youngster – black or white – in against Australia or on a tour of England. You can destroy that youngster's career.[16]

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Boeta Dippenaar from the Free State, who has been in and out of the South African team, has provided a white perspective on what is a thorny issue. He told Reuters in May 2008 that 'we are on dangerous ground as soon as we start saying "*x*" amount of players have to be white and "*x*" amount of players have to be of colour. We don't mind if the whole team is Black if that's the best team. Throughout the whole transformation process a lot of patriotism has been lost.'[17] Dippenaar pointed to the example of England's Kevin Pietersen. 'No country can afford to lose a player of Pietersen's calibre. That puts a question mark about whether we are doing the right things.' Pietersen is the most high-profile cricketer to leave the country, allegedly because of quotas. He was born in Pietermaritzburg in 1980 and made his first-class debut for KwaZulu-Natal against England in 1997. He was spotted by Nasser Hussain who, together with Clive Rice, made his move to England possible. He would retrospectively argue that it was the racial quota system that forced him to move for, as a white, he would not have played at international level for South Africa. After serving a qualifying period of four years, he made his international debut in the one-day international match against Zimbabwe in 2004, and his test debut in the 2005 Ashes series against Australia. Pietersen became the fastest batsman to reach both 1 000 and 2 000 runs in one-day international cricket; was the fastest player, in terms of days, to reach 4 000 test runs; and became only the third English batsman to top the ICC One Day International rankings (in March 2007). Pietersen captained England from August 2008 to January 2009 but lost the position after a dispute with England coach Peter Moores. What Pietersen and those who cite his case ignore, is that since his departure young white players like A.B. de Villiers, Dale Steyn, Morné Morkel, Albie Morkel and Johan Botha have broken into the South African team.

Around September 2007, 25 national players, including black players, submitted a memorandum to CSA that quotas (officially 'targets') were damaging the game.[18] The viewpoint of black players is that there is a stigma attached to being a 'quota' player and it is not a label that they would like to carry. However, the flip side is that it was this struggle over transformation

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that ensured that Gibbs and Ntini were given a fair run, and it is easy for them to now chide the system. In March 2008 coloured bowler Charl Langeveldt withdrew from South Africa's tour of India in the aftermath of the controversy over his selection ahead of white paceman André Nel. CSA chief executive Gerald Majola issued a statement:

> Charl Langeveldt called me today in an emotional state saying he wanted to withdraw from the tour to India so that he can consider his international future in the right frame of mind. He said that the public controversy over the selection of the Proteas team to tour India had upset him to the extent that he would not be in the right frame of mind to tour India. Charl said he wanted to use this time instead to consider his future in international cricket in a cool and calm manner.[19]

The controversy centred on the fact that South African coach Mickey Arthur had insisted on Nel being in the squad, but it is alleged that Langeveldt was picked to lift the number of black players to comply with the 'target' of seven black players in a 14-man squad (with four black players on the field at all times). As the story unfolded it emerged that it was CSA president Norman Arendse and not CEO Majola who had insisted that the target be complied with. Langeveldt issued a statement on the episode:

> As players we all have a good idea of when we are clearly in the running for selection and when we aren't. You just have to look at André's Test record compared to mine and the fact that he has been part of all the Test match plans while I haven't played a Test match for two years. I have always fought for a place in the team but I don't want to be put there because of my colour. I'm quite upset by this now and I'm going to need a bit of time to consider my future.[20]

Both Langeveldt and Nel were lost to South African cricket. Nel signed for Surrey and Langeveldt for Derbyshire in the English County Championship as Kolpak players, a system that is discussed later in this chapter. The lucrative English contract no doubt eased Langeveldt's

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'sacrifice'. Following this incident CSA appointed a Transformation Review Committee under the chairmanship of John Smith, whose 12 recommendations were accepted by the board of CSA on 12 June 2008. Racial 'targets' were maintained. Importantly, the president's right to veto the team was abolished. The CEO (Majola) and convenor of selectors (Mike Procter) were to manage the process. It was recommended that selectors should consult with the captain and coach of the national team and that the selection panel should include one African to ensure representivity. Both CSA and the South African Cricketers Association were encouraged to initiate programmes 'to engage professional players on transformation'. Importantly, one of the recommendations was that CSA should lobby 'the State and other stakeholders to make possible the main thrust of the transformation policy which is to provide facilities, resources and access in previously disadvantaged communities, with particular emphasis to [sic] black African areas, as no sport has the resources to achieve these goals on its own'.[21] The likes of Ahmed Kharwa, Norman Arendse and Percy Sonn, who were 'old school' SACOS and had fought the hard fight over many years to achieve race representivity, had their power stripped away. While the emergence of players like Parnell, Amla, Prince and Duminy has made the task of meeting 'targets' easier, it may be argued that this is a vindication of the battles fought by old SACOS stalwarts, whose ideas, however, are out of kilter with the new age of professionalisation, commodification and mediatisation of sport.

Professionalism, commercialism and mediatisation

The game of cricket has changed considerably since South Africa was readmitted to international cricket. These changes have included the emergence of powerful television stations and mega-dollar payments for broadcast rights, which has shifted the power away from administrators, the so-called Kolpak system (see below), the 'invention' of a shorter version of the game, Twenty20 cricket, and the formation of the Indian Premier League (IPL), which attests to the power of India in world cricket. As a result

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of television, mainly pay-TV, cricket is now a global game that can be watched all year round by subscribing television stations like DSTV (South Africa), Sky TV (UK), Foxtel (Australia), ZEE TV (India) and ARY (Pakistan). It is these stations that dictate when matches should be played and at what time, and which dancing girls should perform during the breaks, so that each match is accessible to as many people as possible internationally. This has been accompanied by the seedier side of the game, with betting scandals involving some of the great names of international cricket like Hansie Cronje, Wasim Akram, Shane Warne, Mohammed Azharuddin and Mark Waugh.

In recognition of the professionalisation of cricket, the UCBSA devolved the operational side of the professional game to CSA in 2006. The General Council of CSA, consisting of the senior office-bearers and the presidents of the provincial unions, is the supreme policy-making body of South African cricket. The operational issues concerning the running of professional cricket are controlled by the board of directors of CSA (PTY) LTD.

Aside from television revenues, South African cricket has been affected by a number of other important changes. One is the Kolpak ruling. This was a European Court of Justice ruling on 8 May 2003 in favour of Maros Kolpak, a Slovak handball player, who won a legal battle to play in Germany. The decision meant that no resident of the European Union (EU) could be stopped from working in another part of the EU. In professional sport it meant that a sporting club could not be prevented from employing EU players even if the national association placed restrictions on foreigners. Since Kolpak was not from the EU but from a country with an associate trading relationship (the Cotonou Treaty of 2000), the decision applied to all nations with such a relationship. South Africa, Zimbabwe and several Caribbean countries were signatories to the treaty and their players have been snapped up by English counties. Such players cannot play for England, and have to sign an undertaking not to represent South Africa. This has affected the game in England, where the authorities are concerned that the pool of players available for English selection is getting smaller. Actions such as reducing the annual grant to each county by £1 100 per Kolpak player have not deterred the counties (Maguire 2005).

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Around 50 South Africans have used this clause to play domestic cricket in the United Kingdom. While putting players in the 'pound' seats, its long-term consequences for local cricket might not be as rosy. Ken Borland, the sports editor for the *Natal Witness*, has referred to Kolpak, admittedly with some hyperbole, as 'the rape of South African cricket' because of its consequences.[22] Players like Nicky Boje, Andrew Hall, André Nel, Lance Klusener, Jacques Rudolph and Tyron Henderson signed Kolpak contracts when they felt shabbily treated by South African selectors. South African administrators have to tread warily, because players can earn much the same or more for less stressful work, and without fear of being dropped, which means a pay cut. Following their spat, both André Nel and Charl Langeveldt have signed Kolpak contracts. This option may have influenced Langeveldt, whose reaction certainly disappointed Norman Arendse, as he told reporter Zaahier Adams:

> It is disappointing because Langeveldt had a meeting, which Haroon Lorgat (then chair of the national selection committee) facilitated, with me just about a week or so after the incident. He then promised me that he would make himself available to represent the country if selected, and what had been attributed to him in the media was not true. Yes, I have been disappointed by his subsequent actions.[23]

Cricket authorities in South Africa are also worried about the loss of young talent. A good example is Ryan McLaren, who signed for Kent. The South African selectors tried to get Kent to release him to play for South Africa against Australia in March 2009 because he was seen as a player who could fill the void in the one-day team left by the retirement of Shaun Pollock, Lance Klusener and Nicky Boje. Kent turned down this request, which meant that McLaren would continue to play English domestic cricket instead of international cricket. The flood of players leaving for England, even if they would not have represented South Africa, has weakened the domestic game in South Africa. CSA's first reaction was to ban such players from domestic cricket in South Africa. But they quickly realised that this would affect the

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standard of the domestic game, and since May 2008 they have allowed each franchise to field three Kolpak players. Majola is concerned:

> It's a financial issue and it will continue for as long as the rand is weak. What is most concerning for us is that when players sign Kolpak contracts, they denounce playing for South Africa. We invest a lot of money in young players and then they are lost to the system. We can't compete financially, our top players are cheaper for the counties than their own mediocre players. Sport is different, it should not be about trade agreements. We would be quite relaxed about it all if they could still play for South Africa...there would be no problem, no limits on our side.[24]

This is not the only threat to CSA. The biggest development in 2008 was the creation of the IPL and the extravaganza that accompanied it. The IPL was made up of eight franchises bought by Indian corporations and Bollywood stars. They play Twenty20 cricket, in which each team bats a maximum of 20 overs and the game is completed in about two-and-a-half hours. It is estimated that global broadcast rights will earn the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) around US$1 billion per annum. The tournament was first played in India in 2008, and in South Africa in 2009, because of security concerns around the Indian elections being held at the same time. South Africans like Graeme Smith, J.P. Duminy, Herschelle Gibbs, Tyrone Henderson and others have signed lucrative contracts. Duminy, for example, was paid about R7 million for six weeks of cricket. This is about 10 times more than he will earn from CSA and clearly reduces his dependency on the national body. A rival Indian Cricket League (ICL) was started in India in 2007 with six teams. Although this league was not sanctioned by the ICC and BCCI, and players have been banned from ICC competitions, it did allow the likes of Lance Klusener, Andrew Hall, Justin Kemp and Nicky Boje to earn large sums of money. For example, Hall and Kemp left South African cricket while under contract in May 2008, signing ICL contracts worth around US$300 000, and had county contracts worth around £70 000

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and £80 000 respectively. Together, at the then prevailing exchange rate, they were earning R3.5 million per annum as opposed to the national contract worth around R750 000.[25] The ICL subsequently collapsed in 2009 and many players have returned to the ICC fold.

For repeatedly breaking team curfews and alleged alcohol abuse, Andrew Symonds was sent home from the Twenty20 World Cup by Australian authorities in June 2009. It was reported shortly afterwards that he was set to become the world's first freelance Twenty20 player, as the Deccan Chargers of the IPL announced that they would retain his services at US$1.35 million per season (which lasts six weeks) and a South African provincial franchise was rumoured to have offered him US$120 000 per season to play in the 20 and 50 overs formats of the game. In between these tournaments he would play for Hampshire in the County Championship. According to one report, his fees would 'dwarf those he stood to earn under his current Cricket Australia deal. A reduction in his bowling workload could also extend his playing career, and his global exposure may go some way to restoring his marketability...'.[26] In September 2009, English star Andrew Flintoff not only announced his retirement from test cricket but also turned down a central contract with the English Cricket Board. Like Symonds, he too has become a freelance cricketer in an effort to maximise his earning potential in the final years of his career. Flintoff's manager, Andrew Chandler, indicated that he would 'play for Chennai [Super Kings in the IPL], he might play for an Australian team, a South African team, maybe one in the West Indies'. South African captain Graeme Smith responded that 'you can't hide the fact that huge financial rewards and benefits for players have come into the game in the last few years, and it's obviously such a short career, so you want to make as much money in that time as possible'.[27] These developments constitute a threat to the power of cricketing authorities.

These changes in the game brought matters to a head within CSA. Arendse's veto of the national team in early 2008 raised the important question of whether dedicated anti-apartheid fighters had a place in the modern game. As a first-year law student at the University of Cape Town

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(UCT) in the mid-1970s, Arendse was chosen for the UCT First XI. His excitement soon wore off when he came face-to-face with reality:

> I was selected to play in the UCT First XI for the first game of the season. It was then that I received my first political education. Alan Zinn, Robbie Ford, Lenin Jingles, all really big SACOS guys, at the time physically, and I mean physically, sat me down in the student union building and told me that I was not aware of what I was doing and explained the role sport played in politics at the time. After the conversation, I returned home to inform my father and two elder brothers what had transpired. They agreed that I should not play.[28]

When Arendse adopted this principled position during the Langeveldt/Nel fiasco, he received some support from ordinary South Africans:

> When there is an issue of national selection or criticism of my role as president of CSA, as was prominently featured in the media recently, there was overwhelming positive response from them [former SACB cricketers]. I was encouraged, comforted by this response. I even had to ask my secretary just to take calls because so many people were calling. Having been born on the Cape Flats, and also having played and administered soccer at a high level, Georgie van Oordt, Vinnie Barnes, Neil Fortune, Terry Richards, Randall Cupido, Jonny Kleinveldt, Goolam Allie and Muis Allie are the guys who would phone me up and say I'm doing the right thing. And even just ordinary people in the street, whether it's here in Cape Town or Johannesburg where I also practise, have good things to say. I was very comforted that I enjoyed their support because that is where I come from.[29]

The problem was that the SACOS 'struggle' past had little place in the contemporary cricketing world. Arendse resigned as president of CSA on 17 September 2008. His three-year term was to have ended in 2010, but he said that CSA's 11 local affiliates were split over his efforts to ensure that the sport reflected South Africa's racial demography. In this regard, Arendse

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cited differences with CEO Gerald Majola and made it clear that he was not prepared to be a 'rubber stamp'. Arendse was replaced by Dr Mtutuzeli Nyoka. According to CSA's website, Dr Nyoka was persuaded to enter cricket administration by Gerald Majola's brother Khaya Majola.[30] Dr Nyoka became a member of the Gauteng Cricket Board (GCB) in 1998, its vice-chairman in 2000, and chairman in 2001. He was chairman from 2005 to 2008 until he became president. He also served on the World Cup Cricket Committee in 2002, the executive committee of the UCBSA in 2001, and on the 2003 Ministerial Transformation Review Committee, which had been set up by then Minister of Sport Ngconde Balfour to investigate transformation in cricket.

At a special general meeting at the end of October 2008, it was decided to form a new Section 21 company to take advantage of tax breaks that would be given to sporting bodies that met development criteria. CSA was formally registered by the Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office as a Section 21 company in January 2009, with Dr Mtutuzeli Nyoka as chairman and Mr Raymond Mali as vice-chairman of the company's board of directors.[31] In another important change, former CSA and ICC president Ray Mali defeated Peter Cyster for the position of vice-president. Thus a triumvirate of 'black Africans', Gerald Majola, Mtutuzeli Nyoka and Ray Mali, were at the helm of cricket. Among their first actions was the appointment of apartheid-era great Mike Procter as chairperson of the national selection panel, which also includes another white former player, Craig Matthews, and Mustapha Khan and Winky Ximiya.

Meanwhile, the very way in which the game is structured has, at a local level at least, cut down on opportunities to play at a provincially representative level. In the 1990s the number of franchises was increased from six to eleven to democratise the game by making it available to as many South Africans as possible across the country. The number of franchises was reduced to six in 2004 because the expanded system was seen to dilute the talent and weaken the standard of play.[32] A Franchise Review Committee under former Minister of Education Kader Asmal recommended that CSA

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increase the number of franchises from six to eight with effect from the 2009/10 season, to include Border and Griqualand West. This would be a means to give more opportunity to black players in the Eastern Cape especially, where there is a long cricketing tradition. However, CSA decided to retain the existing six-team franchise system. This was announced on 21 February 2009 by CEO Gerald Majola following a two-day board meeting.[33] The reaction of CSA to the recommendations of its own Franchise Review Committee suggests that it will adopt a business-first approach to cricketing matters. Clearly, commercial considerations have held sway over the imperatives of democratising the game.

In August 2001 Dr Nyoka had challenged Percy Sonn, a three-decade veteran of non-racial cricket, for the presidency of the UCBSA on the basis that an African should lead the organisation. When defeated, Nyoka told reporters, 'I hope one day this organisation will be led by a black African. It is what millions of marginalised people are calling for and I hope that time will come sooner rather than later' (*Sunday Tribune* 5 August 2001). Nyoka has been insistent that the broad notion of 'black' be jettisoned and quotas refer specifically to Africans. At the end of the 2001/02 season Nyoka resigned as chairman of the Gauteng Cricket Board, asking:

> How do we tell this country's 35 million black Africans that transformation is working when only one player [Makhaya Ntini] represents them? While the numbers of the other racial groups are on the increase the African continues to be underrepresented... The UCB's transformation record is a betrayal of African aspirations. No man can belong to an organisation in which his people's inferiority is assumed without building up powerful resentments. (*Johannesburg Star* 10 April 2002)

Nyoka added that 'Gerald Majola must understand that his appointment was an affirmative action and others should be getting the same opportunities as him if transformation is going to work'. He describes as 'buffoonery' and 'pure idiocy' Majola's statement that transformation was working in cricket.[34]

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The squad for the June 2009 Twenty20 World Cup did not even contain one African player. And this at a time when cricket was ruled by Majola, Nyoka and Ray Mali. It is compelling, in the context of Nyoka's 2001 statement, that there was hardly a whisper about the composition of the team from this black South African leadership.

South Africa's hosting of the IPL tournament in April–May 2009 led to a major split in South African cricket. According to CSA president Mtutuzeli Nyoka, the CSA was paid a R30 million hosting fee and affiliates received R125 000 for each match that they hosted. There was much acrimony because the negotiations were concluded privately and without consulting the members who make up the CSA. At the heart of the dispute were the 2 400 seats in the prime corporate suites in the main stand, which the GCB had to give up to the IPL. When Alan Kourie, the CEO of the GCB, refused to give up the seats, he was told that he was in breach of the contract in terms of which Majola had handed the GCB's rights to the IPL. The GCB asked for the contract and for Majola to participate in negotiations with the IPL over the seats but this was not forthcoming. Despite protestations, the GCB was forced to give up the seats, 'really pissing off' longstanding suite holders, according to Kourie. According to GCB chairman Barry Skjoldhammer, many suite holders threatened never to renew their suite.[35]

After the IPL was completed, the GCB sent a letter to the CSA's audit committee on 4 June 2009 requesting full details of the agreement between CSA and the IPL. Following a meeting on 10 July 2009, CSA gave its full support to Majola and dismissed 'with contempt' the complaints of the GCB. CSA threatened to withdraw all international matches played under its auspices from the Wanderers stadium until the GCB apologised to Majola and the CSA.[36] With no apology forthcoming, CSA ruthlessly wielded the big stick. It moved the most attractive matches in the ICC Champions Trophy played in September 2009, the opening match, final and South Africa's matches, to Centurion Park in Pretoria. CSA also removed lucrative Pro20, one-day and test matches against England which were to have been played between November 2009 and January 2010. Ironically, the row had brewed because

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the GCB was trying to protect its suite holders, who were now to be denied the opportunity to watch the best matches.[37]

While this drama was being played out, a group of discontented black clubs, drawn primarily from Soweto, Lenasia and Eldorado Park, whose spokesperson was Hussein Manack, a former Gauteng provincial cricketer, and who called themselves the Concerned Cricket Fraternity Gauteng, sent a memorandum to Sports Minister Makhenkesi Stofile complaining of the GCB's 'failure to comply with various transformation guidelines and commitments; ...failure to create opportunities and produce Test players, and losing talented young cricketers to other provinces' and its 'failure to produce results'. Manack added that while the issues of corporate governance and transformation were different, 'where they overlap is that it indicates the GCB's condescending and arrogant manner'.[38] With Kourie and Skjoldhammer both white, the issue quickly translated into a race issue. What the Concerned Fraternity conveniently ignored was that Dr Nyoka had himself been at the helm of Gauteng cricket until he was nominated by the GCB as president of CSA. The timing of the allegations, in the midst of the dispute between the CSA and the GCB, suggested to cynics that it was a deliberate attempt to embarrass the GCB and racialise the issue. While Mohammed Mohsin of the Lenasia cricket club blamed the 'dogmatic, rigid approach' of the GCB for the exodus of (black) players,[39] he ignored the fact that in the past year, black players like Jonathan Vandiar and Ugashen Govender had left the (black-controlled) Dolpins teams and joined Gauteng, and that the Dolphins had also performed miserably during this period.

As the matter was dragged out in public, there was pressure from the Sports Ministry to resolve the dispute. To an extent Sports Minister Makhenkesi Stofile saw through the attempt to racialise the issue when he said that he was 'suspicious that, with the successes of the Indian Premier League (IPL), economic interests are beginning to muddy the waters'.[40] Both sides accepted Advocates Brian Currin and Khaba Mamba as mediators and agreement was eventually reached, which restored the matches against England to the GCB, but not those of the ICC Trophy. According to Nyoka, 'Wanderers [stadium]

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is the Mecca of South African cricket; you can't have cricket in South Africa without staging matches at the Wanderers. Someone said it's like staging Hamlet without the prince.'[41] Even in this age of corporate transparency the agreement between CSA and the IPL has never been made public.

Skjoldhammer was replaced as chairman of the GCB in October 2009 by Polelo Lazarus Zim, who is currently executive chairman of Afripalm Resources (Pty) Ltd and chairperson of the board of Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd, the first BEE company to be more than 50 per cent black-controlled. His past positions include being the first black president of the South African Chamber of Mines, chair of Kumba Iron Ore, CEO of Anglo American SA, CEO of M-Net & SuperSport, and MD of MTN International. Outgoing GCB chairman Barry Skjoldhammer said of Zim, perhaps with a hint of sarcasm, 'He may not have cricket experience, but as chairman of four other boards, he brings a wealth of knowledge to the GCB' (*Sunday Times* 20 September 2009). At the same time two vice-presidents were chosen. In uniquely South African 'speak', Joe Pamensky was elected to represent the 'previously advantaged' clubs and Essop Pahad the 'previously disadvantaged' teams. Pamensky was the president of the (mainly white) SACU during the 1980s when the country was isolated from international cricket because of its apartheid policies, and with Ali Bacher, organised 'rebel' tours by overseas teams. He is or has been chairman of companies such as Terra Nova Financial Services (Pty) Ltd and Bidvest Bank Ltd, and a director of Enviroserv Holdings Ltd, Schindler Lifts (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd and Stonehage Financial Services Holdings (Jersey) Ltd, Jersey, UK.[42] Pahad served as Minister in the Presidency under Thabo Mbeki (1999–2008), during a period when the government pursued neoliberal economic policies with almost religious zeal, and is currently on the board of Sahara Computers, which became a 'fully empowered and Proudly South African accredited' company during this period. According to Pahad, the aim of the new leadership will be to implement a 'non-racial and non-sexist approach to cricket'.[43] There was no mention of addressing the serious class disparities in the sport.

Thus, all the talk of representation and race ends up with multinational corporations, the new black elite and old white power!

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Conclusions

In the mid-1990s Mike Marqusee asked the following in relation to South Africa's cricket trajectory:

> Will development or international tours take priority? Will affirmative action really change the SACU ethos of paternalism? Can the entrenched resistance of the old white guard, still ruling the roost in cricket clubs across the land, be overcome? Will development be aimed at producing showpiece players for the national squad, or will it tend the grass roots?...With the end of apartheid and the coming of democracy, will white and black in South Africa at long last share a level playing field? How will the legacy of apartheid be redressed? Are electoral democracy and legal equality enough? Or will more radical solutions have to be found? (Marqusee 1995: 212)

One could respond, as Chou En-Lai did when asked his opinion about the impact of the French Revolution: 'too soon to tell'. But answers to some of Marqusee's questions more than a decade after he asked them, and 15 years after 'unity', however perfunctory, can be given.

The holding of the second IPL tournament in South Africa during April and May 2009 shows how far the country has come from the days when it was an international pariah. Since 1994 it has hosted a Rugby World Cup (1995), Cricket World Cup (2003), Africa Cup of Nations (1996), and Twenty20 Cricket World Cup (2007). Besides the IPL tournament, the ICC Champions Trophy has also been moved from Asia to South Africa (October 2009). The 'cherry on the top' will be the much awaited Football World Cup 2010. Yet, while South Africa's reputation has been enhanced, the debate about the transformatory role of cricket continues to fester.

Despite what Jacqueline Maingard refers to as 'mythic enactments' of a collective identity (Maingard 1997), cricket has failed to create an imagined South African community. Very few Africans attend cricket matches and even fewer play the game at the highest levels. This chapter

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has illustrated the changing face of post-apartheid South African society: a move from acceptance of all-white teams (c.1990–1995) to calls for inclusion of some 'players of colour' (c.1996–1997) to demands for selection quotas (c.1997–1999) and, finally, clamour for African control (2000). Change was contested and forced as a result of pressure from black players, administrators and government. Thus, CSA and most of its affiliates are under black control. The CSA's black empowerment levels during 2008 were as follows: General Council: 66 per cent; permanent staff: 63 per cent; domestic professional cricket: 56 per cent; domestic amateur and youth representative cricket: 60 per cent; senior and junior national representative cricket: 52 per cent; and women's senior and junior representative cricket: 54 per cent.[44]

Impressive, but what does this mean for the transformation agenda in the country? The meanings and results of transformation are contested, due largely to the absence of a clear definition of transformation. Boloka and Krabill provide an insightful way to focus on transformation, holding that:

> ...[it] is not only about replacement of colours...We define successful transformation...as being achieved when it reflects, in its ownership, staffing, and product, the society within which it operates, not only in terms of race, but also socio-economic status, gender, religion, sexual orientation, region, language, etc. This is only possible if access is opened...not only to the emerging black elite, but also to grassroots communities of all colours. (Boloka & Krabill 2000: 76)

Boloka and Krabill's model can be seen as a target to be progressively reached – one that is not mechanistically applied, but seeks to place the issue of access at the centre of change. However, this model of transformation is unlikely to satisfy the market, media and public thirst for match-winning elite cricketers. The model also does not take into account the changing nature of what constitutes 'society'; the presumption of Boloka and Krabill is that 'society' is the national state, but as we have seen, sport is progressively being de-nationalised and simultaneously commercialised, and one has to factor this into any national programme of transformation. Trends indicate that

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the gulf between the world of commercial cricket and cricket as pleasurable recreation open to all South Africans will continue to widen. It is not difficult to discern how this context, and the prevailing model of transformation both in cricket and in the wider society, are facilitating elite class formation ironically accompanied by the language of Africanisation.

International tours were touted as an important part of the broader development programme, with money derived from the tours taking the game into previously disadvantaged areas. In addition, with black players performing at the highest levels, it was felt that role models like Makhaya Ntini would serve as catalysts for attracting Africans to the game. But the emphasis on a broad-based development programme has increasingly found itself challenged by an emphasis on siphoning off black players into selected 'white' schools and then into high-performance centres. The balance has arguably shifted towards the production of 'showpiece players for the national squad' at the expense of the grassroots. The continuing lack of facilities in black areas is indicative of the fact that the fields are far from level.

But even in producing 'showpiece players' the programme has been an abject failure as far as African players are concerned, and there clearly is a need to go back to the drawing board if the aim remains to produce such players to appease political demands and be representative of the national demographic. One might look at this from another angle. The South African football team (Bafana Bafana) is dominated by African players. There is therefore no pressure from government about getting the colour balance right. However, the team does not include a single African player who may be described as 'world class'. So is it fair to criticise cricket for not producing African world class cricketers? And does it suggest that the government is failing its citizens in terms of creating the conditions in which sportspersons may excel?

Cricket has made strides in that black administrators are getting into positions in central decision-making arenas. While some might downplay this, given our history this is an important gain. But like BEE deals, this is unlikely to bring about a fundamental transformation within the game.

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It seems that administrators are using their race to position themselves but then making little attempt to change the rules of the game fundamentally. This development mirrors BEE, which has seen the creation of a small, fabulously wealthy African class while inequality within the wider African population persists and even increases. As Michael MacDonald points out, BEE not only 'legitimate[s] South Africa's political economy, but it also provides business, the ANC, and leading tendencies within the ANC with ancillary benefits…Since some Africans are becoming rich, economic inequality is deemed not to be a racial problem, an immense advantage to the established bourgeoisie' (MacDonald 2004: 646). One should be circumspect in coming to any quick conclusion, as there is much play left in the way the transition in South Africa unfolds. The contestation over macroeconomic policy has been renewed in the context of the April 2009 Zuma presidency. The transition remains contradictory and provisional, 16 years into the 'new' South Africa.

Nonetheless, maybe more cognisance needs to be taken of the fact that the very nature of the pitch has changed and the boundaries of what constitutes cricket have been pierced. When South Africa began a process of transformation in cricket in the early 1990s, the parameters of the game were still bounded by the nation-state, and cricketers wanting to succeed and make a living from the game saw provincial cricket and playing for the national team as their main, if not only, option. This gave administrators dedicated to changing the racial and class complexion of the game lots of purchase, even within the confines of the negotiated political and sporting settlement. But ironically, just as this was taking place, the game was starting to change fundamentally.

Limited-overs cricket was becoming an overwhelmingly popular version of the game, especially with the increasing television audience. More importantly, with the emergence of Kolpak and then the IPL and other Twenty20 tournaments, players' options outside of the provinces and the national team were broadened. The dominant power in world cricket, India, was able to ensure 'representation' by insisting on a quota of Indian players in every IPL team. However this kind of 'representation' was limited to India.

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The IPL, with its financial muscle, has plucked players from across the globe and created incredible tensions between the 'nation' and the IPL. The 'market' has now appeared at the heart of cricket.

How are progressive cricket administrators committed to transforming the game able to negotiate between the imperatives of market forces and redress? They understand that to continue to attract revenue, the lifeblood of the game, they need to have a winning team. They also see that with the IPL, ICL and Kolpak, players have many more options and are no longer dependent on CSA. If anything it is the other way around. An indication of the way in which CSA has come to terms with this in the past year, since the ousting of Norman Arendse, is that when black players were recently dropped there were no cries of racism. Makhaya Ntini was omitted from the one-day team against Australia in March 2009 while Hashim Amla was not included in South Africa's Twenty20 squad for the World Cup in England in June 2009. In fact, as indicated earlier, there was no national outcry that the team did not include a single African player. Success, it seems, overrides every other issue and the South African team, the Proteas, have been successful over the past 18 months, winning series in Australia and England for the first time.

Erasmus has argued that 'race' will be with South Africans for some time to come, even if only 'a detour on the way to new creations. It is always there because, whether we like it or not, we are still living in the shadow of the history of colonialism, segregation and apartheid, and their cultural and political aftermath' (Erasmus 2001: 392). Does Erasmus' view still have purchase? For the moment at least, given the ascendancy of an African leadership, it seems to have abated in the case of cricket. This is in keeping with the demands of narrow African nationalism that prioritise race over class, and economic prerogatives that value growth over redistribution and middle class entitlement over working class welfare. These tensions lie at the heart of the difficulties of nation-building and citizenship, but are also useful in the cynical world of electoral survival where the entitlement of a few may be dressed up as 'future' delivery to the many.

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Those wanting to argue for a transformative agenda for cricket need to understand the terrain on which they fight. In the early 1990s they could afford to look at the internal situation and try to create the conditions for change. The writings and debates during this period reveal that there was very little sense of the changing nature of the game and the impact of global forces (professionalisation, commercialisation, mediatisation, de-nationalisation), and how these should be factored into transformatory agendas. The international cricket calendar will soon have at least five Twenty20 leagues involving international players – the IPL, P20 in England, a Southern Premier League involving South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, the Champions League, a possible IPL Season 2 and ICC events. In the global championship of club winners mooted for October 2009, will J.P. Duminy play for the Mumbai Indians or the Cape Town South Africans? Can South African cricketing authorities insist on racial quotas in these teams, and how will they enforce them?

Tim May, chief executive of the Federation of International Cricketers' Associations, recently told *Cricinfo* that 'more and more players' have stated in surveys conducted by the association that they have 'less of an attachment' to international cricket'.[45] The power of national cricketing authorities is under threat. If this is the way cricket is transforming, where will the commitment come from to throw resources into previously disadvantaged areas? The state has thus far been reluctant to contribute to developing sport. And the cricket authorities are unlikely to do so either. Despite the rhetoric, their agenda is to maintain a winning national team and the best way to do this, they have found, is via cricket-in-elite-schools schemes and national academies; in this way they can continue to attract millions of rands in sponsorships and lucrative broadcasting contracts.

Is it not time to reflect on C.L.R. James' adage that 'cricket does not just reflect the age, it is the age'? Are we living in the age of the spectacle, where the emphasis is not on mass participation but on mass spectatorship? Are calls for redress and change as 'outdated' as the calls for more test cricket? Butana Khompela, the ANC MP and parliamentary head of the Sports

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Portfolio Committee, might occasionally fume about the racial composition of national cricket teams and summon cricket bosses to Parliament, but do the new cricket lovers of the IPL care? Do the television bosses and team owners quake in their boots when Khompela speaks? Is there any significance in the fact that President Jacob Zuma sat among the dignitaries at the IPL final in May 2009? There was not one African on the field of play. He did not seem to care. For Zuma, the IPL's coming to South Africa was a signal that South Africa was a safe destination, that it had the capacity to host mega events, and that the tournament was a financial boost for an ailing economy. Read in the context of his commitment to keeping the existing national macroeconomic project in place, it makes eminent sense. As James would say, 'What do know they of cricket who only cricket know?' (James 1986: xxi).

Now, more than ever, cricket administrators have to look not just beyond the boundary but beyond the nation.

Notes

1 Basil D'Oliveira, the South African-born coloured cricketer, was forced into exile and began a test career as an England player at the advanced age of 34. He was invited to take part in the grand ceremony at Newlands that launched the Cricket World Cup 2003. Oborne writes, 'I was privileged to watch from the stands as D'Oliveira walked, with some difficulty, out on the ground where he had been barred from playing as a young man. Graeme Pollock, South Africa's greatest ever test batsman, walked with him. Pollock, a courteous man who has never turned his back on the new world of South African cricket, kept himself one pace behind D'Oliveira, a gesture that was warmly appreciated by the spectators' (Oborne 2004: 251). In 1999 Pollock was voted South Africa's cricketer of the twentieth century. In Oborne's account, Pollock recounts that the careers of Mike Procter, Barry Richards, Eddie Barlow and his brother Peter Pollock were affected by the international cricket ban from 1970 (Oborne 2004: 252). There is no mention of what the system did to black careers, apart from that of the 'exceptional' D'Oliveira.

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2 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.

3 Docrat was referring to change in the ANC's orientation at its 50th National Conference in December 1997. Mandela's final report hit out at 'spokespersons of the advantaged [who]...propagate a reactionary, dangerous and opportunist position which argues that a normal and stable democracy has been achieved; the apartheid system is a thing of the past...They exploit dominant positions achieved as a result of apartheid to campaign against real change' (*Sunday Times* 21 December 1997). Mbeki's African Renaissance agenda placed great emphasis on affirmative action to achieve the rapid formation of an African bourgeois class. According to an ANC document, the middle class, which included professionals, the managerial corps and public servants, 'squashed between the rock of poverty and the glass ceiling of job reservation', was identified as the motive force of transformation and had to be increased through 'instruments such as the Employment Equity Act' (ANC 2002).

4 http://www.cricket.co.za/landing-page-csa.html

5 Adams Z, Arendse on the Langeveldt/Nel Fiasco, 30 May 2008. Accessed 10 April 2009, http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=6&click_id=17&art_id=vn20080530071602368C550558

6 See http://content.cricinfo.com/ci/content/player/46599.html

7 We thank the anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this point.

8 Cohen L, How the boy from the unfashionable side of town used hard work and talent to reach the top, *The Times*, 11 April 2009. Accessed 15 April 2009, www.thetimes.co.za/SpecialReports/Schools/Article.aspx?id=978857

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10 Chesterfield T, Politicians square off in Cape Town, *Cricinfo,* 4 January 1999. Accessed 20 January 1999, http://www.cricinfo.com/ci/content/story/80485.html

11 For example the BMI Sport Info found that he was South Africa's favourite sportsman in 2007. See *Mail & Guardian*, 28 November 2007. Accessed 15 June 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-11-28-makhaya-ntini-still-south-africas-favourite.

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Interviews

Ahmed Kharwa, former president of the non-racial Natal Cricket Board, Durban, 16 July 2002

Haroon Lorgat, former convenor of the National Selection Committee, present CEO of the ICC, Durban, 23 March 2006

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Between black and white: A case study of the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union

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> 'Race' is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing contradictory, self reinforcing plastic process, subject to the macro forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions...terms like 'black' and 'white' are social groups, not genetically distinct branches of humankind. (Haney-Lopez 2000: 65)

THERE HAS BEEN AN increasing volume of writing on cricket in the post-apartheid era. However, most of this has centred on national dynamics or on individuals like Ali Bacher, Allan Donald and Bob Woolmer. There have been brochures and reports issued by the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCBSA), now re-named Cricket South Africa (CSA), in praise of its achievements in transforming cricket, books that look at the national picture (Murray & Merrett 2004), and those that have sought to reclaim the past by focusing on the histories of black cricket (Allie 2000; Desai et al. 2002; Khota 2003; Odendaal 2003).[1] However, as the previous chapter illustrates, the applause for post-apartheid cricket conceals more than it reveals, and painting the story of cricket in broad strokes detracts from the specificity of the struggles involved in the transformation process. The dynamics are quite

different in KwaZulu-Natal, for example, with its large Indian population, than at the Pretoria-based Titans franchise, where whites are dominant, or in the Eastern Cape which has substantial African involvement in cricket. The absence of in-depth case studies at local levels, we believe, detracts from the rather complex and nuanced story of cricket in South Africa. More localised studies reveal that the picture is not that of a black/white binary, as this chapter on post-apartheid developments at the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union (KZNCU) will illustrate.

The uniting of sports bodies divided by apartheid changed the sporting landscape of South Africa. Bitter foes now united in the common cause of building a non-racial South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) appreciated that symbols, songs and icons distinguish nations from each other, that sporting victories create positive images of national strength and provide 'shared memories' and ideas of 'common destiny', and saw sport as a crucial plank in its nationalising programme (Booth 1998: 210). However, despite the formation of non-racial sporting bodies in many codes (including cricket) at both national and provincial levels, in early post-apartheid South Africa this did not mean the end of contestation over the transformation of sport and where the emphasis for change should be located. While the previous chapter sought to reveal some of the debates that were taking place at a national level, this chapter looks at the aftermath of unity at a provincial level.[2]

In particular this chapter explores a variety of issues arising out of these changes in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. Its major focus is on the historic construction of boundaries between Indians, whites and Africans in the struggle for control of cricket in this province in the first decade of freedom. The chapter is less a narrative about cricket than it is about the (re) making and persistence of racial and ethnic classifications, the struggle over resources, and attempts to mould disparate racial, economic, political and ideological interests into a common nationhood. The chapter also probes the impact of the commercialisation of the game, and the challenges that this poses to governance in the context of the imperatives of redress.

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While Africans make up the majority population in KwaZulu-Natal, Indians and whites together constitute over 95 per cent of cricket players and administrators in the province, both historically and in the contemporary period. Cricket has always been popular among coloureds, but their numbers in the province are negligible (see Desai et al. 2002: Chapter 4). Unlike the case in the Cape and the Transvaal, historical circumstances resulted in cricket failing to take root among Africans in Natal. Cricket was first introduced to Africans in Durban when the local state appointed J.T. Rawlins as its 'Native Welfare Officer' in April 1930. His mandate was to gainfully occupy the leisure time of the burgeoning African urban population so as to take their minds away from political 'agitation'. Cricket was part of a larger project implemented by the local state to change African leisure time activities, with the collaboration of capital, white liberals and the African middle classes. The local state sponsored African participation in national tournaments for almost three decades. However, cricket was confined to African elites in Christian missions and schools, where it was part of a wider transmission of European norms and values, as well as to clerical workers in Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Soccer and leisure activities like dance halls and music, which required less investment of finance and time, were more practical options for a migrant population employed primarily in low-paying jobs as dock and domestic workers.

With the coming to power of the National Party in 1948, the relationship between the state and Africans changed. As black resistance grew and the National Party sought to implement apartheid policies, the state relied increasingly on coercion to control Africans. From the 1950s Africans were relocated to townships devoid of facilities, especially for cricket, which required proper playing conditions. The popularity of soccer increased, while cricket ceased to be played from around 1960 (see Desai et al. 2002: Chapter 3). Cricket was re-introduced to Africans in the 1990s and a growing number of players, coaches and administrators are coming to the fore. Their role in the struggle for control of cricket will be taken up in the latter part of this chapter.

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Constructing racial boundaries

The roots of the racial boundaries that came to exist between Indians and whites can be traced to the colonial experience, when white settlers imported Indian indentured workers from 1860. Indentured workers were followed by traders from the west coast of India from the early 1870s. The emergent colonial settler government, feeling economically, socially and politically threatened by Indians, treated them legislatively as a homogeneous and discrete racial category, and sought to control and subjugate them on the basis of this racial categorisation. In indentured workers they found a convenient 'other' (Vahed 1995: 53). Indian migrants were divided by language, religion, culture, caste and class. However, the way white authorities homogenised 'Indians' and the way 'Indians' responded to discriminatory legislation reinforced an 'Indianness' amongst the migrants themselves (Bhana 1997: 100).

It was during the colonial period that the essence of what Said (1978) calls 'Orientalism' was instituted in the core organising principles of Natal's polity and economy. The racially typified indentured labourers were considered different to Africans, steadier ('the faithful servant') but more sinister and avaricious ('the wily Oriental'); close supervision and systematic discipline were consequently embedded in the indentured labour system (Vahed 1995: 17). Racial separateness became more rigorous after Union in 1910 and apartheid in 1948. Racial segregation by residence, racially segmented labour markets and wages, and a close relationship between race and concrete institutions – governmental, civil, educational and so on – ensured that race mattered in regard to people's life chances. Race carried ascriptive meanings and was the fundamental social categorisation for most South Africans, in a hierarchy of multiple identities. Race identity and race boundaries are sustained by new dynamics in post-apartheid South Africa. As Maré reminds us, South Africans still 'operate with race as a collective identity and as the articulating or organising principle for other identities... race thinking is embedded in our everyday thinking' (Maré 2000: 2).

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Contesting unity: the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union, 1991

Negotiations between the non-racial Natal Cricket Board (NCB) and the Natal Cricket Association (NCA) gave birth to the KwaZulu-Natal Cricket Union (KZNCU) on 23 May 1991. The affairs of the KZNCU were to be managed by an interim executive of 14 members, 7 from each side. According to Farred:

> SACU [South African Cricket Union] hegemony within the UCBSA was achieved via a dual strategy. The evacuation of SACB [South African Cricket Board] history and, more strategically, the absorption of nonracial players and administrators, sans traditions. Nonracial players and clubs have had to accommodate themselves to new cricket infrastructures that bear no evidence of their struggles, their customs, or their past. Administrators have been assimilated, for the most part nominally, into the official structures of the SACU, in the guise of the UCBSA.[3] (Farred 2000: 142)

This dual strategy played itself out at provincial level. NCA vice-president Don MacLeod became the first president of the KZNCU. The NCB was absorbed into the infrastructure of the NCA, with its headquarters at Kingsmead cricket ground in Durban. The lease of the ground remained in the name of the NCA 'to ensure continuity and legality'. One of the first acts of the KZNCU was to appoint Brian Short as chief executive. Short, as public affairs manager of the Natal Building Society during the 1980s, had shown a great appetite for supporting the NCA financially, but was reticent about supporting non-racial cricket (Desai et al. 2002: 378). White dominance was reflected in other key positions such as the director of playing affairs, Mike Procter, and the director of administration, Vic Hohls.

According to Cassim Docrat, the CEO of the KZNCU for most of the period since 1990, white administrators argued that this was the most reasonable option because they had developed a close association with sponsors as well as with the Durban City Council over ground facilities; voting rights in the union were heavily weighted in favour of (mainly white)

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Premier League clubs and the largest sub-union, the Durban and District Cricket Union (DDCU), while the strength of non-racial cricket lay in less influential areas like the townships of Chatsworth and Phoenix.

The commitment to real change and transformation at grassroots level took a back seat, as we shall now see.

The (under)-development of cricket

Struggles of (former) NCB clubs

Given the atrophying of non-racial cricket by the 1980s, cricket administrators faced a challenge as to how to create the conditions for competitive club cricket. The merging of clubs became one mechanism. Four teams from the NCB – Clares, New Era, Aurora and Kismet – who had merged with Pirates, were included in the new Premier League of 16 teams. Many more NCB clubs merged in order to become more competitive. Unification, according to Douglas Booth:

> ...forced Black clubs to amalgamate, ostensibly to strengthen their competitiveness. Amalgamating tradition is not easy. It takes time to build allegiances to symbols and to develop working relationships. Nor could the new leagues absorb all the players. The three clubs with five teams suddenly became one club with three teams. This left thousands of black enthusiasts without cricket homes. (*Post* 29 January 1995)

NCB teams found it difficult to be competitive. One of the first crises was implementation of a decision during unity talks that the Premier League would be reduced from 16 to 12 teams at the end of the 1992/93 season. Reducing the league would have excised all teams from the old NCB. Former NCB officials Logan Naidoo and G.V. Naidoo argued for a moratorium on relegation 'as the reduction of the league would not be in the best interests of cricket in Natal'. It was agreed to retain the 16-team league for three seasons. This reprieve was temporary. The odds were stacked against teams from the NCB. They lacked proper facilities and sponsorship, while the new KZNCU continued to pander to white interests, without taking cognisance of history.

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Clubs with long histories started to fold as they failed to generate resources to keep playing the game.

Provincial team: 'baaskap' management

During the early 1990s there were many outstanding young black cricketers like Yunus Bobat, Imraan Paruk and Jesse Chellan. Jesse Chellan was the best batsman in the NCB at the time of unification. He had a poor first season but was excellent in his second season, scoring over 700 runs in the Inter-City League and a century for Natal B. But that was the limit of his progress. He was not selected for the A team. In the absence of proper facilities and training, and faced with an unfamiliar environment, feelings of alienation and low expectations on the part of white officials, most of these players became disillusioned and some gave up the game altogether. Ashok Odhav, a former NCB executive member, complained that 'a white player is given countless chances because of his "tremendous potential"; if a black player fails once he is dumped' (*Post* 7 January 1998).

During the mid-1990s KwaZulu-Natal had a powerful team and 'development' took a distant back seat. Winning was prioritised; there was little will to redress historical imbalances. In 1997/98, the UCBSA introduced quotas, which made it mandatory for provincial B teams to include at least three black players. Graham Ford was concerned about the 'feelings' of white players who might have to be excluded to meet quota requirements. He asked black selector Krish Reddy how he was expected to explain this to whites (Krish Reddy interview). The indifferent response of whites was reflected on the playing fields. On 16 January 1998 young fast bowler Desigan Reddy represented a Natal Academy XI against Gauteng but was not asked to bowl a single ball, while part-time white bowlers were given preference (*Daily News* 22 January 1998). Disdainful treatment became a regular experience for black players.

The anger of blacks was fuelled by a number of other 'race' incidents. Pat Symcox was accused of being abusive towards South African Indian spectators during a match against Pakistan in Durban in February 1998. A disciplinary committee found that he had used abusive but not racist

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language. During the same match, trainer Paddy Upton was fined £250 and fast bowler De Villiers was warned for getting into a confrontation with South African Indian spectators (*Electronic Telegraph* 14 March 1998). South African Indians particularly despised Allan Donald because he swore at Rahul Dravid of India during a match at Kingsmead in January 1997 (*Daily News* 28 January 1998). Abbey Naidoo felt that white cricketers were deliberately aggressive 'to teach dark-skinned cricketers who is boss' (*Tribune* 14 February 1999). According to a UCBSA report, the anti-South African sentiment among South African Indians in Durban was 'even worse' than that experienced in Australia, South Africa's traditional rival. White players were made to run 'the gauntlet of hostile and often acrimonious racial abuse and the worst kind of foul language imaginable' (*Cricinfo* 13 March 1998).

Another row broke out in February 1999 when Brian McMillan asked a teammate to bowl a 'coolie creeper' to an Indian player, Ashraf Mall, during a domestic match between Western Province and KwaZulu-Natal. McMillan's reaction to protest against his comments was that he had used a 'cricketing term' and the fuss was a 'load of crap' (*Natal Witness* 6 March 1999). The white editor of a local newspaper felt that 'we must be careful not to fall into the trap of conducting a purge of terminology that is termed politically incorrect' (*Sunday Tribune* 7 March 1999). However, for Indian South Africans, as for all Indians, 'coolie creeper' was not a cricketing term. It was freely used by white schoolboys who understood its derogatory connotations. A letter to the editor signed 'Cricket Lover' noted that 'creeper' signified using a sneaky way to get a stubborn batsman out: 'Sneaky like conniving, manipulating, shrewd and cunning Indians. These are the very images that Whites created of Indians in Natal' (*Daily News* 10 March 1999). According to Valentine Daniel, while 'coolie' referred to a servant in India, in the imperial context the word had acquired a different connotation. 'Coolie' is a mixture of Gujarati and Tamil terms and has to do with a denial of personhood and suggestions of someone devoid of morals (Daniel & Breman 1992). Whites and Indians in colonial Natal understood this very well. For example, in 1899 'White Man' wrote to the *Natal Mercury* that while 'coolie' literally meant a

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servant, in Natal the 'word "coolie" can only be used in speaking of Indians. Neither work nor anything else under the sun can make a white man a "coolie"' (*Natal Mercury* 26 August 1899).

As the experience of Hashim Amla shows, these lessons have still not been learnt. Amla carries the 'double burden' of being of Asian descent and a Muslim as well. The devoutly religious Amla wears a long beard, and carries all the negative connotations of that in the post 9/11 era. In August 2006, former Australian test cricketer and television commentator Dean Jones was heard to say on a live television broadcast that 'the terrorist has got another wicket' when Amla caught Sri Lankan batsman Kumar Sangakkara on the fourth day of the second test in Colombo. In South Africa, the words 'Thank goodness Amla didn't face a coolie kreeper' were displayed on a board belonging to electronic goods manufacturer Toshiba near the Hans Strydom offramp on the N1 highway in Johannesburg. The financial director of Copy Type Electronics, Graham Lane, a distributor for Toshiba, issued an apology to Amla but his insensitivity showed how little things had changed.[4] Amla shrugged off the incidents but made it clear how he viewed the question of identity:

> People may see you as an Indian, or a Muslim, or whatever the case is, but I don't put that in my mind. When I play for Natal, I'm a Natal guy. And when I play for South Africa, I'll always be a South African. You want to do the country proud. If people want to see me as an Indian or a Muslim, that's up to them. But I'm a South African trying to win a game for South Africa. You have a duty to try your hardest and to conduct yourself as well as you can. But I guess I do stick out.[5]

The 'development' programme

The 'white' cricket 'development programme' could not be launched in Indian, coloured or African townships with a cricket tradition during the 1980s because anti-apartheid organisations made it impossible for white cricket to make inroads (*Post* 29 March 1995). After unity, critics felt that development

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was not taken seriously. An anonymous letter-writer, 'Let Justice Prevail', complained in 1992 that past officials of the NCB had conveniently forgotten the past struggle 'among people of colour':

> All that matters to these people who have moved from 'shorts and sandals to three piece suits' appears to be personal gain, popularity, status, being seen with prominent white figures and cheap publicity... It is only on 'special days' that the UCB organises busloads of aspiring black mini-cricket players in free t-shirts and displays them in front of TV cameras. (*Daily News* 3 October 1992)

A related problem was the thrust of programmes. Mohammed Timol, who attended a KZNCU meeting chaired by Don MacLeod in 1992, complained that 'the belief that underpinned this strategy was that blacks had to be introduced to the game. There was disregard for the fact that they had a long cricket history and needed facilities and opportunities' (Timol interview). A report in *Post*, an Indian ethnic newspaper, suggested that the problem with the development programme was that it was launched in African townships that lacked a culture of cricket, like Soweto and Alexandra, because cricket was a key component of the apartheid regime's programme of upgrading African townships. Anti-apartheid sports organisations made it impossible for whites to make inroads in Indian, coloured or African townships with a cricket tradition (*Post* 29 March 1995).

In the post-apartheid period as well, the strategic option of 'development' going to areas left out of cricket historically was, in the view of some, holding back cricketers who had a long history in the game. Mustapha Khan, one of Natal's best black cricketers and a national selector, has touted this view:

> The biggest farce in South African cricket was Ali Bacher. He misled the public and politicians by coining the words transformation and development. Since 1990, at every Test match and during every tour when teams visit, the media publicise transformation and development. I recall that the main focus was on Alexandra. Ali Bacher was always on hand to hand out bats and T-shirts to bluff the world. As a cricketer,

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what I cannot understand is what happened to the millions spent on this so-called development. It is now 2006, almost 20 years since these terms were first coined, and we are still struggling to find black players who can automatically walk into the team, players that are ready to compete on the international stage. This is due to the lie of transformation. There were two sides to the coin of transformation. At the same time that Ali Bacher focused on black townships where cricket had either never existed or all but disappeared in the apartheid years, he also allowed the game to degenerate in Indian and coloured townships where cricket had been played for decades. These townships had produced players of the highest calibre for decades. The game had gone into decline from the late 1970s because of defections and the false promises of white administrators and cricketers. Surely, if Ali Bacher was serious about transformation he would have targeted these areas and regenerated the game. But no, his main aim was to find African 'trophies' to showcase on the international stage. And, more important, he wanted to curry favour with the new political masters. No one could point a finger at him if he was seen in townships. This would mean that his heart was in the right place. Be realistic. In 1990, the main game among Africans was football. There was some cricket in the Eastern Cape, but no embedded culture. Was it realistic to expect the programme to unearth world-class cricketers? So why were so many millions spent in vain? We have planted the seed but it will be a long time before it bears the fruit we are looking for. Ali Bacher succeeded in destroying cricket in former Indian and coloured townships in the process. He could have spent far less and obtained much better returns by focusing on these townships. So the question that needs to be asked is 'Who lied to whom?' Today, we cannot find a single Indian or coloured player in Gauteng who is spoken of in national terms. These areas produced great cricketers in the past. Have they suddenly lost it? (Khan interview)

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Khan's statements reveal his own limited understanding of transformation. There was a general sentiment of broadening the ambit of the game in South Africa post-apartheid, and the international tours had increased general interest in the game. So this move cannot simply be laid at Bacher's door. Also, to claim that 'Ali Bacher succeeded in destroying cricket in former Indian and coloured townships' is an argument difficult to fathom. What apartheid could not destroy, Bacher was able to eliminate in a few years? The truth is that the standard of 'SACOS' cricket had been in decline for a myriad reasons. However, what is salient for this chapter is the racialised discourse in Khan's comments. His is not a limited opinion, but a widespread sentiment that the cost of broadening the game's reach into African areas was not met by sacrificing 'white cricket' but at the expense of Indian and coloured cricketers.

As we will see later in the chapter, this was to play itself out in particular ways in KwaZulu-Natal.

Neglect of schools cricket

For several years after unity, African, Indian, coloured and white schools played cricket separately. Black youngsters handicapped by inadequate facilities and poverty could not compete against white players from affluent backgrounds, with access to the finest education and coaching. There was no conduit for talented black players to progress. The director of playing affairs only attended white schools cricket weeks, while the identification of black players was done on an ad hoc basis (Naidoo 1993: 224). The progress of black schoolboys was left to interested parents. One such initiative was led by Mohammed Timol. In 1990 Timol approached Andrew Layman, the chairman of Natal Schools Cricket, to field an under-16 team in the Offord Week in 1993, a tournament that brought together top cricketing schools in the province. Timol's composite side, known as Clubs XI, had a traumatic time. Timol complained to Layman on 10 December 1993 that players of Kearsney College had directed racist comments at his players. For example, when Clubs players cheered a team member, a Kearsney fielder had shouted: 'Shut up you coolies'.

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Against Ixopo a spectator had shouted, 'Bowl daardie Coolie a Creeper'. Against unbeaten Maritzburg College, when last man Pranesh Naidoo was bowled for 13, he was told by Cowley to 'get off you fucking Coolie'.

Timol complained of the treatment of black players in a confidential report to the KZNCU dated 23 January 1995. He claimed that when selected for representative teams, black players were not given an opportunity to bat or bowl. Black and white officials interpreted affirmative action differently. Timol referred to clause 5 of the Affirmative Action Charter which stated that 'the process of affirming the disadvantaged player must occur by ensuring that his role is no less significant than any others in the team'.[6] Timol met with Mike Bechet, the manager of the schools team, on 14 February 1995 to resolve this issue. A disappointed Timol reported to the KZNCU on 20 February 1995 that the meeting had been futile because Bechet was adamant that 'the success of the team is the most important factor'. He did not understand 'affirmative action to mean the boys of colour had to be preferred over white boys'. White players and administrators refused to acknowledge historical discrepancies and provide opportunities to black players.

'Unity' and its discontents: COGOC and NAMIC

By the mid-1990s many blacks began to express their disquiet about the absence of black players in the KwaZulu-Natal team. Some exchanges were acrimonious. Black administrators were branded 'sell-outs' by critics. S.K. Reddy remembers being constantly badgered: 'It didn't matter where you were. Somebody would come up to you and ask how come there were no Indians in the team' (S.K. Reddy interview). Criticisms from old stalwarts of the NCB began to gain momentum. Ronnie Govender, a former non-racial sports official, condemned black officials as 'former fighters against racialism who...now that they are ensconced in cushy careers, have abandoned the struggle. It is time they realised their public responsibility and woke up' (*Daily News* 13 May 1998). Cassim Docrat defended black administrators.

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He pointed out that they had to take a pragmatic view in the early 1990s because non-racial cricket started from a 'thin base with regard to facilities and opportunities'. Unity in cricket, according to Docrat, should be viewed as part of the broader negotiation process. Like the ANC, they adopted a conciliatory approach in order 'to serve and consolidate' non-racial cricketers, but faltered in not pursuing this task with a 'missionary zeal' (Docrat interview).

Black supporters became convinced that white cricket structures would not provide opportunities for black players. But black anger at marginalisation lacked an organisational driving force. The first signs of organised opposition came from a group of ex-NCB players and administrators who formed a pressure group in December 1996 called 'Concerned Group of Cricketers' (COGOC). Leading members were Karam Hiraman (president), Ash Biseswar (vice-president) and Nelson Raju (secretary). According to Raju, by 1996 former NCB officials and players had become:

> ...thoroughly disgusted at the slow pace of transformation. We had the distinct impression that they had been coopted. They were projecting the façade of transformation taking place...We were not only interested in the few administrative positions and players. We were frustrated with the whole thing, who was selling the peanuts, ice-cream, cricket caps. Whites were running the show with a few cosmetic changes. (Raju interview)

COGOC, Hiraman explained, wanted to protest against the lack of transformation, transparency and stakeholder involvement in cricket. They were concerned that the NCB had been incorporated into the dominant white organisation. The 'NCB system' had ceased to exist while the white system was there with a few 'comfortably ensconced' Indians at the top, who were incapacitated by the fact that they had lost contact with former colleagues and clubs, and were helpless to bargain within the white-dominated organ (Hiraman interview). COGOC's strategy included criticising former NCB officials in articles to the press, holding meetings, canvassing among clubs and writing to the government (Biseswar interview).

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By April 1997 COGOC had branches in Ladysmith, Pietermaritzburg, Stanger, Tongaat, Verulam, Phoenix, Sydenham, Chatsworth and Isipingo. At a meeting at Springfield Training College on 23 March 1997 'to formalise the concerns and grouses of a growing constituency', COGOC members rejected 'meritocracy' in a context of 'massive inequalities in resources, opportunity, education and leisure time' and called for 'a mass infusion of new blood into cricket's top structures instead of the gradual entryism propagated by the leadership of the UCB', and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to make those who had 'propped up racist cricket...account for their actions'.[7]

While COGOC's letters to the UCB and Minister of Sport and Recreation Steve Tshwete on 25 May 1997 were ignored, the KZNCU was forced to the negotiating table. At a meeting on 13 May 1997, COGOC argued that cricket had failed to assist in the creation of democracy and was in fact detrimental to nation-building. KZNCU president S.K. Reddy, however, said that black officials did not need the mandate of the 'community'. He argued that since the NCA and NCB had merged into the KZNCU, leaders could not be accountable to a body (the NCB) that did not exist.[8] The KZNCU did not fulfil its promise of a follow-up meeting.

By December 1997 the numbers of the disillusioned had grown. A group of younger cricketers, organised by Sadha Govender and Sathie Govender, met with COGOC in Chatsworth on 15 January 1998. These 'Young Turks' felt that COGOC was 'too academic' and that its strategy of letter-writing and petitions would not produce meaningful changes. Together with COGOC they formed the Non-Aligned Movement in Cricket (NAMIC), which called for active protest such as holding placard demonstrations at matches and organising boycotts. The aim was to galvanise the support of black clubs to unseat the white power structure. A carefully planned public protest during a one-day international between Pakistan and South Africa at Kingsmead on 3 April 1998 gave publicity to the cause. About 100 members entered the ground and, as pre-arranged, met below the new multi-million rand electronic scoreboard, the most conspicuous point in the ground. They held placards denouncing the national team as unrepresentative. It was a brave act in a hugely hostile environment, and added to existing pressure on the UCBSA (Tewari interview).

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'Quo vadis?' Vision seminars and the Transformation Charter

Protest over transformation and representivity dominated the national cricket scene from around 1997/98. Black protest eventually forced white elements to concede that urgent change was needed to embrace blacks. In response to the growing crisis the UCBSA convened a 'Vision Seminar' in July 1997 (*Daily News* 15 May 1997). Hiraman, the chairman of COGOC, considered it 'preposterous' that the UCBSA, which had failed to deliver benefit to the majority population, should audit its own performance while COGOC, as a watchdog organisation, was not invited (*Daily News* 27 May 1997). Hiraman's call was ignored. Delegates failed to reach consensus on whether 'Africanisation' included Indians and coloureds (UCBSA 1997a). Another meeting on 12 August 1997 focused specifically on 'Africanisation'. The category 'black' was defined as referring to Africans, Indians and coloureds. The absence of Africans was singled out as a problem that needed to be addressed urgently, and separate racial targets were set for Africans (UCBSA 1997b). 'Transformation Vision Seminars' were held throughout the country during 1998 to analyse the shortcomings of unity, and commit provinces to addressing imbalances. KZNCU's Stakeholder Conference on 10–11 May 1998, attended by COGOC/NAMIC members, turned out to be an important process of 'bloodletting'. Ahmed Kharwa, patron of the KZNCU, offered a powerful critique of transformation which summed up the perspectives of the COGOC/NAMIC grouping:

> I cannot, try as I may, find it in me to support the present South African team. Many of those associated with the present team, players, coaches, and administrators alike, supported apartheid. It is unprincipled for South Africa to field a 'National' team which is really the fruits of an evil ideology. Winning is not all. International glory can wait for a while longer, until the evil of the past has been wiped off the slate...What is development? It is no more than a new catchphrase. It is represented by several million rands, press releases, corporate blazers taking care to use key phrases like 'grass roots' which caress the Black conscience. Millions of rands are handed over

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> as 'silence money' to placate once non-establishment officials. Former SACB officials need to be reminded that their posture thus far 'I am all right, bugger you, Jack' is abhorrent...[9]

As part of the 'healing process' delegates wrote down things they were 'sorry' about. Their narratives sum up the major issues facing cricket – the disillusionment among blacks that cricket remained under white control; racism; lack of Africanisation; the psychological difficulty experienced by blacks in identifying with such bastions of apartheid as the old cricket stadiums; inadequate development facilities; resistance to affirmative action; and issues around the selection of teams (KZNCU 1998: 12–17). A Steering Committee of 16 was formed 'to bring about change in cricket, create a cricket environment for the entire cricket community, promote all aspects of the game and to make it accessible and identifiable to all peoples in KZN' (Steering Committee Minutes 19 May 1998). Even while provincial seminars were being held, cricket lurched from crisis to crisis nationally, mainly around the absence of black players. This led, as we have seen in the previous chapter, to the adoption of a Transformation Charter in January 1999, and establishment of a (national) Transformation Monitoring Committee (TMC) and Provincial Monitoring Committees (PMCS) to monitor transformation at provincial level. The onus was on provincial CEOS to 'embrace and self-consciously drive the process from the top' (TMC 1999a). Quotas were also set from school to provincial levels for players, administrators, journalists,[10] scorers, groundsmen, umpires and coaches with the objective of achieving equal representivity by 2003. There were specific targets for Africans within the category 'black' (UCBSA 1999).

'Power shifts' in KwaZulu-Natal cricket

Protesting groups in KwaZulu-Natal were determined to seize power. In 1999 Robbie Kurz, the president of the DDCU, agreed to make the constitution more democratic. Premier League clubs, who were all white, had the most votes and could determine the president. This was changed to give an equal

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vote to every team affiliated to the DDCU, the major affiliate of the KZNCU. The effect of this was that black teams had 76 votes and white teams 60. NAMIC organised effectively. Meetings were held with black (mainly Indian) teams imploring them to attend the DDCU AGM. On election night, 26 May 1998, seven executive positions were contested. Representatives of black clubs turned up en masse and seven black candidates were elected to the DDCU executive. With voting strictly along racial lines, the incumbent white office-bearers were unseated. KwaZulu-Natal cricket was revolutionised. First Logan Naidoo and subsequently Sathie Govender were elected successively as presidents of DDCU. Black representation increased at all levels. The 36 councillors of DDCU in 2001/02, for example, comprised 21 Indians, 3 Africans and 12 whites. Logan Naidoo explained the difficulties faced by black administrators:

> Some [white] administrators were wary of how new administrators would cope and, instead of supporting them, appeared to [be] waiting for them to make mistakes. There was a misconception that blacks only knew about politics and whites all about administration. Much to the dismay of many, we exploded that myth...The media hounds progressive black administrators while supporting white administrators whose commitment to transformation was questionable. (*Tribune Herald* 4 June 2000)

Changes in KwaZulu-Natal mirrored those at national level, where black administrators like Gerald Majola, Percy Sonn and Rushdie Majiet were coming to the fore.

Making gains – but for whom?

The ascension to power by what journalist Patrick Compton called 'Indian radicals' (*Daily News* 31 May 2000) created (once again) the opportunity for changes. But, as we shall see, while some problems were addressed, change also brought to the fore fissures along new fault lines.

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The emergence of black administrators created opportunities for black players. The realisation by 1997 that development had failed to produce quality black players resulted in a change of strategy. Black players were now placed in traditionally white schools 'with a culture of cricket and a track record of developing high-quality cricketers', in a programme funded by large corporations like Anglo American and De Beers (UCBSA 1997a). This remains the policy. According to Maxwell Jordaan, director of amateur cricket at the UCBSA, 'talented school cricketers from all walks of life are identified and given bursaries to traditional cricketing schools where they can build a relevant platform to progress into senior cricket. These schools, in turn, are provided with grants to maintain coaching and facilities standards.'[11]

Black players from these elite schools, with access to privileged education, facilities and coaching, are selected to meet 'race' quotas, and exhibited as proof of the successful indigenisation of cricket. Development is more concerned with the production of 'role models' to appease politicians than with building community structures. For example, Hashim Amla of Tongaat attended Durban High School, which produced the legendary Barry Richards, while Lucky Dladla was placed at Maritzburg College. Despite public pronouncements of its objective to establish a 'people's game', this policy has entrenched elitism, as we argued in the previous chapter. According to Enver Mall, a former national selector and ex-CEO of KZNCU, this was unavoidable:

> Throughout the world your best cricketers come from private cricketing schools, whether it is in England, West Indies, India, or even Pakistan. Existing cricketing schools in South Africa have the infrastructure (coaches, grounds, equipment, tradition), and for the moment, given our various other needs, we are exploiting this situation for our advantage. We hope that in time we can establish similar schools in townships but that is some time off...The use of elite cricketing schools is the only practical option for the moment. (Mall interview)

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This policy has paid off in a few instances. Hashim Amla became the first player of Indian descent to play for South Africa when he made his debut against India in November 2004. Amla, the son of a medical doctor from Tongaat on the North Coast of KwaZulu-Natal, captained the KwaZulu-Natal team in virtually every age group as well as the South African under-19 team at the World Cup in 2004. He attended Durban High School, where he set many records. After a tentative start, Amla is now a permanent fixture in the test team. Imraan Khan became the second player of Indian descent to represent South Africa in test cricket when he was chosen in the third test against Australia in March 2009. Khan, the son of businessman A.K. Khan who has been president of KZNCU since 2008, began his schooling at Orient School. A profile of Khan following his selection stated that he was:

> ...schooled in his formative years at Orient Islamia, but it was his move to DHS [Durban High School] in his teenage years that cultivated his primary talent into a tangible schoolboy cricketing genius. Both Amla and Khan attended South Africa's premier cricketing institution, where the likes of Barry Richards, Richard Snell and Lance Klusener went to school. It was not long before DHS flaunted its non-white, blue-eyed boys and the future of South African cricket in cricketing circles. So talented were these two boys, even the dreaded T-word – transformation – didn't seem such a daunting prospect after all.[12]

Khan made his debut for the Dolphins in 2003/04, with a reputation as an off-spinner who could bat. His bowling gradually fell away while his batting lacked consistency, as he averaged in the mid-30s. This changed in the 2008/09 season when he scored over 800 runs, including five centuries, at an average of 60, which earned him his national call-up.[13]

A third player of Indian descent, Yusuf Abdulla, was chosen to represent South Africa in the shortest version of the game, Twenty20, against Australia in 2009 and claimed the wicket of Australian captain Ricky Ponting. He subsequently secured a contract with Punjab in the

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lucrative Indian Premier League (IPL) which was held in South Africa during April and May 2009, and he was included in South Africa's squad for the Twenty20 World Cup in England in June 2009. Abdulla grew up in the coal mining town of Dundee, where there were no elite cricketing schools. Once his potential was spotted, his path to the provincial team was via the other route offered by the programme aimed at churning out cricketers of international standard, the academy. He was included in the provincial academy and in 2007 was one of 20 amateur players to attend the national academy based at the high-performance centre in Pretoria.[14] The emergence of players like Abdulla raises the question of how much this is due to the 'development programme' and how much just to being given an opportunity. Peter Roebuck makes a thought-provoking point in this regard:

> For all the turbulences of the period, with its desperation to find brown-skinned players worthy of advancement, Amla's rise was orthodox even as his background was distinctive. Born into an affluent family whose roots lay in the state of Gujarat, he was reared in a middle-class home and sent to a highly regarded cricketing and academic school, Durban HS, previously the alma mater of Lance Klusener and Barry Richards. His parents are doctors and Ahmed, his older brother, is a fine batsman in his own right, albeit one held back for a time by the hotness that often affects youth...In short, the Amlas are intelligent, professional, serious but not solemn, and keen on cricket. Evidently the parents are also enlightened because they did not discourage their younger boy from trying his luck in cricket. Previous generations of Indian parents might have pointed him towards a 'proper' profession.[15]

While Mustapha Khan's argument cited earlier in this chapter about the neglect of cricket in the Indian areas might have some veracity, it would appear that as 'white' schooling opened up, Indians with private resources were able to send their children to these schools. Almost 20 years since 'unity', one can see the likes of Amla and Imraan Khan coming through.

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However, none of the schools in the huge townships of Chatsworth and Phoenix have seen their facilities upgraded. In fact many do not play organised cricket any longer. Jayson Sathiaseelan has pointed out that cricket has surpassed soccer as the most popular sport among school children in Chatsworth, with 40 schools fielding teams. However, he added, while 'former white schools have three to four cricket fields, not one school in the whole of Chatsworth, which has a population of a quarter of a million people, has a proper cricket field. We have to use the municipal grounds. And when we identify good players we get bursaries for them to attend Glenwood or DHS [Durban High School]. This is good for the kids and for those schools whose standard of cricket keeps improving. But our cricket remains stagnant. We need the facilities here' (Sathiaseelan interview). The situation is even more dire in the African townships. Cricket is played in 18 townships across KwaZulu-Natal; however, there is one cricket field in Kwa Mashu and two in Umlazi but not a single cricketing school (Zondi interview). Under these circumstances it is virtually impossible for the game to take root in townships which are still predominantly African, and for provincial- and international-standard cricketers to be produced on a consistent basis.

So here we have the two sides of change. On the one hand Indian youngsters are emerging in the upper echelons of the game, while on the other, within the community at large the base of the game is narrowing.

Promoting black clubs

A more encouraging move by the newly elected officials was to provide opportunities to black teams to participate in higher domestic leagues. This met a deep need in black communities. Sundra Reddy of Chatsworth United, imploring the KZNCU to include his team in the Premier League, explained:

> We will not be absorbed into historically-white clubs and neither will we tolerate the cradle-snatching of our talented players. We believe in transformation. The heritage and principled struggle of all those people of Chatsworth must be revered by way of respect for the efforts put in by people to develop a club such as Chatsworth...We have walked a long

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> road – we have developed our people, our players, our sponsors and are of the belief that our players can represent this country without having to play second fiddle. (*Daily News* 31 March 1999)

Shortly after the 'Black Cabinet' assumed power in 1999, township clubs like African Warriors, Chatsworth United, Phoenix and Delta were promoted to the Premier League. While Warriors and Phoenix struggled, Chatsworth United and Sparksport Delta made steady progress. While their success is noteworthy, club cricket is generally in danger in the former black townships. To break down race barriers, Logan Naidoo mooted a policy in 2000 requiring white league clubs to field at least two black players, with financial incentives provided from 2002/03. While well-meaning, this policy was a double-edged sword. Black clubs like Chatsworth United expressed disquiet at losing their best players and thus completely destroying fledgling programmes in townships. In 2008, the KZNCU appointed Linda Zondi as township manager. Aside from promoting cricket in the townships, he was specifically mandated to see to the affairs of African Warriors. The union also provides administrative support and an extra grant to the club. Loots Bosman, who joined the Dolphins in 2009/10, will play for African Warriors in an attempt to boost cricket in African townships. But problems remain. For example, Jayson Sathiaseelan, of the Premier League team Chatsworth Sporting, pointed out that they do not have a turf wicket in Chatsworth. The players train and play on astro wickets and are at a huge disadvantage in away matches. Consistent efforts in the past six years to procure funding for a turf wicket have ended in failure (Sathiaseelan interview).

Quotas versus merit

Debate over 'affirmative action' has been a source of great tension. Crises over national selection, often involving government intervention, resulted in the UCBSA introducing quotas at provincial level. Many blacks feel that white insistence on 'merit' is ahistorical because meritocracy overlooks the legacy of inequality fashioned by apartheid. Physics professor Ramesh

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Bharuthram felt that whites were using 'merit' and 'time' to stall transformation, and that cricket had become 'a "white boys" club', under the guise of 'merit' selection' (*Daily News* 14 January 1999). The white-dominated media portrayed attempts to redress imbalances as 'racist'. Lynette Steenveld from the Department of Media Studies at Rhodes University found that cricket stories were 'ideologically loaded'. Steenveld added that there was a general failure to recognise race as a phenomenon playing a role in cricket, an assumption that sports and politics were separate spheres, that issues in cricket did not have a political dimension and that language was 'loaded' to denigrate transformation (TMC 1999b). Patrick Compton, a weekly contributor to the *Daily News*, wrote with regard to quotas, 'It's tough being an Umlungu [white]':

> No cricketer likes to think he is in the team because of the colour of his skin. Transformation should be about processes and structures being just. The big T should not simply be about numbers. You don't need to be over-endowed in the brains department to realize that it is becoming increasingly tough to be a white cricketer in South Africa today...It is why an increasing number of local schoolboys have been lost to this province in recent years. (*Daily News* 1 February 2001)

Transformation has created some apprehension among whites. Since 1999 many white players with British or European passports have emigrated to England. KwaZulu-Natal lost Maritzburg College product Kevin Pietersen. Former national player and selector Clive Rice said that Pietersen had moved:

> ...[to] enable him to escape the quota system and non-merit selections...I first saw Kevin in the 1997 schools' week in Grahamstown and he missed out on South African Schools selection then due to the quota system. And that is something that will continue to push him sideways in South Africa, whereas in England merit selection is entrenched in the game. It's his best chance of playing Test cricket. (*Cricinfo* 3 October 2000)

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Pietersen, as seen in the previous chapter, has had an excellent international career. Quotas, on the other hand, have facilitated the emergence of players like Gulam Bodi, Rivash Gobind, Imraan Khan, Lucky Dladla, Hashim Amla and Ahmed Amla who, history suggests, might have been discarded prematurely if the selectors had not been forced to provide opportunities to black players. Conversely, it can be argued that the careers of some of the black players have not advanced at all, even though they have been playing for years. They can afford to under-perform because they know that they will remain in the team because of their colour.

'Too many Indians are chiefs'

While 'black' players have been coming through, racial tension in post-apartheid sport cannot simply be read as a matter of black and white. New and complicated 'patterns of prejudice' have surfaced. The meaning of 'black' is now contested, and struggles have emerged between Africans, Indians and coloureds over power and opportunity. The nomenclature 'black African' in the Transformation Charter is a source of concern to many Indians and coloureds as it excludes them. The UCBSA, for example, promised extra funding to provinces contracting 'black Africans', notwithstanding the fact that the South African Constitution regards Indians and coloureds as black (TMC 2000). An analysis of KwaZulu-Natal cricket in 2000/01 illustrated why the definition of 'black African' is important. 'Black' has largely become synonymous with Indian. In 2006 the only black honorary life vice-president, the seven black patrons, the CEO, president, treasurer, seven of fifteen members (seven of eight blacks) of the executive committee, the manager of amateur cricket, stadium manager, president of the largest sub-union the DDCU, chairperson of the PMC, and five of seven black contracted players, were Indian. This composition has persisted into the present. The absence of majority African representation is obfuscated by the homogenising category 'black'. As a result of a conscious effort to increase African representation, in the 2004/05 season two African teachers, Temba

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Mamela and Slovo Mabaso, with little or no cricket background, were coopted onto the executive. According to Cassim Docrat these members made little headway in the executive when they raised problems that faced African cricket development (Docrat interview). A third member, Ernest Molotsi, an engineer who had served on the executive previously, was added in 2005/06. Mamela and Mabaso subsequently resigned, and were replaced by Israel Ngengwane, S. Mbongwa and Jabu Mhlanga. Ernest Molotsi is the present vice-president of the KZNCU. The fact that African officials were always 'coopted' led to insinuations that they were political nominees who did not deserve their positions. However, the recent trend is for a more substantial African presence in decision-making positions, which is creating the conditions for promoting African cricket in the future.

Awareness of the non-involvement of Africans in the KZNCU was heightened following the stirrings of anti-Indianism in the province, highlighted by a CD released in May 2002 by the musician Mbongeni Ngema. The track *AmaNdiya* touches on the sensitive relationship between Africans and Indians, and contains such lyrics as 'We need strong and brave men to confront Indians'; 'Indians do not want to change'; 'Even Mandela has failed to make them change'; 'Whites were better than Indians'; 'Indians have conquered Durban'; 'We are poor because all things have been taken by Indians'. In an article entitled 'Too many Indians are also chiefs', political analyst Dumisani Hlope commented that 'the sentiments the song expresses about Indians are widely shared by the African masses...The quest for "Indian votes" should not come at the expense of disregarding the ugly historical processes that favoured Indians above Africans' (*City Press* 2 June 2002).

How did such sentiments play out in the local cricket arena? Fast bowler Mfuneko Ngam, who joined the KwaZulu-Natal Dolphins during the 2004/05 season, returned to the Eastern Cape after just one year. He told *Drum* magazine that the future of African players in KwaZulu-Natal was 'bleak. I've played there and what I've witnessed was depressing. African players are third-class citizens in the province' (*Drum* April 2005). He felt that the UCBSA should intervene because little was being done to develop African players who did

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not have 'mentors and proper guidance'. CEO Cassim Docrat had a different perspective on Ngam. He felt that the province took a player 'practically going nowhere' and helped him turn his career around. In his view the failure to increase African involvement was due to a combination of factors, including the fact that many Indians and whites were superficial about transformation, only paying lip service to the project, and the lack of adequate facilities and structures in townships (Docrat interview). Whatever the case, it is an indictment of the KZNCU that of 20 teams in the Premier League only one, African Warriors, caters largely for African players. Plans to introduce quotas at club level were put on hold for two reasons; firstly, there was a concern that the exodus of the best black players to white teams would be counter-productive, and secondly, club cricket is seen as a social activity by the UCBSA and it was deemed unfair to force integration at this level (Naidoo interview). However, since 2008/09 the KZNCU has mandated that all clubs must field at least one 'black African' player for 50 per cent of their games or risk being fined. This includes the mainly Indian teams in Chatsworth. Saidi Mhlongo, who had progressed through the KZNCU 'development programme', made his provincial debut against the much vaunted Cape Cobras in February 2006. He was the star bowler in his team's 6-wicket win, taking 7 wickets for 85 runs. However, he has since remained a bit player, being in and out of the team without really making an impact. For the 2009/10 season KZNCU contracted Loots Bosman, an African player from Diamond Eagles. There are promising signs of potential being shown by three young players, Zondi, Mgenge and Shezi. Time will tell whether they will become regulars in the provincial team or fall by the wayside, like many African players in the past decade.

Many 'promising' African players who failed to make it into the provincial team have been employed as coaches. Lucky Dladla, the first KwaZulu-Natal-born African player to make his mark when he burst onto the scene in 2002, was released from his contract at the end of the 2004/05 season. He now coaches at Chelsea Prep and has a bursary to study for a teaching degree. Others have suffered a similar fate. Linda Zondi, who played in the South African under-19 team in the late 1990s as wicketkeeper, was

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coach of Glenwood High and a provincial selector. He was subsequently appointed township manager and is responsible for the African Warriors team. Simon Sakhele and Anderson Ndlovu, promising players at one stage or another, are employed by the union. Sakhele is a coach/coordinator of the academy; Ndlovu is the administration manager of the academy. Sakhele was sent to India during 2005 to attend a coaching clinic for spinners in order to hone his coaching skills. The fact that these 'failed' cricketers were put into pivotal positions is an indication of how valuable a commodity the African cricketer is. From the point of view of the union, utilising African coaches is very sensible. They have invested large sums of money and time in these players, who understand the system very well and are well placed to take the game to African youth in the townships. Time will tell whether this policy pays dividends. One positive development was that in February 2006 the union executive formed an African Forum with Themba Memela as chairperson. Ernest Molotsi, a procurement officer with South African Petroleum Refineries, replaced Memela as chairperson in late 2008. This committee was mandated to provide guidance on issues pertaining to the development of African cricket in the rural and township areas, and to work closely with the Transformation Committee to increase African representation.[16]

A Muslim 'cabal'?

As if to further complicate matters, insinuations of Muslim dominance began to do the rounds. The *Sunday Tribune Herald* of 22 February 2009 carried front-page headlines insinuating that a Muslim cabal was forcing non-Muslim Indian players out of the province. This followed the decision of paceman Ugashen Govender to sign a contract with Gauteng. In 2008 Jonathan Vandiar, who represented the South African under-19 team at the World Cup in 2008 and was touted as the province's best batsman since Hashim Amla, also signed for Gauteng. Anonymous sources told reporters that the control of key positions by Muslims was creating uneasiness among non-Muslims. The CEO Cassim Docrat, president A. Khan, captain Ahmed Amla, and coach

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Yashin Ebrahim are all Muslim. Regular Indian players in the team, like Yusuf Abdulla, Imraan Khan, Ahmed Amla and Hashim Amla, are all Muslim.

Scarcely mentioned in any of these accounts is the fact that Muslim players like Gulam Bodi have also left the province, as well as the fact that we live in an age of greater mobility for players.

But one cannot discount the reality that there are tensions created by what is seen as Muslim dominance, read in the context that the majority of Indians in the region are Hindus. These tensions are not new. During the 1990s there were suggestions that North Indians had taken over black representation;[17] thereafter there were complaints from 'coloured' officials like Faeez Jaffar that the focus was entirely on Africans and Indians and that the needs of coloured schoolboys were disregarded; and more recently there were 'whispers' of 'South Indian' dominance made by 'North Indians' (see Desai et al. 2002: 430–441).

What this story shows is that there are many shades of black, and it will be interesting to see how this dynamic plays itself out in the changing political and sporting environment.

'Corporate misgovernance?'

Issues of corporate governance and concerns about financial mismanagement have swirled around the workings of KZNCU. Since 2003 the union has spent over R300 000 in three separate investigations into its management and financial affairs. In the context of apparently strained relations between the president Logan Naidoo and CEO Cassim Docrat, a Re-structuring Committee was appointed in mid-2002 to examine the state of KwaZulu-Natal cricket. It was known in cricket circles as the 'Govender Commission' because it was chaired by Sada Govender, with Sathie Govender and Ravi Govender making up the three-man team. Part of its findings were that the CEO had a limited knowledge of financial management, 'lacked decisiveness and conflict resolution skills', and 'ducks from controversial decisions'.[18] The recommendation was that Docrat's

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removal should be negotiated. However, it has been suggested that Sathie Govender did an about turn, distanced himself from the package offered to the CEO and advised Docrat not to accept the package (Docrat interview), all this in the context of renewed tensions around the time of the elections to the KZNCU executive. As it turned out, Logan Naidoo stood down and Sathie Govender became president of the KZNCU at the elections held in June 2003. Cassim Docrat remained its CEO.

The KZNCU appointed a commission of enquiry on 24 June 2003, headed by former soccer boss and religious leader Ashwin Trikamjee, to investigate the role of NAMIC and its members in the KZNCU, and also to look into allegations of financial irregularities and mismanagement in the affairs of the KZNCU. The commission interviewed major role players in KwaZulu-Natal cricket, including Cassim Docrat, Ravi Govender, Sada Govender, Logan Naidoo and Sathie Govender, and submitted a report which has not yet been made public. However, it was leaked to newspapers during June 2005 and most of its findings were leaked to local newspapers.[19] Among the commission's findings were that (i) members of a restructuring committee had been paid R12 000 each during 2003 without authorisation from MANCO or the executive committee; (ii) the constitution of the KZNCU was 'a mess' and had been changed 'willy nilly' to alter the voting structure to suit incumbents; (iii) while NAMIC had been formed with a 'very clear and constructive intention', its role had changed when 'personal interest became paramount'; and (iv) minutes of meetings were not properly recorded.

The major portion of the commission's report was devoted to alleged financial irregularities surrounding the allegedly improper purchase of a racehorse using cricket union funds, and apparent irregularities in the procurement of computer equipment. We would argue, having seen the entire report, that it is amateurish, incoherent and unhelpful; it neither provided an analysis of the crisis in KwaZulu-Natal cricket, nor did it make recommendations that would have gone some way to addressing the structural, management, financial and governance changes that seem to us to be necessary in the KwaZulu-Natal cricket establishment.

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In October 2004, Docrat announced that he would be 'retiring' at the end of the financial year February 2005. His position was advertised and he was succeeded by Enver Mall. Dr Logan Naidoo was nominated by the DDCU to challenge Sathie Govender for the presidency at the AGM on 24 June 2005. Amidst more allegations of nepotism and misgovernance, Govender announced that he would stand down for the 'good of the game' and that he expected Naidoo to do the same. The situation was so serious that the AGM of the KZNCU was postponed. Dr Logan Naidoo was re-elected president on 22 July 2005. In 2007 he became vice-president of CSA and Cassim Docrat returned as CEO. The position of CEO was re-advertised and, after lengthy interviews, Dr Logan Naidoo emerged as one of the strongest candidates for the position. The appointment committee, however, decided to re-advertise the position.

In August 2009 Jessie Chellan, the nephew of Davidson Chellan, one of the greatest batsmen in the non-racial NCB, was appointed as the new CEO with effect from 1 October 2009. Chellan, of Indian ancestry, matriculated from a private school, Michaelhouse, and has a pharmacy degree from the former University of Durban-Westville. He played representative cricket for both the NCB and the NCU during the 1980s. He is an experienced sports administrator, having been president of Northerns Cricket Union, chairman of Eastern Titans (Pty) Ltd and a director of CSA. He has also occupied management positions at Adcock Ingram, Novartis and Pfizer.[20] Chellan was one of the best young batsmen in the late 1980s, and it was alleged at the time by critics of transformation that he was not given a fair deal during the unity process. The mix seems ideal for the present professionalisation of cricket. It remains to be seen how he will respond to the allegations of ethnic and racial dominance, and to demands for transformation that moves beyond the elite model that presently dominates. After all, while he has lived through the period of racial discrimination and experienced its impact, his world view and post-apartheid experiences have allowed him to progress on a personal level.

Beyond such intrigues, important as they are, this case study of the KwaZulu-Natal cricket world raises a number of crucial issues. The

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first relates to the role of provincial units in this age of commodification. On most days it would be hard to find 'two men and a dog' at provincial matches. Especially at first-class level, there is a complete lack of interest. The Twenty20 tournament remains important because there are huge cash incentives for winners. Given that the international cricket calendar is a year-round event, and the competition for their time and interest from other activities and work, it is understandable that domestic cricket does not attract many spectators. A second problem relates to the outcomes of the millions of rands spent on development. KwaZulu-Natal is a province that, in the past, regularly churned out international cricketers. Names like Barry Richards, Vincent van der Bijl, Jonty Rhodes and Shaun Pollock were known throughout the world. Of the present team, only Hashim Amla is a player that one would pay to watch. And this is reflected in the consistently mediocre performances of the franchise. Over the past five years the team's standing has been abysmal. The administrators need to consider and provide answers to the question of why the province has failed to produce a single African player in over two decades of development, one who holds a regular place in the team. Why have so few players of international ability emerged among those of Indian descent (the jury is still out on Khan and Abdulla), when Indian administrators and former players have consistently argued that this is 'our game'? And where are the white cricketers? Has the focus on quotas driven them to focus on other sports, particularly rugby, where substantially more money can be earned even at provincial level? What message is being sent when 'run of the mill' players continue to receive contracts simply because of their colour? Why is it that a province with such a large cricket-loving population, rich history and so many resources (elite schools, academy, Bakers Mini Cricket), has to consistently import players (of average quality, it should be said) from other provinces? Recent imports have included Quinton Friend, Johann Louw, Pierre de Bruyn, Bradley Barnes, Alfonso Thomas and H.D. Ackerman, with Loots Bosman the latest signing in May 2009. In this professional era, player movement is to be expected. Many of the players recruited are in their twilight years, and part of the

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reason for the exodus of brilliant young players might be precisely these acquisitions.

The salient question that demands investigation is: what has substantial investment in development produced, in local terms?

Boundaries

Stuart Hall, writing about political mobilisations in England in the 1970s, referred to the construction of the 'essential black subject' (Hall 1992). He was reflecting on West Indians of African descent who made common cause with South Asians under the rubric of blackness. By the late 1980s this had given way to the resurgence of more circumscribed ethnic identities. One can sense similar developments in KwaZulu-Natal cricket. 'Blackness' of the anti-apartheid period, heavily influenced by the Black Consciousness Movement, has started to erode. While the demise of apartheid saw the *de jure* ending of racial discrimination and the proclaiming of non-racialism, the unfolding transition has seen the flowering of contestations and setting up of boundaries dressed up in ethnic garb.

What the present case study does show is that the struggle to challenge white dominance has not laid the basis for an abiding non-racialism. Rather, in the case of the KZNCU it has fuelled tensions between Indians and whites, between Indians and Africans, and among Indians of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. This indicates quite starkly the challenges involved in building a common national identity while pursuing redress.

This is sobering in a context where sport is often unproblematically seen as the bridge that crosses language, race and class barriers, and draws both spectators and participants towards a common nationhood. This chapter has shown that sport can divide as much as it can unite, and not only mirrors many of the tensions of the broader society but can also serve to generate its own tensions that feed back into the broader body politic.

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Notes

1 'Black' in this context refers to South Africans classified as 'African', 'coloured' and 'Indian' under apartheid laws.

2 Different versions of this chapter, by the same authors, have been published as 'Managing South African transformation: The story of cricket in KwaZulu-Natal, 1994–2004', *Patterns of Prejudice* 38(3): 253–278 (2004) and 'Beyond apartheid: race, transformation and governance in KwaZulu-Natal cricket', *Transformation* 61: 63–88 (2006).

3 The South African Cricket Board (SACB) represented non-racial cricket during the apartheid era, while the South African Cricket Union (SACU) was associated with apartheid cricket structures.

4 Rose E, Furore over Amla Ad, *news24.com,* 12 August 2006. Accessed 4 June 2009, http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/News/0,,2-7-1442_1981526,00.html

5 Hashim Amla is Rainbow Nation's fearless warrior, *Foxsports*, 19 December 2008. Accessed 15 January 2009, http://www.foxsports.com.au/story/0,8659,24821984-23212,00.html

6 Timol M to KZNCU, 1 April 1995; private correspondence made available to the authors

7 From the Hiraman Collection of personal documents, including minutes and correspondence relating to development during this period

8 Minutes, Hiraman Collection

9 Speech, Kharwa Collection of documentary records

10 As indicated in Chapter 7 of this volume, the UCBSA planned to provide bursaries to train black journalists, in order to create a pool of mainstream journalists who could report on the transformation process with more insight.

11 http://www.cricket.co.za/cId=9460&cl

12 Essa A, The other Imraan Khan, *Mail & Guardian Online*, 20 March 2009. Accessed 2 June 2009, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-03-20-the-other-imraan-khan

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14 Moonda F, Yusuf Abdulla: In the end, the beginning, *Cricinfo,* 30 April 2009. Accessed 20 May 2009, http://content.cricinfo.com/magazine/content/current/story/402121.html

15 Roebuck P, The unbreakable South African, *Cricinfo,* 29 January 2009. Accessed 2 June 2009, http://content-rsa.cricinfo.com/magazine/content/current/story/388134.html

16 http://www.dolphinscricket.co.za/default.asp

17 North Indians were mainly Hindi speakers, while South Indians were Tamil and Telegu speakers. There were feelings during the 1990s that North Indians dominated administrative positions.

18 Report dated 30 November 2002, provided to the authors by Cassim Docrat

19 See for example *Daily News* 22 June 2005, and *Natal Mercury* 26 June 2005.

20 Jessie Chellan appointed CEO, Nashua Dolphins website, 31 August 2009. Accessed 16 September 2009, http://www.dolphinscricket.co.za/content/view/271/179/

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